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Abstract
In this thesis I present an account of the formal semantics of counterfactuals that systematically 
deals with impossible  antecedents.  This, in turn, allows us to gain a richer understanding of what 
makes  certain  thought  experiments  informative  in  spite  of  the  impossibility  of  the  situations  they 
consider. 
In  Chapter  II,  I  argue  that  there  are  major  shortcomings  in  the  leading  theories  of 
counterfactuals.   The  leading  theories  of  counterfactuals  (based  on  classical  two-valued  logic)  are 
unable to account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  In such accounts, everything and 
anything follows from an impossible antecedent.  
In  Chapter  III,  I  examine  some  crucial  notions  such  as  conceivability,  imaginability,  and 
possibility.  Herein I argue that there is a distinction to be made between the notions of conceiving and 
imagining.  Conceivability, it turns out, is a sufficient condition for being a case.  Recent literature on 
the semantics for relevance logic have made some use of the notion of a “state”, which differs from a 
world in that contradictions are true in some states; what is not done in that literature is to clarify how 
the notion of a state differs from an arbitrary collection of claims.   I use the notion of a case as a 
(modal) tool to analyze counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, one for which, unlike the notion of 
states, it is clear why arbitrary collections of claims do not count.
In Chapter IV, I propose a new account of counterfactuals.  This involves modifying existing 
possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals by replacing possible worlds by the “cases” identified in 
Chapter III.  This theory discerns counterfactuals such as: “If Dave squared the circle, he would be 
more famous than Gödel” which seems true, from others like:  “If Dave squared the circle, the sun 
would explode”, which seems false.  
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In Chapter V I discuss one of the main pay offs of having an account of counterfactuals that 
deals systematically with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  To apply the new account of 
counterfactual to thought experiments, first we have to transform  the thought experiment in question 
into a series of counterfactuals.  I show how this is to be done, in Chapter V.  There are two advantages 
of  such an account  when we apply it  to  thought  experiments:  First,  for  thought  experiments  with 
impossible  scenarios,  our  new  account  can  explain  how  such  thought  experiments  can  still  be 
informative.  Secondly, for thought experiments like the Chinese Room, where it is not clear whether 
there is a subtle impossibility in the scenario or not,  this new account with its continuous treatment of 
possible and impossible cases makes clear why the debate about such thought experiments looks the 
way it does.  The crucial question is not whether there is such an impossibility, but what is the "nearest" 
situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it is impossible or not) and what we would say 
there (about the intentionality of the room).  On traditional accounts, it becomes paramount to deal with 
the possibility question, because if it is an impossible scenario the lessons we learn are very different 
from the ones we learn if it is possible.  There are no available theories of thought experiments that 
account  for  thought  experiments  with  impossible/incomplete  scenarios.   With  the  new account  of 
counterfactual and by applying it to thought experiments we over come this difficulty.
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Chapter I: Thought Experiments and Counterfactuals: Undiscovered Links
Counterfactual reasoning is important in many areas of philosophy, science and everyday life, and such 
reasoning  often  deals  with  impossibilities  of  various  kinds.  However,  existing  theories  of 
counterfactuals do not offer a satisfactory account of why some of these counterfactuals are true and 
others  false.   In  this  thesis  I  develop  a  theory  of  counterfactuals  that  systematically  handles 
counterfactuals  with impossible antecedents.  Such an account is important in various ways. In the 
thesis I pay attention to one example of the new theory's philosophical pay offs: having a semantics that 
allows us to understand how counterfactuals with impossible antecedents work allows us to understand 
how thought experiments work.  
It is common to reason about what would be the case assuming certain impossibilities, e.g., if 
there were only finitely many primes, Gödel's theorem would not apply to most formal languages.  So 
such  counterfactuals  are  crucial  to  reasoning.   Having  an  account  that  explains  how  these 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents work helps us understand why is it useful to reason with 
such impossibilities in the first place.
There is a large and interesting literature on thought experiments, but as I show in Chapter V, 
the current book length treatments do not give us a grasp on how thought experiments with impossible 
scenarios can be useful or informative.  Since, (as I show, and as is probably unsurprising when you 
think about it) thought experiments and counterfactuals are closely related, the theory of counterfactuals 
with impossible antecedents offers the promise of a better understanding of thought experiments with 
impossible scenarios.
Thought experiments and counterfactuals are two tools widely used in Philosophy.  Both these 
devices invite the audience to construct a contrary-to-fact scenario, and in so doing, adduce acceptance 
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or rejection of claims about the real world.  Thought experiments and counterfactuals are well known 
for the philosophical analyses they demand.  The many analyses of thought experiments and those of 
counterfactuals have yielded enormous bodies of literature.  While Philosophers are known to analyze 
the tools they use, the fact that sorting out a crucial class of counterfactuals that have implications for 
the thought experiments has gone unnoticed.  
I take this as an opportunity to develop an account of counterfactuals that will also shed new 
light on thought experiments.  The leading theories of counterfactuals (based on classical two-valued 
logic)  are  unable  to  account  for  counterfactuals  with  impossible  antecedents.   In  such  accounts, 
everything  and  anything  follows  from  an  impossible  antecedent.   Hence  such  counterfactuals  are 
brushed aside.  In Relevance Logic, in contrast, there are some important semantic tools that one can 
use  to  analyze  impossibilities  and  inconsistencies,  in  a  more  fine-grained  and  less  arbitrary way. 
Relevance Logics are non-classical logics that require, for the conditional P à Q to be true, that there 
be some kind of a content-related “connection between P and Q”.  In other words, for P à Q to be true, 
P must be relevant to Q in some sort of way.  
What we have from classical accounts is a method of determining when a conditional is true 
based on classical implication.  One way or another, the traditional accounts wind up saying that P ⃞ 
àQ (we shall use this symbolization throughout the thesis to stand for the claim “If P were true, Q 
would be true”) is true when P U S entails Q, where S is some suitably chosen set of statements.  (The 
accounts differ in what they include in S—all the statements true in a possible world that is  nearly 
actual in some sense, or a set of background presuppositions or whatever.  For further details on this 
see Chapter II.)  But if P is incoherent, then, classically, P  ⃞ à Q is true for any Q. Consider the 
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following two examples: “If Dave were to square the circle, he would be more famous than Gödel”, and 
“If Dave were to square the circle, horses would fly”.  Prima facie, the former seems plausibly true, but 
the latter seems false.  Under standard accounts of counterfactuals that depend on a classical notion of 
logical consequence, both of these counterfactuals come out true.  But intuitively only the former seems 
true.  So how do we make sense of counterfactuals of this kind?  This is the main question that drives 
this thesis, for reasons that will presently become clear.  
Clearly, to make progress we need to allow that it is possible for P to be incoherent and yet P ⃞ 
àQ not come out true for some Q.  The recent semantics using “states” in Relevance Logic allows for 
this.  The crucial thing about “states” is that they allow for A & ¬A to hold in a state, without forcing 
every other statement to follow.  I will use this feature of “states” and develop a new semantic tool 
called  “cases” to  fill  the  gaps  in  classical  accounts  of  counterfactuals.   This  more  comprehensive 
account of counterfactuals—one that can handle counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—is the 
core of my project.  Apart from its inherent interest as a semantics, though, we can also use it to show 
that  thought experiments with impossible/unimaginable conditions are not useless, and  to sketch an 
explanation for why this is so.   
This chapter is divided into 6 sections.  In section 1, I put in place some basic characterization 
of counterfactuals.  Section 2, is a brief discussion of the basic characterization of thought experiments. 
In section 3, I provide a list of thought experiments discussed and referred to in this thesis.  In sections 
4 and 5, I address the questions of why counterfactuals and thought experiments (respectively) are of 
interest to philosophers in particular.  In section 6, I discuss the previously identified links between 
counterfactuals  and  thought  experiments.   In  this  section  I  also  discuss  the  various  philosophical 
payoffs that should arise from an improved account of counterfactuals. 
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Section 1. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals have been investigated by many thinkers, yielding various accounts.  What 
constitutes  a  counterfactual  is  much  debated.   I  will  use for  the  remainder  of  the  thesis  the  term 
“counterfactual” as a shorthand for “counterfactual conditional”.  Consider the statement “Poonam is 
seven feet  tall”.   This is obviously a  counterfactual statement.   However this  is  different from the 
counterfactual conditional “If Poonam had been seven feet tall, she would have been the tallest in her 
family”.  As a first approximation we can take counterfactuals to be subjunctive conditionals with false 
antecedents.
Of course, not all  conditionals  are subjunctive.   Besides subjunctive conditionals  there are 
those that are known as indicative conditionals.  In the current literature, there is a debate as to whether 
these two types of conditionals are fundamentally distinct or whether subjunctive conditional is just a 
past tense form of the indicative.  As their names suggest, there is, at least prima facie, a distinction to 
be made between subjunctive and indicative conditionals.  Consider the following pair of conditionals 
due to Ernest Adams (1970): 
(a) "If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else did" and 
(b) "If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, someone else would have": 
The former is in indicative and the latter is in subjunctive mood.  One can easily accept (a) 
while rejecting (b): we all know that somebody killed Kennedy, so we know that if it was not Oswald it 
was someone else.  But there are many people who think that (b) is false, because they think that 
Oswald acted alone in Kennedy’s assassination.  
The literature is replete with examples of such pairs.  Consider another such pair:
“If Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, then some aristocrat did”
“If Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, then some aristocrat would have”.
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Jonathan Bennett points out that although in examples like the above typically the indicative 
conditional is shown as the acceptable one while the subjunctive is not, this does not always have to be 
the  case.   One  can  also  come  up  with  examples  in  which  the  subjunctive  is  acceptable  and  the 
indicative  unacceptable.  Consider Bennett’s own example: “The Department wants the eulogy for our 
honorary graduand to be written by either Alston or Bennett, and we two decide that he will do it. 
Asked later who wrote the eulogy, I reply that I think Alston did, adding ‘If not, I don’t know who 
wrote it.’ I would reject ‘If he didn’t, I did’ because I know that I didn’t; but I may well accept ‘If he 
hadn’t, I would have’” (Bennett, 2003, p. 8).
The point is that, on the face of it, these two kinds of conditionals seem to say different things. 
Of course, what accounts for these differences, and the degree of the relationship between the two sorts 
of  conditionals,  is  itself  a  subject  of  philosophical  dispute.   Below  I  will  briefly  sketch  Robert 
Stalnaker's and David Lewis’s respective views on this.   In this context I will also sketch a recent 
debate on the subject between Bennett and Dorothy Edgington.
3Stalnaker offers a view in which the two kinds of conditionals are more or less similar.  In his 
account  indicative and subjunctive conditionals  receive  structurally similar  semantic  interpretation. 
According  to  Stalnaker,  in  each  kind  of  conditional  (where  A  is  the  antecedent  and  C  is  the 
consequent), the speaker says that C is true at an A-world picked out by a certain ‘selection function’. 
Exactly what the selection function is will vary according to the context, though it will always involve 
some sort of ‘most similar’ notion.  He introduces a ‘context set’ of worlds, from which the selection 
function should find its value, if possible.  As Bennett explains, “ ‘the context set’ is Stalnaker’s name 
for the set of worlds at each of which all those taken-for-granted propositions are true” (Bennett, 2003, 
p. 358).  The difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, then, is that with subjunctive 
conditionals the selection function may need to go outside the context set to pick its value.  So, “[I]f 
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there  are no signals  to  the contrary,  we take it  that  someone who asserts  a conditional  is  using a 
selection function that picks an A-world belonging to the context set, that is, a world that is not agreed 
on all  hands to be out of the running as a candidate  for actuality.   When a speaker uses ‘would’, 
however, he thereby signals that he regards himself as free to reach outside the context set, selecting a 
world that nobody in his vicinity thinks might be actual” (Bennett, 2003, p. 358).  Thus in case of a 
subjunctive conditional the speaker “signals to the contrary” that the selection function is to pick a 
world outside the context set.
Lewis on the contrary offers a view according to which there are some important structural 
differences between the two kinds of conditionals.  In his book  Counterfactuals, Lewis provides the 
following argument for distinguishing between indicative and subjunctive conditionals (what he calls 
counterfactuals):
As Ernest Adams has observed, the first conditional below is probably true, but the second 
may very well be false…
if Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did
if Oswald had not killed Kennedy, the someone else would have
Therefore, there really are two different sorts of conditional; not a single conditional that 
can appear as indicative or as counterfactual depending on speaker’s opinion about the 
truth of the antecedent (Lewis, 1973, p. 3)
Lewis’s argument is directed against the view (which he alludes to in the above quotation) that 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals do not really differ in their structure, but only with regard to the 
truth-value of the antecedent.  On this view indicative conditionals do not express any commitment 
concerning the value of the antecedent, whereas subjunctive conditionals express a commitment to the 
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falsehood of the antecedent.  However, according to Lewis, since there are examples of conditionals 
(like the ones above) which are the same, save that one is indicative and one is subjunctive, for which 
the truth conditions are clearly different, there must be more to the difference between the two kinds of 
conditionals than their view of the truth value of the antecedent.1
Bennett  also  draws  a  sharp  distinction  between  indicative  conditionals  and  subjunctive 
conditionals.  This has not always been Bennett’s view, as he himself admits in A Philosophical Guide 
to Conditionals  (Bennett, 2003, p. 13).  He had held what is known as the relocation thesis, according 
to which, e.g., the conditional If you go swimming today, your cold will get worse (indicative), uttered 
now,  is  acceptable  to  us  now if,  and  only if,  the  conditional  uttered  tomorrow,  If  you  had  gone 
swimming yesterday, your cold would have gotten worse (subjunctive), is acceptable to us tomorrow 
(Bennett, 1988).
Edgington holds a thesis similar to the relocation thesis that Bennett calls the correspondence 
thesis (CT), which is the following2:
(CT) For any A and B, if A ⃞ à B is the right thing to think at a certain time, then at 
some earlier time A à B was the right thing to think.  (Bennett, 2003, p. 366)
According to  Edgington the two sorts  of conditionals,  i.e.,  indicative  and subjunctive,  are 
actually  fundamentally  the  same,  with  counterfactuals  merely  being  the  past-tense  version  of 
indicatives.  One consequence of this is that she rejects both the idea that indicatives have anything to 
do with the material conditionals and that they are truth functional, as do many other authors working 
on conditionals these days.  In her words:
That there is not a huge difference between them is shown by examples like the following: 
"Don't go in there", I say, "If you go in you will get hurt".   You look sceptical but stay 
1 I have relied on the following source for this discussion: Fogelin, R. J: 1998, pp.286-289.
2Bennett uses '>' for the subjunctive conditional symbol '⃞ à'.
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outside, when there is large crash as the roof collapses.  "You see", I say, "if you had gone 
in you would have got hurt.  I told you so" (Edgington, 2006).
Let’s consider the following two familiar conditionals:
DD: If (it is the case that) Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, (it is the case that) no one else did.
HW: If it had been the case that Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, it would have been the case that no one 
else did.
Edgington in “On Conditionals”, in a section ‘One theory or two?’ [on the matter of two sorts 
of conditionals] discloses that her answer is “one”, because the two types of conditionals differ only in 
tense.   If  Edgington's  thesis  about  tense  is  right,  it  defeats  the  argument  that  there  must  be  two 
conditional connectives. The argument that there must be two conditional connectives is the following: 
the same two propositions,  N [No one else killed Kennedy] and O [Oswald did not kill  Kennedy] 
conditionally connected, express HW and DD.  We accept HW and reject DD.  So the conditional 
connective in HW does not mean the same as that in DD. 
On the above [tense] analysis, we do have the same two propositions, conditionally connected 
in the same way, but connecting different times.  Accepting something as probable now, and accepting 
the same thing as having been probable then, are mutually independent judgments.  Thus, for example, 
the truth of HW comes from the acceptability at an earlier time, for any well-informed person, of ‘If 
Oswald doesn’t kill Kennedy, no one else will’; this is indicative, and obviously differs only in tense 
from DD.
As Bennett makes clear in his book, he is no longer persuaded by such considerations.  To 
understand his reasons, it is useful to begin by noting that he suggests that the correspondence thesis 
(CT) is no more plausible than the suppositional account of conditionals, because that account is the 
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only one that would warrant accepting CT. 
The  suppositional  account  of  indicatives  holds  that  a  “conditional  judgement  involves  two 
propositions, which play different roles.  One is the content of a supposition.  The other is the content 
of a judgement made under that supposition.  They do not combine to yield a single proposition which 
is judged to be likely to be true just when the second is judged likely to be true on the supposition of the 
first” (Edgington,  2006).   Thus,  Phillips  explains,  a conditional  like,  ‘If today is  Wednesday, then 
tomorrow is Thursday,’ is a conditional assertion of the consequent.  If, in fact, it is Wednesday, then 
this  remark  is  equivalent  in  force  to  an  assertion  of,  ‘Tomorrow  is  Thursday.’  If  today  is  not 
Wednesday, no proposition is asserted.  According to the suppositional view, conditionals are not true 
or false.  They are evaluated in terms of their conditional probabilities. Notice that conditional assertion 
and assertion of a conditional probability are two separate things3.
The extension of the suppositional view to subjunctives relies on the correspondence thesis 
(CT):
(CT) For any A and B, if A ⃞ à B is the right thing to think at a certain time, then at some earlier time 
A à B was the right thing to think.  (Bennett, 2003, p. 366) 
Note  the  lingering  ambiguity  in  what  is  meant  by “right”  here.   It  could  either  mean  “true”  or 
“warranted”.
Consider the following two examples:
(1) Tweedledee and Tweedledum toss a coin and, whilst it is in mid-air, Tweedledee calls heads.  The 
coin lands tails, and Tweedledee loses. It seems that he is right in saying: ‘If I had bet tails, I would 
have won’. 
(2) You cancel your booking for a flight which subsequently crashes due to unexpected circumstances. 
3 Also see Ian Phillips’s paper “Morgenbesser Cases (MC) and Closet Determinism” for a superb summary of the debate 
between Bennett and Edgington.
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Your relief seems well expressed by the conditional: ‘If I had caught that plane, I would probably be 
dead’ (Edgington, 2003) 4.
The above examples point out that while some counterfactuals seem intuitively true, their truth 
can only be established on the basis of hindsight.  As Ian Phillips points out, this feature has significant 
implications when it comes to theorizing about counterfactuals.  For example, for Bennett, (2) poses a 
problem for extending a suppositional account of the indicative conditional to the subjunctive (Bennett, 
2003, pp. 366-369).  
Bennett rejects (CT).  The reason is that cases like (2) show the existence of counterfactuals 
that we intuitively regard as correct but for which there seems to be no previously right indicative: 
‘would haves’ without any previously acceptable ‘will’.  For whilst the coin is in mid-air or the plane 
on the ground it would be unacceptable to say, ‘If I bet tails, I will win,’ let alone, ‘If I catch the plane, I 
will die.’ 
According to Edgington, however, there is (in fact) a previously correct indicative even though 
it would then have been irrational to endorse it.   She thinks that with ‘the benefit of hindsight’ we 
would judge even a fortune-teller right if they had said: ‘If Poonam boards the plane, she will not live’. 
After all, on hearing about the plane crash Poonam might exclaim: ‘My God, the fortune-teller was 
right!’ (Edgington, 2003, p. 22)  
Bennett questions Edgington’s ability to make this move.  Notice that Edgington says that the 
fortune-teller  ‘was  right’  or  ‘vindicated’  rather  than  that  they  spoke  the  truth.   This  is  because 
conditionals do not have any truth value on her account.  Indicative conditionals instead have objective 
conditional probabilities.  Given this, can we say that the fortune-teller was right insofar as Poonam’s 
death did (in fact) have an objectively high probability conditional on Poonam catching the plane?  It 
4 Sydney Morgenbesser cites a similar case in Slote (1978), p. 27. See bibliography for reference.
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seems we cannot, for even in hindsight the plane crash was then objectively extremely unlikely.  Hence, 
Bennett complains: 
It is not clear to me what the probabilities are in the light of which the indicatives are 
judged  to  be  ‘right’  in  hindsight.   …  [F]or  the  fortune-teller’s  conditional  to  be 
‘vindicated’, room must… be found in the story for a nearly 100 per cent probability of 
the plane’s crashing given that ...[Poonam] was on it.  I cannot find… anything allowing 
us to say that the predicter’s conditional probability for the plane’s crashing given my 
being on it  was,  though not  ‘justified  at  the time’,  correct,  right,  vindicated  (Bennett, 
2003, p. 367). 
Responding to this Edgington says: 
Lucky  guesses  are  sometimes  right…  The  value  to  be  assigned  to  the  hindsightful 
counterfactual  trumps  the  most  rational  value  to  be  assigned  to  the  forward-looking 
indicative.  The chance that C given A, beforehand provides the best available opinion on 
whether C if A, but it can be overturned by subsequent events, not predictable in advance 
(Edgington, 2003, p 23). 
As Bennett points out, this is not merely hind-sight but hind-rightness-making.  In cases like this, the 
idea of the forward indicative’s being ‘right’ depends on the idea of subjunctive’s being right—the 
explanatory direction runs from subjunctive to indicative, not the other way.  The suppositional theory 
hoped to explain counterfactuals in terms of indicatives.  But the above explanation has reversed the 
order of priorities.  It is our independent grasp on subjunctives that seems to determine the rightness or 
wrongness of the indicatives.   Thus, whether or not we hold on to (CT), we remain in need of an 
independent theory of subjunctives (Bennett, 2003, p. 368).
So much for the views on whether the two kinds of conditionals should be treated as the same 
or distinct.  Without pretending that I have solved the issue, for the purpose of this thesis I side with 
Bennett's current view.  There is something to be said about the distinction between indicative and 
subjunctive conditionals.  I will treat them as distinct and deal with subjunctive conditionals only.  As I 
mentioned earlier I will take counterfactuals as subjunctive conditionals with false antecedents.  For the 
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purpose of this thesis, treating subjunctive and indicative conditionals as separate provides for some 
much needed simplicity.  As I have mentioned before, the main focus of this thesis is counterfactuals 
with impossible antecedents.  In order to deal with conditionals like “If Dave were to square the circle, 
then the sun would explode”, it is hard to see why we would need to have determined whether it is 
reasonable to accept CT or a similar thesis.
Section 2. Thought Experiments
Thought experiments have held a central role in philosophical inquiry since at least Descartes. 
They have been investigated extensively by various philosophers yielding numerous accounts.  While 
most philosophers probably think they have at least a reasonable idea of what a thought experiment is, 
an exact, satisfactory, characterization of the notion is not so easy.  In a recent book devoted to thought 
experiments and their analyses,  Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases, 
Tamar Gendler provides the following characterization of thought experiments which is quite robust 
(Gendler, 2000, p. 21):
(1) An imaginary scenario is described. 
(2) An argument is offered that attempts to establish the correct evaluation of the scenario.
(3) This evaluation of the imagined scenario is then taken to reveal something about cases beyond the 
scenario.
For now, suffice it to say that Gendler’s characterization does a good job of describing roughly 
what a thought experiment is.  For some classic examples of thought experiments see section 2  of this 
chapter. 
In  surveying  the  literature  on  thought  experiments,  I  found  that  one  could  divide  the 
philosophers with regard to their position on thought experiments, roughly into three broad categories. 
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First  there  are  those  who  see  thought  experiments  as  being  no  more,  and  no  more  useful,  than 
arguments.   Philosophers  in  this  category such  as  John  Norton,  maintain  that  any good scientific 
thought experiment can be transformed into a non-thought-experimental argument without loss of any 
demonstrative force.  Enthusiasts (like James Brown) of thought experiments, on the other hand, stretch 
the  use  of  thought  experiments  much  further;  he  seems  to  think  that  a  certain  class  of  thought 
experiments (viz., what he calls platonic thought experiments) have an ability to reveal platonic reality. 
What  makes  him an  enthusiast  is  that  in  his  view some  thought  experiments  reveal  things  about 
platonic facts that are inaccessible by any other means.  The third category of philosophers are the 
moderates.  While they believe that thought experiments are a distinct category (and not arguments in 
disguise, for example) and are useful, they do not make any claims about thought experiments revealing 
knowledge about platonic or any other realm that is otherwise inaccessible.  Both the enthusiasts and 
the moderates maintain that this tool, when employed, asks the audience to imagine and work through 
some relevant  implications  of the hypothetical  world.   In so doing it  can highlight major flaws or 
contradictions in one’s own and others’ theories or beliefs.  Thought experiments have a surprising 
ability  to  reveal  previously  unknown  tensions  between  explicit,  conscious  beliefs  and  implicit, 
unconscious ones.  In many cases it seems that it is in this surprising ability that their persuasive force 
lies.  
Before  going on  to  discuss  counterfactuals,  it  will  be  useful  to  gather  in  one  place  brief 
descriptions of several of the thought experiments that I refer to frequently in the remainder of the 
thesis.
Section 3. Some Paradigmatic Thought Experiments
In  this  section  I  will  outline  five  thought  experiments  that  I  will  consider  and  refer  to 
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throughout the thesis.  I will devote a little more time and space to Derek Parfit's fission and P. F. 
Strawson’s auditory world since they prove to be crucial to my thesis.  Strawson's auditory world is 
non-standard in its formulation and thus, unlike the rest it has proven challenging to provide a succinct 
version of this thought experiment.
Galileo’s Falling Body
Imagine that a heavy and a light body are strapped together and dropped from a significant 
height.  What would the Aristotelian expect to be the natural speed of their combination, given that the 
Aristotelian thinks that heavier bodies fall at a faster rate than lighter bodies?  On the one hand, the 
lighter body should slow down the heavier one while the heavier body speeds up the lighter one, so 
their combination should fall with a speed that lies between the natural speeds of its components.  (That 
is, if the heavy body falls at a rate of 8, and the light body at a rate of 4, then their combination should 
fall at a rate between 4 and 8 (cf. Galileo 1638/1989, p. 107).)  On the other hand, since the weight of 
the two bodies combined is greater than the weight of the heavy body alone, their combination should 
fall with a natural speed greater than that of the heavy body.  (That is, if the heavy body falls at a rate of 
8 and the light body with a rate of 4, their combination should fall at a rate greater than 8.)  But then the 
combined body is predicted to fall both more quickly and more slowly than the heavy body alone (cf. 
Galileo 1638/1989, pp. 107-108).  The way out of this paradox is to assume that the natural speed with 
which a body falls is independent of its weight (Gendler, 2000, pp. 40-41).
Newton’s Bucket
Newton proposes this thought experiment for his postulation of absolute space.  We are to 
imagine away all the rest of the material universe, except a bucket of water suspended by a twisted 
rope.  The bucket goes through three distinct successive states:
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State 1: at the instant the bucket is released, there is no relative motion between the water and the 
bucket.  And the surface of water is level,
State 2: shortly after that bucket is released the water and the bucket are in relative motion, i.e., motion 
with respect to one another.  The water is still flat in state 2.
State 3: we reach this state after some time has passed.  The water and the bucket are at relative rest, 
i.e., at rest with respect to one another.  But the water is not level; its surface is concave at this stage.
Now, how do we account for the difference between state 1 and state 3?  We cannot explain it by 
appealing to relative motion since there is no relative motion at either state.  Newton’s answer is the 
following: in state 1 water and bucket are at absolute rest i.e., at rest with respect to absolute space. 
And in state 3 the water and the bucket are in absolute motion, i.e., in motion with respect to absolute 
space.  The difference in absolute motion explains the observed difference in water level.  We should 
therefore, accept absolute space (Brown, 1991, pp. 9-10).
Ship of Theseus
I have borrowed this version from Gendler (Gendler, 2000, p. 68).  There was once a thirty-
oared ship that belonged to Theseus, which, during the years, went through gradual repair.  In the years, 
one by one, each of its original planks was replaced with a new plank of the same size, shape, and 
material,  and the old planks were gathered in a barn on the shore.  Eventually none of the original 
planks remained a piece of the original vessel.  However, its appearance remained unchanged.  One fine 
afternoon, Theseus collected the planks from the barn, and nailed them together in a form identical to 
that  of  the  original  ship.   Suddenly Theseus  was  presented  with  both  practical  and  metaphysical 
difficulties: there were two ships before him.  Did one or both require re-christening?  Which one was 




John Searle asks his reader imagine that someone who knows only English is put in a room. 
She receives sheets of papers with shapes on them through a slot.  The person consults a huge rule book 
linking shapes to other shapes.  Symbols come in through the slot and after consulting the rule book the 
person inside the room puts out symbols linked to the symbol coming in and puts it out through another 
slot.  Unbeknownst to  the person inside the room the symbols  coming in  are encoded questions  in 
Chinese and the symbols going out are answers to these questions.  The thought experiment is intended 
to  show  that  computers  merely  use  syntactic  rules  to  manipulate  symbol  strings,  but  have  no 
understanding of meaning or semantics. 
Fission
Fission can be reconstructed in the following way: Imagine triplet brothers who were in an 
accident.  In this accident the body of one (call him Brainy) is fatally injured, while the brains of the 
other two brothers are totally destroyed.  Brainy’s brain is intact while the other two brothers bodies are 
in  relatively  good  shape.   Brainy  is  so  constituted  that  the  physical  bases  for  his  psychological 
characteristics happen to be realized in duplicate, one complete set in each lobe.  Doctors operating on 
him after the accident divide his brain in half and transplant the two hemispheres into the bodies of the 
two brothers.  There are two scenarios to be considered:
(1) Single-transfer case: only the left transplant is successful, and the right transplant is destroyed.  The 
resulting individual (call him Lefty) has all of Brainy’s memories and psychological states and a body 
almost indistinguishable from that of Brainy’s before the accident.  From this Parfit concludes: In the 
single transfer case, Lefty is Brainy.
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(2) Double-transfer  case:  in  this  scenario  both  transplants  are  successful.   Each  of  the  resulting 
individuals (call them Lefty and Righty) has all of Brainy’s memories and psychological states and a 
body almost indistinguishable from that of Brainy’s before the accident.  
Now, according to Parfit, Lefty and Righty are not the same person (since they occupy distinct 
spatial locations, undergo different experiences and so on).  If Lefty and Righty are different people, 
and Brainy is a single person, then Lefty and  Righty cannot both be identical to Brainy.  So in the 
double transfer case Lefty is not Brainy.  
The problem that fission presents is the following: we have a process which, if it happens a 
certain way (in the single-transfer-case), would result  in continued existence of an entity over time 
(where Lefty is Brainy).  If the same process happened in another way (in the double-transfer-case) it 
would  result  in  the  creation  of  two  new entities  (where  Lefty is  not  Brainy)  (Gendler,  2000,  pp. 
120-125).  As Parfit puts it, “How could a double success be a failure?”
Now, to the extent  that  the process is intrinsically the same in both cases, how could the 
rationality of one’s attitude towards one’s continuer depend on whether the process ends up being 
entity creating or entity preserving? Parfit  concludes that what makes one’s prudential  concern for 
oneself tomorrow rational is not the fact that oneself-tomorrow will be the identical to oneself-today, 
but  only that  they will  be connected by the right  sort  of  relation  of  psychological  continuity and 
connectedness.  So strict numerical identity is not what matters (Gendler, 2000, pp.  146-147). 
I should also mention that there is another version of the “fission” thought experiment that is 
sometimes  discussed,  and  that  I will  occasionally mention.   If  we are  to  imagine  Brainy  literally 
undergoing fission, dividing, amoeba-like, into two identical Brainy-successors before our very eyes.
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Auditory World
Strawson, in  Individuals, introduces this  thought  experiment  in  an attempt to  examine  the 
thesis that space is a prerequisite for objectivity.  He invites the reader to imagine a being (called Hero, 
following Gareth Evans) who resides in a world that is completely auditory.  Is it conceivable that such 
a subject be able to grasp the concept of objective particulars?  Thus he asks: ‘‘Could a being whose 
experience was purely auditory have a conceptual scheme which provided for objective particulars?’’ 
(Strawson,  1959,  p.  66).   According  to  Strawson,  auditory perception  is  what  is  needed  for  the 
identification of a sound particular, and the auditory experience of continuity and discontinuity is what 
is needed for distinguishing sound particulars.  But for the re-identification of sound particulars spatial 
criteria  are  needed.   For  re-identifiability,  in  the  auditory world,  we  need  an  analogue  to  spatial 
dimensions in our conceptual scheme.  For an analogue of space in the auditory universe, Strawson 
introduces the universal master sound (M-sound).  Hero distinguishes between different “locations” of 
a particular sound or sound sequence against the background of the pitch M-sound.  Thus the sound 
world is conceived of as containing many particulars, unheard at any moment, but perhaps audible at 
other positions than the one occupied at the moment that it is not being heard.  This provides for re-
identifiability of sound particulars.  
According to Strawson, the re-identifiability of particulars in the auditory world is at least a 
necessary condition for non-solipsistic consciousness.  Is it also a sufficient condition?  According to 
Strawson it is, for the concept of a re-identifiable particular entails the concept of a particular's existing 
while unobserved, and thus the distinction between being observed and being unobserved.  But this 
distinction  is  based on the idea of an  observer.   In the auditory world,  Hero could not  make this 
distinction without having the idea of himself as an observer.  In order for Hero to be able to make the 
distinction between observed and unobserved entities, this distinction should be based on something 
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purely auditory.  He cannot make the distinction based on the idea of an observer, since the idea of an 
observer is not purely auditory.  Being a member of the auditory world, he is just a sound.  What we 
need to figure out is what conditions need to be satisfied in order for Hero to be more—to be a subject 
of  his  experience.   Thus,  the  question  is:  what  are  the conditions  requiring fulfillment  for  a  non-
solipsistic consciousness.  Or how are the conditions of subjective/objective experience fulfilled?  From 
this question we can ask the more general question: where do I get the idea of myself as a subject that 
has experiences of things that are other than myself?  Strawson runs another experiment to retain the 
distinction between observed and unobserved entities in the auditory world and goes on a bit further 
with the thought experiment. 
Eventually trying to reproduce the general features of the ordinary world in the auditory world, 
he concludes that  the fantasy of producing as  close an analogy " besides  being tedious,  would be 
difficult, to elaborate.  For it is too little clear exactly what general features to reproduce, and why.  It 
might be better, at this point to abandon the auditory world…" (Strawson, 1959, p. 85).  
Section 4. Why Counterfactuals Are of Interest to Philosophers
Counterfactuals  are  interesting  for  various  reasons.   Ordinarily,  counterfactuals  are  an 
undeniable part of the process of our knowledge acquisition.  People often contemplate hypothetically 
considering “what if” situations, and in so doing, extrapolate information about themselves or their 
states.  One considers the following kinds of situations, e.g., “What if I had not applied to Canadian 
graduate schools”, “What if I had been a millionaire…”.   The list can go on.  One can see that the step 
from the “what if” form to the subjunctive counterfactual form is small.  One can just as easily say 
“Had I been a millionaire…” or “Had I not applied to a Canadian Graduate school…”.  In theorizing in 
science,  political  analysis,  economic  analysis  and our  day-to-day lives,  we constantly make use of 
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counterfactuals.  
Philosophically,  counterfactuals  are  interesting  from  an  epistemological  and  semantic 
standpoint, inter alia.  There are two important questions about counterfactuals that I will ask.  The first 
is the epistemological question, “How could I know whether a counterfactual is true?” and the second 
is the semantic question “What are the truth conditions for a counterfactual conditional?”.  
First let us consider the epistemological question: How can we know when counterfactuals are 
true, if any of them are true?  For some counterfactuals, at least, if they are true, they are contingently 
so.  It seems that the only way to discover contingencies is by looking at the world around us.  But how 
are we to tell what would have happened, if something had been the case (that in fact was not the case)? 
Observations, after all, seem at best a tool for finding out what is the case.  The fact that counterfactuals 
do not seem to be about the actual—rather that they seem to be about possible states of affairs other 
than the actual  ones (setting aside the ones with impossible  antecedents for now),  yet  they tell  us 
something  about  the  real  world  (at  least  the  interesting  or  useful  ones  do)—makes  them 
epistemologically rather mysterious.  It is this epistemological mystique that draws philosophers' initial 
attention to them. 
Another important question for philosophers is how are we to distinguish counterfactuals that 
are true from the ones that are false?  In other words, what are the truth conditions for a counterfactual 
conditional?  Consider the following counterfactual: “Had Bush not been the president of the U.S., the 
Iraq war would not have taken place”.  While Bush was the president, the above sentence seems true or 
in any case likely, and, if it is, it tells us something about the real world.  Of course, this sentence 
comes out true if counterfactuals are understood simply as the familiar material conditionals of classical 
logic, but so do sentences like "Had Bush not been the president, Iraq would have been invaded," which 
seems false if the first is really true.  It is an interesting fact about counterfactuals that they are non-
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truth functional.  That is to say that the truth value of a counterfactual does not depend merely on the 
truth value of its components.  So, a truth functional analysis of counterfactuals proves unsatisfactory.  
How are we to distinguish true counterfactuals from false ones?  In order to distinguish true 
counterfactuals  from false  counterfactuals  we have  to  analyze  them a  certain  way.   Much  of  the 
philosophical work involved in the investigation of counterfactuals comes down to sorting out suitable 
truth conditions  for them so the different truth conditions  of counterfactuals  like the above can be 
explained.   We find numerous  accounts by various philosophers that  try to  do just  that.   We will 
consider various analyses proposed by philosophers such as Goodman, Chisholm, Stalnaker, and Lewis, 
in Chapter II.
Section 5. Why Thought Experiments Are of Interest to Philosophers
What about thought experiments?  As a philosopher it is hard not be irked when a first year 
student’s reaction to, say, John Locke’s discussion of the consciousness of a prince waking up to in the 
body of a pauper is something like: “Thought experiments?  Why waste your time talking about things 
that never happen?”  In response I like to point them to the following passage from Roy Sorensen:
At this point [after having warped their minds with brain-in-a-vat scenario] many students 
feel  they  got  their  money’s  worth.   They  leave  class  like  they  leave  an  absorbing 
matinée---a little disoriented, a little preoccupied, depressurizing to everyday reality.  But 
there is the occasional objection, “So what?  What do those brains [in-a-vat] have to do 
with anything?  They are just  hypothetical.”  One could respond with correct but arcane 
allusions to counterfactuals and the general relevance of possible worlds.  Tu quoque is 
also tempting.  Doesn’t any sensible student heed  possibilia when crossing the street or 
practicing birth  control?   But  the best  response is  to find partners in crime:  scientists 
conduct thought experiments, so why pick on the philosophers? (Sorensen, 1992, p. 8)
At this  point  the first  year student can still  come back and say: “So what?   The fact  that 
scientists  use thought experiment  is  hardly a reason why they are of any interest  to philosophers”. 
Gendler’s words point us towards answering this question: 
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Thinking about  imaginary cases  can help  us  learn new things  about  the world.   This 
simple  fact  is  both a commonplace  and a puzzle.   It  is  a commonplace  because it  is 
undeniable that imaginary cases play a central role in our investigation of the world—in 
legal reasoning, in linguistic theorizing, in philosophical inquiry, in scientific exploration, 
and in ordinary conversation.  And it is a puzzle because it is prima facie surprising that 
thinking about what there isn’t and how things aren’t should help us to learn about what 
there is and how things are (Gendler, 2000, p. 1).
An important philosophical issue that arises when considering Gender’s point is:  How could 
thought experiments work?  In trying to answer this question philosophers offer different analyses.  For 
John Norton, there is nothing special about how thought experiments work.  Every scientific thought 
experiment  is  replaceable  by an argument.   So a  good thought  experiment  is  a  good argument  in 
disguise.   James  Brown  offers  a  very  different  analysis;  although  some  thought  experiments  are 
replaceable by arguments, there is a special class of thought experiments (that he calls platonic thought 
experiments) that work by revealing facts about platonic realm.  Gendler offers an account in which 
thought experiments lead us to new knowledge, helping us reconfigure old data in a new light.  Thus one 
can see that thought experiments puzzle philosophers as much as counterfactuals do. 
Section 6. Links between Counterfactuals and Thought Experiments 
Both Gendler’s and Sorensen’s comments in the previous section help us see the connection 
between  counterfactuals  and  thought  experiments.   It  is  precisely the  puzzling  feature  of  thought 
experiments that Gendler talks about that also make counterfactuals interesting: that in spite of being 
about merely possible states of affairs counterfactuals seem to tell us something about the actual world. 
Sorensen seems to take it for granted that one can allude to counterfactuals and possible worlds, in 
order to explain the usefulness of thought experiments.
As  I mentioned  in  the  beginning  one  important  philosophical  pay  off  of  developing  a 
comprehensive theory of counterfactual that deals with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents is 
22
that with such a theory we can account for thought experiments with impossible scenarios.  For this 
purpose, we start by analyzing thought experiments in terms of counterfactuals.  
It is an underlying assumption made by many theorists, including Gendler, that the prevalent 
uses of thought experiments  in Philosophy, particularly in areas of Metaphysics and Philosophy of 
Mind, are seriously limited.  These thought experiments are limited, according to Gendler, because of 
some significant inherent flaws in them.  These flaws are a result of using a thought experiment to 
derive unwarranted conclusions.  These conclusions are not warranted by the underlying theory at hand, 
in the context of which the thought experiment aims to generate new knowledge.  As I shall argue in 
Chapter V, Gendler’s account suffers the following limitations: (a) it fails to account for the usefulness 
of  thought experiments that involve imagining impossible scenarios, (b) it fails to recognize that there 
is not always an underlying theory in the context of which a thought experiment tries to generate new 
knowledge, and (c) imaginability cannot be a formal criterion for characterizing thought experiments. 
It  is  well  recognized  that  counterfactual  sentences  are  used  in  the  articulation  of  thought 
experiments; most thought experiments can be expressed in terms of a series of counterfactuals where, 
in each case, the antecedent (though unnaturally long) recapitulates the imaginary scenario described 
and  the  consequents  depict  possible  outcomes  of  the  thought  experiment.   By developing  a  new 
semantics of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents and analyzing thought experiments with such 
an account, I may be able to overcome some shortcomings in Gendler’s account.  I may be in a position 
to   shows  how  some  thought  experiments,  like  Strawson’s  auditory  world,  can  be  informative. 
Strawson puts forth this thought experiment in the second chapter of Individuals to probe the thesis that 
space is  a prerequisite for objectivity.   Strawson's objective in this  thought experiment  is  to better 
understand the concept of objectivity in the actual world by construing a parallel but very different 
conceptual  scheme  and  trying  to  reproduce  the  features  of  the  actual  world  that  are  required  for 
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objectivity, in that world.  He invites the reader to imagine a completely auditory world with a being 
residing in that world.  Could this being have the concept of objective particulars, as  separate entities 
from himself? Strawson asks.  Although Strawson succeeds in reproducing some of the features of the 
ordinary world in the auditory world,  he eventually abandons the project  as he finds that  the task, 
besides being tedious, is also very difficult, as it is not clear exactly what general features to reproduce 
and why.
In  this  thesis  I  shall  argue  that  there  are  major  shortcomings  in  the  leading  theories  of 
counterfactuals.   Within  the  book  length  accounts  of  thought  experiments,  there  are  no  available 
theories  that  account  for  thought  experiments  with  impossible/incomplete  scenarios.   At  best  such 
thought experiments are discounted as having little use for generating new knowledge.  Similarly, as we 
already noted the leading theories of counterfactuals (based on classical two-valued logic) are unable to 
account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  In such accounts, everything and anything 
follows from an impossible antecedent.  A more comprehensive account of counterfactuals—one that 
can handle counterfactuals  with impossible  antecedents  is  the core of  my project.   Apart  from its 
inherent interest as a semantics, though, we can also use it to show that  thought experiments with 
impossible/unimaginable conditions are not useless, and  to sketch an explanation for why this is so.   
So within the counterfactual literature there is no solution for counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents  and  within  the  thought  experiment  literature  there  is  no  good  story  about  thought 
experiments that involve impossible/incomplete scenarios.  Is this a mere coincidence—absence of a 
way to account for impossibilities?  Although I do not have an answer to this question, it suggests a 
strategy.  Perhaps it will help us figure out something crucial if we try extending a sound analysis of 
counterfactuals  to  thought  experiments.   We  need a  new theory of  counterfactuals—one  that  will 
account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  If we can construct such a theory it may be 
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helpful  to  analyze  thought  experiments  with  impossible/incomplete  scenarios  in  terms  of  a 
counterfactual, and to figure out their truth conditions.
In this thesis I will show how with the help of Relevance Logic and Lewis-Stalnaker style 
semantics  we  can  construct  a  theory  that  will  be  able  to  handle  counterfactuals  with  impossible 
antecedents.  Such an account has the following two advantages: First, with the help of such an account 
we will be able to distinguish between counterfactuals such as “If Dave squared the circle, he would be 
more famous than Gödel” which seems true, and “If Dave squared the circle, the sun would explode”, 
which seems false.  Secondly, by translating thought experiments into counterfactuals we will be able 
to account for the usefulness of thought experiments that are incomplete/impossible. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters.  Chapter II will begin the necessary 
preliminary conceptual spadework by briefly surveying the available accounts of counterfactuals.  As 
we will see, theories of counterfactuals can be broadly divided into two categories viz., meta-linguistic 
theories and theories that  depend on possible world semantics.   Under the first  category,  I will  be 
considering in particular the works of Goodman, Chisholm, and Kvart.  And under the possible world 
theories I will be discussing the theories due to Lewis and Stalnaker.  I will indicate  some of the crucial 
advantages and disadvantages of each account.
Much of Chapter III is dedicated to isolating the notion of a “case”.  Conceivability it turns out 
is a sufficient condition for a set of sentences to be a case.   Cases, which are strategically defined in 
Chapter  III,  are  used  a  modal  tool  for  analyzing  counterfactuals  with  impossible  antecedents.   In 
Chapter III, I begin by examining the notions of conceivability and imaginability, and argue that there is 
a distinction to be made between the two.  In this context I also examine the question: is conceivability 
a guide to possibility?  There is a natural tendency to assume that conceivability entails possibility.  I 
argue that conceivability is not a guide to possibility although “full and coherent describability” is.  But 
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this  is  far  from a reason to  regard conceivability as philosophically unimportant.   While  there are 
impossibilities that are conceivable, not all impossibilities (and in particular, not every contradictory set 
of sentences) are conceivable, and those that are conceivable are the “cases”.  
In Chapter IV, we will provide an account that offers a systematic analysis of counterfactuals 
with impossible antecedents.  It is, in essence, a modification of the possible worlds accounts described 
in Chapter II, under which a counterfactual is true if its consequent is true at the “closest” world in 
which the antecedent is true.  However, “possible worlds” will be replaced with “cases”.  And there 
remains philosophical work to do, because the existing analyses of “closeness” make sense for possible 
worlds, but do not tell us much about how to tell which impossible cases are closer than any others to 
actuality.  This topic will occupy much of that chapter. 
In  Chapter  V,  I will  show  that  with  this  new  semantics,  thought  experiments  with 
impossible/unimaginable conditions  need not be discounted.  With the help of four crucial  thought 
experiments I will show how the new theory of counterfactuals allows for some nice representation of 
crucial philosophical issues in hand. 
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Chapter II: Counterfactuals: An Overview
The main purpose of this chapter is to survey the main body of literature on counterfactuals.  Needless 
to  say,  there  are  numerous  accounts  of  counterfactuals.   The  various  analyses  proposed  for 
counterfactual statements can be divided into two broad categories: metalinguistic or syntactic analyses 
in the pre-Kripke era and the possible world approach in the post-Kripke era.  In this chapter, I will 
discuss  several  accounts  of  counterfactuals;  specifically the  works  of  Chisholm,  Goodman,  Kvart, 
Stalnaker, and Lewis.  This chapter naturally divides into two main parts.  Part 1 is a discussion of 
syntactic/metalinguistic accounts of counterfactuals.  In part 2, possible world accounts are discussed. 
In part 1 sections 1 and 2, I will discuss Chisholm’s, and Goodman’s respective accounts.  In Part 2, I 
address the following questions: Why possible worlds?  Why do Lewis and Stalnaker make the shift 
form a Chisholm/Goodman type syntactic approach to the possible world approach?  In part 2 section 1, 
I  will  briefly introduce  the  basic  semantics  for  possible  worlds.   Sections  2  and  3  of  part  2  are 
discussions of Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s particular accounts of counterfactuals respectively.  In section 4, 
I consider the fundamental differences between these two accounts.  Section 5 is a brief discussion of 
Kvart’s syntactic account of counterfactuals.  Notice that although Kvart offers a syntactic account of 
counterfactuals he falls into the post-Kripke era.  Section 6 is a brief introduction to the generalized 
Lewis-Stalnaker style analysis that I adopt in a later chapter to analyze counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents.  
Part 1. Syntactic/Metalinguistic Theories of Counterfactuals
Chisholm’s and Goodman’s accounts, which fall into the pre-Kripke era, are examples of the 
syntactic  approach  to  counterfactuals,  while  Stalnaker  and  Lewis  are  examples  of  the  (by  now 
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orthodox) possible worlds approach, in the post-Kripke era.  
Also known as cotenability theories of conditionals,  the basic idea behind Chisholm’s  and 
Goodman’s accounts is that  a conditional is assertable if its  antecedent, together with its  cotenable 
premises, entails its consequent.  So, p à q is true if q follows by law from p together with a set Γ of 
true sentences [such that for any r ∈ Γ it is not the case that  p à¬ r].  Thus the truth conditions of 
conditionals are evaluated on the basis of whether or not an argument exists from the antecedent and 
suitable cotenable premises to the conditional's conclusion.  
At the time Chisholm and Goodman produced their accounts of counterfactuals, it was clear 
that  these  conditionals  were  part  of  a  cluster  of  inter-related  notions  that  are  central  to  our 
understanding  of  science.   For  instance,  dispositional properties  are  central to  many  sorts  of 
explanations—we explain the dissolving of salt when placed in water by appeal to its  solubility, the 
breaking of glass when struck by its  fragility, and the logical behaviourists reduced mental states to 
dispositional properties to behave.  But it is clear that standard accounts of indicative conditionals won't 
easily represent dispositional terms—for example, “If this salt is put in water it will dissolve” is true if 
the salt is never in fact put in water. So if we use this as our account of what it means to say that salt is 
soluble then, if my shoe never finds its way into water, this definition would count it as soluble as well. 
The difference between the two seems to be that when we take these conditionals in subjunctive form, 
the  salt  conditional  is  true,  the  shoe conditional  not.   So  subjunctives  seem likely to  be a  key to 
explaining dispositional terms.  Similarly, and famously, a key difference between laws of nature and 
mere  accidental generalizations is that laws “support counterfactuals”.  A  law like  “metals expand 
when heated” implies that if this iron bar is heated it will expand.  “All the coins in my pocket are 
dimes” is  only accidentally true,  so “If this  quarter was in my pocket,  it  would be a dime” is  not 
implied.
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Thus a  clearer  understanding of counterfactuals  promises  a clearer  understanding of  many 
things.  However, the prospects of understanding counterfactuals independently of these other notions 
did not seem promising.  Edgington describes the guiding idea for Chisholm and Goodman as follows: 
Counterfactuals appeared to be connected not only with dispositional properties but with 
laws  of  nature.   Laws,  it  seemed,  have  counterfactual  implications,  accidentally  true 
generalizations don't.  If we understood counterfactuals, this might illuminate the notion 
of law.  And conversely.  Leaving the problem "What is a law?" for another day, perhaps 
counterfactuals can be explained as law-governed conditionals (Edgington, 1995, p. 247).
Before discussing the particular accounts, it is worth mentioning here that although it can be 
safely said that most syntactic accounts like Chisholm’s and Goodman’s fall in the pre-Kripke era, we 
see an interesting revival of such accounts in the post-Kripke era as well.  Kvart’s account is such an 
example.  We will discuss Kvart’s account after Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s in part 2 of this chapter.  Now 
let us look at Chisholm’s and Goodman’s accounts respectively.
Section 1. Chisholm
Chisholm derives his account from F.P.  Ramsey who comments: 
In general we can say with Mill that ‘if p then q’ means that q is inferable from p, that is, 
of course, from p together with certain facts and laws not stated but in some way indicated 
by the context.  This means  p⊃q from these facts and laws… If two people are arguing 
about ‘if p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their 
stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q (Chisholm,1949, p. 489).
Thus the counterfactual “If H were to be the case, W would be the case” (call this C), could be thought 
of as another way of saying that the indicative statement ‘H’ together with certain previous information, 
entails ‘W’.  But, Chisholm points out, it is important to spell out what “previous information” refers to, 
since, the meaning of the conditional should not be confused with the grounds on the basis of which it 
is asserted.  Two people may have completely different stocks of knowledge and could affirm  C  on 
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extremely divergent grounds.  But when each of them affirms C it must be assumed that she is saying 
exactly the same thing.  They may supplement H with additional information, in order to deduce W.  So 
the meaning must allow that they may supplement H with W.  But since this statement (with the same 
meaning) can be asserted by anyone, this supplementary additional information added to H, need not be 
a statement expressing any particular item in either of their stores of knowledge, nor indeed need it 
express any knowledge at all.  In asserting a subjunctive conditional we say something more general
—“that there is some true statement which, taken with H, entails  W” (Chisholm, 1949, p. 490).  This 
amounts to what Kvart calls Chisholm’s Formula (CF) (Kvart, 1986, p. 3)
CF: (∃ p) [p is true & (p & H à W)]
Although CF might appear to be the most plausible way of translating counterfactuals, it faces 
the  following two problems,  considered  by Chisholm.   The  first  one  has  to  do with  the  with  the 
trivialization of the formula when we use certain substituends for p.  Chisholm considers a variety of 
cases that might have this result.
The first case has to do with universal conditionals with an antecedent (but not a consequent) 
which contains free variables that are  vacuous.  For instance, let:
H = “Poonam won scholarship number 21423 from SSHRC”.  
It follows from H that: 
p = “there is an x such that Poonam won x from SSHRC”.
Now, since Poonam did not win a scholarship from SSHRC, 
p* = “for all x (if x is a SSHRC scholarship Poonam has won, then dogs can fly)” 
is  vacuously true,  because there is  no x that  has the property attributed x in the antecedent of the 
conditional.  
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But, of course, in classical logic p* is equivalent to5:
q = “((there is an x such that x is a scholarship Poonam won x from SSHRC) à dogs can fly)” 
So, since the universal conditional is vacuously true, so is the existential conditional sentence.  
Recall, H (“Poonam won scholarship number 21423 from SSHRC”) implies p (“there is an x 
such that Poonam won x from SSHRC”).  And H & p* implies W (“dogs can fly”).  Therefore, H 
implies W.  
Thus “if Poonam won scholarship number 21423 from SSHRC then dogs can fly” comes out 
true in Chisholm’s account.  If this process is carried out many false counterfactuals including “if H 
then ¬W” come out true.  But obviously both “if H then W” and “if H then ¬W” cannot be true.  
Chisholm's suggestion to avoid this problem is “to insure that it  [CF] contain no universal 
statement  whose  antecedent  determines  an  empty  class  and  no  material  conditional  (or  material 
implication) whose antecedent which is asserted merely on the ground that it is false (or its consequent 
true).  Every universal conditional included in p must have ‘existential import’, that is, every universal 
conditional  must  have conjoined  with it  a  statement  asserting that  there  are  members  of  the  class 
determined by the antecedent” (Chisholm, 1949, p. 491).
CF faces another threat of trivialization on the following count, even if we disallow vacuous 
universal conditionals from being included in p.  The problem can arise in the following way: Take a 
conditional of the form “if Fa, then Ga”, where a denotes.  To take Chisholm’s own example, suppose 
Fx = x sees the play and Gx = x enjoys the play.  Now let the following statement be a substituend for p 
in  CF (x) [x =  a à (Fx  à Gx)].   The problem of vacuous universal conditionals (i.e., a universal 
conditional with an empty antecedent) does not arise since ‘a’ denotes.  But since, Fa is false, insofar as 
it is the antecedent of a counterfactual, the proposed substituend for p is true, and together with Fa, it 
5 It  is a fact of classical predicate logic that the universal conditional “for all  x (x  à W)” (where x occurs free in the 
antecedent and not in the consequent) is equivalent to “(∃x) (…x…) à W”.
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clearly implies  Ga,  thus  making the  counterfactual  true under  Chisholm’s  amended formula.   But 
obviously, many counterfactuals of the form are false.  To avoid such difficulty we have to add a further 
restriction on our formula; “Let us say: p includes no universal conditional whose consequent includes 
any two functions which are logically equivalent to ‘x sees the play’ and to ‘x does not enjoy the play’: 
i.e., any consequent must exclude either functions logically equivalent to “x sees the play” or functions 
logically equivalent to “x does not enjoy the play” (Chisholm, 1949, p. 491).  However, this restriction 
is  not  enough to  preclude trivialization  either.   There is  a third  case where the formula  might  be 
trivialized—where the consequent of the formula is true.  We should add a further restriction viz., that 
the  indicative  version of  the consequent  does  not  entail  p.   If this  restriction  is  imposed then  the 
problem of trivialization can be avoided.  
An easy way to show how this problem arises in our original example “if H were the case, W 
would be the case”, is to choose W for p in CF.  This will always make such a counterfactual come out 
true, in Chisholm’s account.  The restriction that W does not entail p neatly rules out substituting W for 
p,  since W obviously entails  W.  Chisholm however,  does  not  think that  all  these restrictions  are 
sufficient to overcome these difficulties.  He writes “…the above restrictions as they stand are really 
not sufficient to exclude types of cases for which they are designed….With a little ingenuity, these 
restrictions may be evaded and,…in order to deal with the cases hitherto considered, our formula must 
be one of extraordinary complexity” (Chisholm, 1949, p. 492). 
The second problem has to do with how to distinguish accidental generalizations, which do not 
warrant the inference of certain counterfactuals from non-accidental, law-like statements.  For example, 
suppose two men were to sit on a park bench, quite independently of each other and that each of them 
were Irish, as it happened.  We could then say: “(x) (if x is on….park bench at…time, x is Irish)”.  Our 
formula then, in a particular case, could entail “If Ivan were to be on…park bench at…time, Ivan would 
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be  Irish”.   But  this  is  not  warranted,  i.e.,  that  counterfactual  is  actually  false.   Again,  consider 
Chisholm’s  own example  of a small  community where each of the lawyers happens to have three 
children.  We may say: “(x), if  x is a lawyer in…community in 2002,  x has three children”.  But we 
should not want to say of Jones who we know not to be a lawyer, that if Jones were to practice law, 
then there he too would have had three children.  The difficulty is that our universal conditionals about 
the park bench and the lawyers describe what are, in some sense, “accidents” or “coincidences”.  How 
are we to distinguish such “accidental” conditionals from statements such as “all men are mortal”, “all 
wolves are ferocious”, etc., which describe “non-accidental” connections, and which do not give rise to 
similar problems when substituted for p in CF?  Our formula must exclude such “accidental” universal 
conditionals.  But the only obvious way to exclude these is to say that unlike the “non-accidental” ones, 
they do not warrant the inference of certain counterfactuals.  
Chisholm suggests  two alternatives  for  excluding  “accidental”  conditionals.   They are  (1) 
supply the qualifications CF lacks to handle these cases or (2) accept the counterfactuals as expressing 
some  irreducible  connection  between  the  antecedent  and  the  consequent,  and  thus  reject  or  alter 
radically the extensional logic.  
Kvart argues that no modification of the sort Chisholm offers is likely to save his account, and 
so we need a change of theory rather than putting mere patches on the original.  His reasoning is as 
follows: Take for example, “if A were the case, B would be the case”.  Now one can take A à B for p, 
since A is false,  A à B is true  thus rendering the formula CF, in this case (A & A à B) à B true. 
Under the proposed criterion, every counterfactual comes out true.  We are back to square one, for 
nothing is more troubling than the fact that under a proposed criterion every counterfactual comes out 
true (or false) for it is well known that there are false as well true counterfactuals.  “A natural way to 
overcome this difficulty would be to require B to not entail p.  This move would, of course, do away 
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with all the difficulties Chisholm specified: it would rule out taking p as ‘(x) [ x = a à (Fx à Gx)] in 
the second case [since Ga à Fa à Ga]” (Kvart, 1986, p. 6).  It would also rule out vacuous universal 
generalizations in the first case; and it would rule out taking p as B, in the third case.  
However, this move is insufficient, since we can specify, for every counterfactual “If  A 
were true, B would be true”, a statement M that does not follow from B, and take p as A à 
(M & B).  In this case p is still true since (A is false), but in general B does not entail  p; 
and since  A & [A  à (M & B)] à B, Chisholm’s criterion is satisfied, and is thereby 
trivialized.  Almost every counterfactual can be made to come out true this way….The use 
of  this  type  of  substituend  for  p  allows  for  across-the-board  trivialization,  not  just 
counterexamples for particular cases. (Kvart, 1986, pp. 5-6)
One more attempt might be made to save Chisholm’s proposal, by putting the blame on A and 
requiring that ¬A does not entail p.  We can still trivialize the criterion by selecting a true statement N 
such that ¬A does not entail p and B does not entail N, and take p as N& (A à B).  In this case p is 
certainly true since A is false and N is true.  Chisholm’s restriction on CF is satisfied since neither 
¬A→ [N & (A à B)] nor B à [N & (A à B)] (in other words, neither ¬A, nor B entails p) and yet [A 
& N & (A  à B)]  à B.   Thus  again,  the criterion  is  trivialized.   Chisholm’s  strategy for adding 
restrictions to avoid trivialization does not look promising.  In principle, every trivialization procedure 
of the above kind may be avoided by adding more restrictions but there is no telling how complicated 
the  amended  formula  will  end  up  and  where  we  can  stop  with  these  restrictions.   In  general, 
trivialization  procedures  are  more  serious  than  just  falsification  of  a  formula  since  trivialization 
produces a host of counterfactuals for the formula and thereby shows that the problem is not limited to 
an isolated case only.
Section 2. Goodman
Goodman’s approach to the problem of counterfactuals is quite similar to Chisholm’s.  Recall 
that Chisholm’s formula was: (∃p) [p is true & (p & A à B)].  Goodman adopts the same formula with 
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the additional requirements: (1) (p & A) must be self compatible; and (2) the entailment must proceed 
via some relevant laws.  According to Goodman, a counterfactual is true if and only if “for some set S 
of true sentences, A & S be self compatible and lead by law to the consequent” [note, Goodman writes 
“.” for “&”] (Goodman, 1965, p. 11) [We will call this CFG 1]. 
This has the following form:
 CFG 2 : (∃s) [S & (A & S àL C) & R (S,A)] 
where “C” stands for the consequent, “àL” means inferability by law and R (S, A) is a constraint on S, 
which in CFG 1 was the constraint that A & S be self compatible.
Thus, as Kvart points out, the line of argument against Chisholm’s formula applies equally 
well to Goodman’s—A choice of A à B as S fulfills the requirements of leading to B by law (albeit 
vacuously) and of being compatible with A (except in the case in which A is incompatible with B, 
which is a relatively uninteresting and minor subcase) (Kvart, 1986, p. 9).
Thus almost every counterfactual will come out true under formulation CFG 1.  Goodman, in 
the face of this trivialization, proposes the following criterion:  CFG 3: “A counterfactual is true if and 
only if there is some set S of true statements such that A & S is self-compatible and leads by law to the 
consequent, while there is no such set S′ such that A & S′ is self compatible and leads by law to the 
negation of the consequent” (Goodman, 1965, pp. 11-12).  This has the following form: 
CFG 4: (∃s) [S & (A & S àL C) & R (S,A)] & - (∃S′) [S′ & (A & S′àL ¬C) & R (S′, A)] 
As Goodman points  out this step faces the problem that S′ can be taken as {¬C} [C here 
stands for the consequent], where  ¬C is compatible with A.  This would make the second conjunct 
false and trivialize the new addition.  Notice that this trivializes in the opposite direction, making all 
counterfactuals  false instead of making them all  true.   Goodman, re-formulates his  criterion in the 
following way : (we will call this CFG 5)
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CFG 5 “…a counterfactual is true if and only if there is some set S of true sentences such that S is 
compatible with C and with ¬C and such that A & S is self compatible and leads by law to C; while 
there is no set S′ compatible with C and with ¬C and such that A & S′ is self compatible and leads by 
law to ¬C” (Goodman, 1965, p. 13).
This formulation is not free from trivialization either.  However, for the sake of brevity we will 
not go into the further details  of the threat this formulation faces.  Goodman observes that the last 
formulation faces difficulty of different sort: A further restriction on the set is required on the set S.  It 
cannot  include  statements  that  in  Goodman’s  terminology  are  “not  cotenable”  with  A  (i.e.,  the 
statements that would not be true if A were true).  Goodman is immediately faced with circularity for 
cotenability  is  defined  in  terms  of  counterfactuals,  whereas  now  the  truth  conditions  for  the 
counterfactuals are defined in terms of cotenability.  Goodman recognizes this problem himself and 
says the following: “Though unwilling to accept this conclusion, I do not at present see any way of 
meeting this difficulty” (Goodman, 1965, pp. 16-17).
As we can see, the two main metalinguistic accounts of counterfactuals face severe problems
—Chisholm’s account faces threats of trivialization and Goodman’s account faces circularity.  Such 
results may be a reason for departure from this syntactic approach.
Part 2: Why Possible Worlds?
Before we go on to discuss Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s particular possible world approaches for 
analyzing counterfactuals  we need to say something about the shift from the syntactic to the possible 
worlds approach.  Why was the possible world approach so successful in convincing almost everybody 
to give up the syntactic approach?  What advantages does it have over those approaches?
In Dorothy Edgington’s words:
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With  Saul  Kripke’s  semantics  for  modal  logic  (1963)  came  the  revival  of  the 
philosopher’s dream, a possible world.  It is a promising tool for the elucidation of non-
truth-functional  sentential  connectives.   It  is  certainly  useful  in  the  formulation  and 
clarification  of  modal  thought.   And  it  is  natural  to  turn  to  it  for  an  elucidation  of 
conditionals, which, on the face of it, are about possible situations (Edgington, 1995, p. 
250).
So, with Kripke’s modal logic, philosophers now had the tools to analyze possibilities with 
formal  rigour—an option  pre-Kripke  philosophers  did  not  have,  although  it  was  realized  that  the 
problem of counterfactuals spans beyond syntax.  Hence Chisholm’s comment:
Like Russell in his theory of descriptions, we want to find a new way of saying something
—in this case, in order to assure ourselves that we can restate what we ordinarily express 
in subjunctive conditionals.  The problem is epistemological and metaphysical, as well as 
logical and linguistic; we want to know what it is, if anything, that we have to assume 
about  the  universe  if  we  are  to  claim  validity  for  our  counter-factual  knowledge 
(Chisholm, 1949, p. 486).
Chisholm (and likewise Goodman) essentially tried to unpack a conditional in terms of its 
syntactical properties and determine what we have to assume about the world in making a claim of this 
sort.  So analyzed, these statements seemed to be connected with dispositional properties and laws of 
nature.  However, Chisholm and Goodman did not have the tools available to them to develop logical 
systems in which they could show how these counterfactuals behaved.  Hence, the logical side of the 
analysis remained un(der) developed.  
Now the question that naturally comes up is: what is it about the possible worlds approach that 
makes  it  easier  to  formulate  a plausible  account  of the meaning of  counterfactuals  than it  is  on a 
syntactic approach?  The syntactic accounts of Chisholm and Goodman considered in Part 1 involve 
saying that A à B is true if B “follows from” A along with some extra assumptions.  The job then was 
to figure out what are the legitimate candidates to serve as the extra assumptions.  There was a lot of 
effort devoted to figuring out what these extra assumptions are.  Proponents of these approaches argue 
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that the “surface logical form” of subjunctive conditionals leaves out this extra detail, and try to specify 
what the true logical form of the statements is.  The possible worlds accounts take the surface logical 
form more seriously: For instance, a sentence like “If A were the case, then B”, we assume that it is 
really a statement about alternative ways things might be, in particular ways in which A might be true. 
The benefit is that there is no need for generating a class of statements that, along with A, makes B 
derivable; the cost is assuming that these “alternative ways” are something we need to take with some 
degree of metaphysical seriousness.  Also, we must recognize that there are many alternative ways in 
which  A might  be  true,  and  only in  some will  B also  be  true.   So  which  ones(s)  do  the  job  of 
determining the truth value of the conditional needs to be figured out.  That is, we need to take on the 
job of picking out “nearby” worlds in which if A is true, B is true also.
So  much  for  the  shift  from  metalinguistic  accounts  to  possible  world  accounts  of 
counterfactuals.  Before considering particular accounts, it will be handy to have some details about 
possible world semantics. 
Section 1. Possible World Semantics
Stalnaker’s  and  Lewis’  accounts  of  the  truth  conditions  of  counterfactuals  make  use  of 
Kripke’s possible worlds semantics.  In the usual Kripke semantics for modal logic, one begins by 
defining a frame.  A frame is a set of worlds6, and a relation R, defined on the set of worlds, called the 
(alethic)  accessibility relation.  An  interpretation for a frame is a (logically consistent) truth-value 
assignment to the sentences of the language in each world.  In the analysis of counterfactuals, one often 
identifies a world with the set of all sentences true within it, and restricts attention to one particular 
frame under some particular interpretation.  We assume that there are as many sentences as there are 
facts about a world, and so these sentences are expected to describe the world completely.  Usually the 
6 For a detailed discussion about what these worlds are see Bennett, 2003, pp. 152-158
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number of worlds is assumed to be the cardinality of the power set of the set of sentences.  Some subset 
of these other worlds is the set of possible worlds, with respect to a given world w: these are the worlds 
w has  alethic  access  to.   In addition  to  the  usual  logical  connectives,  ‘⃞à’ is  introduced as  the 
subjunctive conditional, and it is to be read as, ‘if it were the case that _, then it would be the case that 
_’.
Section 2. Stalnaker
Stalnaker, in his analysis of counterfactuals, relies on a function (which he calls the selection 
function) that takes as inputs a base world i and an antecedent A and returns the nearest possible world 
to i in which A is true. 
In his paper “A Theory of Conditionals”, Stalnaker identifies three problems associated with 
counterfactuals.  These three problems are the following:  
(1) The logical problem of conditionals: this involves “the task of describing the formal properties of 
the  conditional function: a function usually represented in English by the words “if… then”, taking 
ordered pairs of propositions into propositions” (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 41). 
(2) The  pragmatic  problem:  this  “derives  from  the  belief…,  that  the  formal  properties  of  the 
conditional function, together with all of the facts, may not be sufficient for determining the truth value 
of a counterfactual; that is, different values of conditional statements may be consistent with a single 
valuation of all non-conditional statements.  The task set by the problem is to find and defend criteria 
for choosing among these different valuations” (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 41).  
(3) The  epistemological  problem:  this “is  based on the fact  that  many counterfactuals  seem to be 
synthetic, and contingent, statements about unrealized possibilities.  But contingent statements must be 
capable of confirmation by empirical evidence, and the investigator can gather evidence only in the 
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actual world.  How are conditionals which are both empirical and contrary-to-fact possible at all?  How 
do  we  learn  about  possible  worlds,  and  where  are  the  facts  (or  counter-facts)  which  make 
counterfactuals  true?”  (Stalnaker,  1968,  p.  42).   Such concerns,  as  Stalnaker  points  out,  have  led 
philosophers  to  analyze  counterfactual  conditionals  in  non-conditional  terms.   Steering  away from 
analyzing  conditional  statements  in  terms  of  non-conditional  statements,  Stalnaker  focuses  on  the 
logical problem of conditionals.  And as we will see he uses modal logic to analyze counterfactuals.
We get an idea of what counterfactuals are for Stalnaker from his comment in devising the 
semantical rule for the selection function:
The interpretation [of the selection function] shows conditional logic to be an extension of 
modal logic.  Modal logic provides a way of talking about what is true in the actual world, 
in all possible worlds, or in at least one, unspecified world.  The addition of the selection 
function to the semantics and the conditional connective to the object language of modal 
logic provides a way of talking also about what is true in  particular non-actual possible 
situations.   This is what counterfactuals  are:  statements  about particular counterfactual 
worlds (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 46).
Stalnaker’s  proposal  for evaluating counterfactuals  is  based on Ramsey’s suggestion about 
how to decide whether or not to believe in a conditional statement.  According to Ramsey, if one has no 
opinion  about  the  truth  of  the  antecedent  of  a  conditional,  one  should  do  the  following  thought 
experiment: 
Add the antecedent, hypothetically, to one’s stock of beliefs or knowledge, and consider 
whether or not the consequent is true.  One’s belief about the conditional should be the 
same as one’s hypothetical belief, under this condition, about the consequent.  
Ramsey’s solution deals only with situations in which one has no opinion about the truth value of the 
antecedent.  In a situation in which we believe the antecedent to be true, but we want to assess the 
conditional as a whole since we are not sure whether the conditional is true, we do not need to make 
any changes to our stock of beliefs.  However, if one already believes in the truth of the antecedent, 
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should the opinion about the conditional be different in this case?  What about a situation in which you 
know or believe the antecedent to be false?  One cannot simply add it to one’s stock of beliefs without 
introducing a contradiction.  
One way to think about Stalnaker’s proposal is as a modernization of Ramsey’s proposal that 
handles such cases.  For situations where the antecedent of the conditional is believed to be true or 
false, Stalnaker suggest the following:
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever 
adjustments  are  required  to  maintain  consistency (without  modifying  the  hypothetical 
belief  in the antecedent);  finally,  consider,  whether or not the consequent is  then true 
(Stalnaker, 1968, p. 44).
Stalnaker, after considering the belief conditions, goes on to consider the truth conditions of a 
counterfactual.   He says: “Now that we have found an answer to the question, ‘How do we decide 
whether or not we believe a conditional statement?’ the problem is to make the transition from belief 
conditions to truth conditions; that is, to find a set of truth conditions for statements having conditional 
form which explains why we use the method we do use to evaluate them” (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 33). 
Kripke’s possible world semantics are used since that “is just what we need to make this transition, 
since a possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs” (Stalnaker, 1968, 
p. 33).  In addition to possible worlds, Stalnaker introduces in his semantical apparatus: 
a selection function (s-function hereafter), which takes a proposition and a possible world 
as  arguments  and  a  possible  world  as  its  value.   The  s-function  selects,  for  each 
antecedent A, a particular possible world in which A is true.  The  assertion which the 
conditional  makes,  then,  is  that  the  consequent  is  true  in  the  world  selected.   A 
conditional is true in the actual world when its consequent is true in the selected world 
(Stalnaker, 1968, p. 45).
The possible world that is taken as an argument of the selection function is called a base world 
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and the  value  of  the  s-function  is  called  the  selected  world.   Thus where  f  (A,  α)  =  β,  A is  the 
antecedent, α is the base world, and β is the selected world.
Stalnaker proposes the following semantic rule for a conditional (using ‘>’, as the conditional 
connective):
• A > B is true in α if B is true in f (A, α)
• A > B is false in α if B is false in f (A, α)
Stalnaker goes on to say that the world selected cannot be just any world.  He introduces the 
following conditions on the s-function, using λ to refer to the (unique) impossible world, i.e., the world 
in which all statements are both true and false:
• For all antecedents A and base world α, A must be true in f (A, α).
• For all antecedents A and base world α, f (A, α) = λ only if there is no world possible with respect to 
α in which A is true.  
The first condition requires that the antecedent be true in the selected world and ensures that 
tautologies like “If snow is white, then snow is white” are true.  The second condition requires that the 
absurd world be selected only in the case that the antecedent is impossible.  Note that according to the 
fourth condition,  this is a specific sort of impossibility.   That is,  the antecedent is impossible with 
respect to α.
Stalnaker’s  account  also  requires  that  the  selected  world  differ  minimally from the  actual 
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world.  This according to Stalnaker implies 
First, that there are no differences between the actual world and the selected world except 
those that are required, implicitly or explicitly, by the antecedent.  Further, it means that 
among the alternate ways of making the required changes, one must choose one that does 
the least violence to the correct description and explanation of the actual world (Stalnaker, 
1968, p. 46).
These he admits are vague conditions which depend largely on pragmatic considerations for 
their application.  However, they suggest that the selection is based on an ordering of possible worlds 
with respect to their similarities to the base world.  He introduces two more formal constraints on the s-
function:
• For all base worlds α and all antecedents A, if A is true in α, then f (A, α) = α.
• For all base worlds α and all antecedents B and B', if B is true in f (B', α) and B' is true in f (B', α), 
then f (B, α) = f (B', α).  (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 47)
These two conditions  together ensure that  the s-function establishes a total  ordering of all 
selected worlds with respect to each possible world, with the base world preceding all others in the 
ordering.  Stalnaker admits  that  the conditions on the selection function are “far from sufficient to 
determine the function uniquely…” (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 47).
One of the main problems in Stalnaker’s account is that the s-function picks out one unique 
possible  world  even in  cases  where there  is  more  than  one “closest”  possible  world.   What  does 
Stalnaker do to rectify this?  We will come to the answer to this question in the next section.
Section 3. Lewis
Lewis begins his book Counterfactuals by saying:
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‘if kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’ seems to me to mean something like 
this: in any possible state of affairs in which kangaroos have no tails, and which resembles 
our actual state of affairs as much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to, the kangaroos 
topple over. (Lewis, 1973, p. 1)
Lewis uses the conditional operator ‘⃞ à’ for statements of the form: 
‘if it were the case that…, then it would be the case that…’ 
and ‘◊à’ for statements of the form:
‘if it were the case that…, then it might be the case that…’
Lewis writes: 
The right general analysis of counterfactuals, in my opinion, is one based on comparative 
similarity of possible worlds.  Roughly, a counterfactual is true if every world that makes 
the antecedent true without gratuitous departure from actuality is a world that also makes 
the consequent true…A counterfactual “if it were that A, then it would be that C” is (non-
vacuously) true if and only if some (accessible) world where both A and C are true is more 
similar  to  our actual  world,  overall,  than is  any world where A is  true but  C is  false 
(Lewis, 1979, pp. 464-65).
Lewis stipulates that if it is not the case that if A were to be true, B might be true, then A 
◊à¬B (read ‘if A were the case, not B might be the case’).  In the event of a ‘tie’, where worlds where 
B is true are equally similar to worlds where B is false7, neither A ⃞ àB, nor A ⃞ à¬B is true.  In 
such a case, given A, B could be either true or false.
How are these other worlds related to each other, and especially to the base world?  The first 
thing to notice about these worlds, for Lewis, is that they are ordered by similarity with respect to each 
world.  For any two worlds a and b, a is at least as similar to base world w as b is (not exclusive) or 
vice versa.  
7 There are two ways that a tie could happen.  If there was no closest world to w with A and B true and no closest world to w 
with A true and B false, then there would be a tie.  The other way is if there are closest worlds with A and B, and A and not 
B respectively true, but these two worlds are equally similar to w.
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The relation that Lewis presumes holds on these worlds he calls a weak ordering or a (total)  
preordering.  In a footnote he clarifies:
‘weak’ because,  unlike a  strong (or  linear)  ordering,  ties  are permitted:  two different 
things  can  stand  in  the  relation  to  each  other,  and  thus  be  tied  in  the  ordering. 
‘Preordering’ because if we take equivalence classes under the relation of being thus tied, 
the induced ordering of the equivalence classes is a strong ordering… (Lewis, 1973, p. 
48). 
He uses an axiomatic definition of “comparative similarity” using the notation ‘j ≤i k’.  This is 
to be read as the world j is at least as similar to the world i as the world k is.  He also uses the notation j 
<i k (defined as it is not the case that k ≤i j).  We read this as j is more similar to i than k is (Lewis, 1973, 
p.48). 
The six axioms with which he defines the relation  ≤i  are (for any base world i,  a set Si   of 
worlds, regarded as the set of worlds accessible from i, and any worlds a, b and c):
(1) ≤i is transitive, i.e., if a ≤i b , and b ≤ic then a ≤i c.
(2) ≤i is strongly connected, i.e., a ≤i b or b ≤i a. 
(3) ≤i is reflexive, i.e., a ≤i a.  In other words the world i is self-accessible.
(4) The world i is strictly≤i -minimal i.e., for any world a, different from i, i < a.
(5) Inaccessible worlds are ≤i maximal, i.e., if a is inaccessible then b ≤i a.
(6) Accessible worlds are more similar to i than inaccessible worlds.  If a belongs to Si  and b doesn’t, 
then  a <i b
What makes this  relation a weak ordering is  that  it  need not be anti-symmetric—i.e.,  it  is 
possible that a ≤i b and b ≤i a and yet a ≠ b.  Condition 1 and 3 are obviously required, since he uses “≤i” 
to explain the comparative similarity between worlds.  3 implies that a world that is not self-accessible 
cannot have the “≤i” associated with it.  2 is a curious assumption that says that for every two worlds 
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one of them is at least as similar to i as the other.  So the similarity relation is presumed to be decidable. 
This also has the implication that two worlds cannot be incomparable.  Condition 4 says that i is most 
similar to itself, and is the unique world to be most similar in this way.  5 implies that inaccessible 
worlds are least similar to i.  This condition implies that all inaccessible worlds are equally dissimilar to 
i.  Condition 6 states that if there are two worlds, one accessible to i and the other inaccessible to it, 
then the accessible world is more similar to i than the inaccessible world.  
Section 4. Differences between Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s Approach 
As  we  can  see,  there  are  differences  in  formulations  between  Lewis’s  and  Stalnaker’s 
accounts.  Lewis devised a triadic relation whose arguments are the propositions A, the actual world α , 
and a set of worlds.  Stalnaker, on the other hand, devised what he calls a selection function going from 
the pair {A, α} to a unique world—the A-world closest to α.  
As Bennett pointed out:
The differences between relations and functions does not matter here: we could rewrite 
Stalnaker’s theory in terms of a triadic relation [like Lewis’s], or Lewis’s in terms of a 
function.  What matters is the difference between getting from {A, α} to a class of worlds 
and getting from {A, α} to a single world (Bennett, 2003, p. 179).
Lewis allows ties in the relative similarity between worlds, as well as no limit on how closely 
worlds can resemble each other.  For Stalnaker, however, there is always exactly one closest similar 
world.  Stalnaker’s theory can be seen as a special case of Lewis’s that does not make these allowances.
As Edgington points out, besides these differences, there is also a difference in their goals:
Stalnaker’s  project  is  less  ambitious.   He does  not  expect  there  to  be  an informative 
analysis  of “A-world which differs  minimally from the actual  world” which could  be 
specified independently of the judgments about what would have been true if A were true. 
Lewis seeks a genuine analysis of counterfactuals in terms which do not presuppose them 
(Edgington, 1995, p. 251).
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The following are the differences between Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s accounts with regards to 
the  assumed  ordering  of  the  possible  worlds:  Unlike  Stalnaker,  Lewis  makes  the  assumption  that 
worlds inaccessible according to base world i are worlds that are equally dissimilar to i  (according to 
condition 6, in part 2 section 2).  On the other hand, the two assumptions that Stalnaker makes and 
Lewis does not are called the limit assumption and uniqueness assumption.  The limit assumption is the 
assumption that for every possible world i and non-empty proposition A, there is at least one A-world 
minimally  different  from  i.   In  other  words,  there  are  most  similar  A-worlds.   The  uniqueness 
assumption is the assumption that for every world  i and proposition  A, there is at most one  A-world 
minimally different from i (Stalnaker, 1978, pp. 88-89).  The uniqueness assumption rules out ties in 
similarity.  It says that no distinct possible worlds are ever equally similar to any given base world.  But 
according to Stalnaker only the limit assumption, is “reasonable to make” in practice (Stalnaker, 1984 
,p. 133).  In contrast, Lewis allows ties in the relative similarity between worlds, as well as no limit to 
how closely worlds can resemble each other.  
These contrasting views are a consequence of their position on whether or not the principle of 
‘conditional excluded middle’ (CEM), which states (A à C) v  (Aà ¬ C) for all A and C, holds.  This 
is explained succinctly by Bennett as follows:
If there is always a unique closest A-world, then at that world C is either true or false; if 
true then so is A à C [Bennett uses “>” instead of “à”]; if false then A à ¬ C is true. 
Thus, one of those must be true, and so we have CEM.  And if there are ties for closest, 
CEM is not universally true.  Suppose w1 and w2 are A-worlds that are tied for closest to 
α.  Since they are distinct worlds, there must be some proposition C that is true at w1 and 
false at w2.  So the conditional A à C is false, because w2 is a closest A-world and C is 
false at it; and A à ¬C is also false, because w1 is a closest A-world and ¬C is false at it. 
So (A à C) v (A à ¬C ) is false in this case because each disjunct is false. (Bennett, 
2003, p. 183)
According to Stalnaker, CEM holds relative to a given selection function f.    In other words, 
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CEM does not hold in case where f has not been determined.  Notice that the argument against CEM 
where there is a tie for closest worlds assumes that if C is false at some closest A-world then A à C is 
false.  Stalnaker does not agree with this assumption.  According to him, if C is true in some closest A-
worlds but not all, A à C is indeterminate—neither true nor false.  In such a case the selection function 
does not select a world.
Thus on Stalnaker’s theory the following are neither true nor false:
‘if Bizet and Verdi  were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian’
‘if Bizet and Verdi  were compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian’ 
On Lewis’s theory however, they are both false.  
As we mentioned in the previous section, one of the main problems with Stalnaker’s account, 
which he recognizes himself, is the following: A world that the s-function picks out must be as close as 
possible to the actual world.  Thus the selection function picks out one unique possible world even in 
cases where there is more than one “closest” possible world.  Consider the following example:
“If my mother had three children,—the first male, and she had more boys than girls, then the second 
born would have been a male”.
Of course this  is false.  Actually my mother has more daughters than sons.  Consider the 
following two possible worlds: in one the third child is a boy and in two the second child is a boy.  In 
this case it does not make any sense to believe that world one is closer to the actual world than two. 
But the s-function would have to either select a world of the first kind or the second.  If world one is 
selected, then the following counterfactual will come out true:
“If my mother had given birth to more boys than girls, then the third born would have been a male”. 
And if world two is selected then the original counterfactual will come out true.  But one is no better a 
candidate for truth than two.
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Talking about the uniqueness assumption, Stalnaker says:
It  [the  uniqueness  assumption]  says  that  no  distinct  possible  worlds  are  ever  equally 
similar  to  any given possible  world.   That  is,  without  a  doubt,  a  grossly implausible 
assumption to make about the kind of similarity relation we use to interpret conditionals, 
and it is an assumption which the abstract semantic theory I want to defend does make. 
But like many idealized assumptions made in abstract semantic theory, it may be relaxed 
in the application of the theory (Stalnaker, 1978, p. 89). 
He goes on to say: “To reconcile the determinacy of abstract semantic theory with the indeterminacy of 
realistic application, we need a general theory of vagueness” (Stalnaker, 1978, p. 89).  And the theory 
of vagueness he uses is the theory of supervaluation developed by Van Fraassen. 
Stalnaker’s defense, in a nutshell,8 is the following: it would be highly implausible to rule out 
ties with regard to similarity between worlds.  He does this by adding a structure of supervaluation to 
the semantics.  This supervaluation feeds on s-functions that may differ in how they decide such ties. 
Such supervaluation may give a truth value to neither of the two counterfactuals, since they would be 
decided differently by different s-functions.  Yet, he holds that conditional excluded middle (A àB v A 
à ¬B) would still be valid, even though in some cases neither A à B nor A à¬B would be true. 
(Kvart, 1986, p.16)
In Stalnaker's words: 
Using  the  method  of  supervaluations,  we  may  acknowledge,  without  modifying  the 
abstract semantic theory of conditionals, that the selection functions that are actually used 
in making and interpreting counterfactual conditional statements correspond to orderings 
of possible worlds that admit ties and incomparabilities (Stalnaker, 1978, p. 90).
Stalnaker points out that in using the method of supervaluations, “we are not resorting to an ad 
hoc device  to  save  the  theory,  since  the  method  of  supervaluations,  or  some account  of  semantic 
indeterminacy, is necessary anyway to account for pervasive semantic underdetermination in natural 
8 For a detailed account see Stalnaker, 1981 pp 87-104.
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language.  Whatever theory of conditionals one favors, one must admit that vagueness is particularly 
prevalent in the use of conditional sentences” (Stalnaker, 1978, p. 90).
In the case where, for some world, there is no single closest world because of the vagueness of 
language, Stalnaker unlike Lewis, accepts that if the sentence is vague it is neither true nor false.  This 
analysis better explains linguistic behaviour than Lewis’.  Lewis himself admits as much, writing about 
the claim that (A ⃞ àB) & (A ⃞ à ¬ B) & (A ⃞ à(B v ¬B)), “… I must admit, it does sound like a 
contradiction.  Stalnaker’s theory does, and mine does not, respect the opinion of any ordinary language 
speaker who cares to insist that it is a contradiction.” (Lewis, 1973, p. 80).
Lewis  and  Stalnaker  also  differ  in  their  ontological  commitments  about  possible  worlds. 
Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist about possible worlds.  Bennett calls him an extreme realist about 
possible worlds.  Other worlds, for Lewis, as different from ours as you please, are as real as ours and 
actual to their inhabitants as ours is to us.  On Lewis’ account these possible worlds are metaphysically 
on a par with the actual world, which is in no way metaphysically special.  The other possible worlds 
are as metaphysically real to the inhabitant of those worlds, as the actual world is to us—the inhabitants 
of this world.  To say that there are no blue swans in this world is to say that in this world in which I 
live there are no blue swans.  But since it is possible that there are blue swans, in some other worlds 
there are blue swans and an inhabitant of such a world could truly say:  “In the actual world there are 
swans that are blue.”  In this view ‘actual world’ means the world that the person in question inhabits.
Bennett offers the following response to Lewis’ Extreme Realism which probably expresses 
the feelings of many:
Like most philosophers, I cannot believe that corresponding to each different position my 
right  foot  could  have at  this  moment  there are  countless  worlds,  each of  them a real 
cosmos; though I admit to having no basis to my incredulity (Bennett, 2003, p. 153).
50
But there are philosophical objections that extend beyond mere incredulity.  Like Bennett I am 
persuaded by Robert Adams’ moral objection against extreme realism9.  
I see a child about to wander onto a busy street where she risks being hurt or killed.  If I 
can  save her,  I  should;  I am morally required to.   However,  while  I can affect  what 
happens  to  this  girl,  I  cannot  influence  the  range  of  what  is  possible for  her;  the 
possibilities are laid out rigidly and immovably, and I can only affect which of them is 
actual.  For most of us, that generates a moral imperative; making some possible harm 
non-actual—that is clearly worth doing! But it  seems less so in the context of Lewis’s 
extreme realism, according to which every possibility is real.  By saving this child from 
being hurt, I do nothing to reduce the total amount of pain suffered; the pain that the child 
could have suffered  is  suffered by some child at some world.  I merely ensure that the 
sufferer is not at my world, the one you and I call ‘actual’ (Bennett, 2003, p. 154).
Stalnaker claims to be a “modest realist”  (Stalnaker, 1984, p. 169) about possible worlds. 
According to him, on this view, at least some counterfactuals are both irreducible and determinately 
true or false.  Counterfactuals have propositional content (they assert true/false things about the actual 
world) and, he thinks, as long as the meaning of a counterfactual has some propositional content, he is a 
realist about possible worlds.
Nowadays,  though,  a  philosopher's  claim to “realism” is  always open to  scrutiny,  and the 
starting place for investigation of whether a view deserves that label is usually the work of Michael 
Dummett.  Is a view like Stalnaker's realist or not according to Dummett's analysis?  Stalnaker himself 
tries to answer this question in the last few pages of his book Inquiry, with reference to Dummett's own 
discussion of counterfactuals  in  Truth and Other Enigmas  (pp. 145-146).   Certainly,  at first blush, 
Stalnaker's view seems to run afoul of Dummett's famous bivalence criterion for realism: realism for a 
discourse implies  that  all  suitably formulated  statements  in  the discourse are  determinately true or 
determinately false; and so by Dummett's lights Stalnaker ought to be counted as an anti-realist about 
9 For a detailed discussion of Lewis’s rebuttal, see Bennett, 2003, pp. 153-155.
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counterfactuals, to the extent that, as we have seen, he is of the view that some counterfactuals have no 
determinate truth values.
According to Stalnaker, Dummett provides the following three options for a counterfactual 
theorist.   Either s/he is a naive realist,  a reductionist,  or an anti-realist.   Dummett’s argument,  in a 
nutshell, is the following: counterfactuals are either bare or simple truths/falsities; that is, they are true 
in virtue of themselves and not because of other propositions, or they are true/false because of some 
other proposition,  in  terms of which the meaning of the sentence can be restated.   An analysis  of 
counterfactuals that asserts that they are “bare truths”, Dummett calls “naïve”.  If the meaning can be 
restated in terms of some other proposition, then the analysis is “reductionist” (Stalnaker, 1984, pp. 
160-169). 
Stalnaker  argues  that  this  a  false  dichotomy due to  Dummett’s  equivocation  on  the  word 
‘bare’.  Stalnaker writes, quoting Dummett: 
At one point, bare truth is defined in terms of reducibility.  “A statement is barely true if it 
is true, but there is no class of statements not containing it or a trivial variant of it to which 
any class containing it can be reduced.” But then it is said that “this amounts to holding 
that we cannot expect a non-trivial answer to the question ‘In virtue of what is a statement 
… true when it is true?” (Stalnaker, 1984, p.161)
Stalnaker asserts that “there is no conflict between the semantic analysis, which says that a 
counterfactual is true by virtue of the truth of the consequent in some different possible situation, and 
the realist thesis that a counterfactual is true in virtue of some fact about the actual world.” (Stalnaker, 
1984, p.163)  For, counterfactuals that are analyzed with respect to some possible world have some 
propositional content.  Stalnaker concludes that some counterfactuals are bare truths/falsities and hence 
irreducible, but complex, and not true only in virtue of themselves. 
52
As Stalnaker points out “Dummett’s characterization of realism seems to leave no room for 
being a realist about some members of a given class of statements and not about others.  Dummett 
seems to assume that if some counterfactuals fail to be barely true or false, then all must…” (Stalnaker, 
1984,  p. 165).  So the question whether he has any anti-realist inklings is still not answered clearly. 
Stalnaker allows for truth-value gaps and what he calls “superficial” and “deep” sources of truth value 
gaps.  Superficial indeterminacy occurs either when some statements like “Jack is tall” expresses a 
vague proposition or when “there is some indeterminacy in the relation between the sentence (as used 
in a given context) and the proposition it expresses” (Stalnaker, 1984, p. 166).  But “the indeterminacy 
in counterfactuals seems deeper than this”, Stalnaker asserts (Stalnaker, 1984, p. 165).  
About deep indeterminacy, Stalnaker says that it is conceivable, in some particular cases, that 
with regard to the counterfactual antecedent there is indeterminacy in the relation between the sentence 
and the proposition it expresses in the actual world, but its semantic determination, via possible worlds, 
is straightforward.  In such a case, we can regard the meaning of the antecedent of the counterfactual as 
determining a space of possible worlds and  “…for each possible world in the space, the [antecedent] 
proposition is true or false.  But when we ask, is the statement true in the actual world, we find the 
question has no answer for the following reason: there are no facts which determine which of several 
points (some on each side of the sharp line) is the actual world.  Our conceptual space of possibilities, I 
am supposing,  has  cut  things  up too  finely,  making distinctions  to  which nothing really answers.” 
(Stalnaker, 1984, p. 166).  
Stalnaker admits that the distinction between deep and superficial semantic indeterminacy is 
clearer in the model than in its application.  However its intuitive basis is evident from the following 
example Stalnaker offers:
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Consider  Tweedledee and Tweedledum,  again.   They had a coin but  before it  was  tossed 
someone ran off with it.   Having no other coin Tweedledee and Tweedledum argued about how it 
would have landed if it had been flipped.  Tweedledee is convinced that it would have landed heads and 
Tweedledum is convinced that it would have landed tails.  Neither has a reason for    his conviction. 
They agree that the coin was normal and the toss was fair.  There is little inclination in such a situation 
to say that one of them must be right.  We may think its absurd to assume that the counterfactual “if the 
coin had been tossed it would have landed heads”, is either barely true or barely false, but Tweedledee 
and  Tweedledum  obviously  make  this  assumption.   They  not  only  make  apparently  conflicting 
statements,  they have genuinely conflicting beliefs.  Their conflicting beliefs may make contrasting 
actions rational, and may lead to different attitudes of other kinds.  Maybe Tweedledee believes that 
because the coin would have landed heads, he will have an unlucky day, in which case he ought, given 
his beliefs, to be cautious.  Perhaps Tweedledum, although he believes that the coin would have landed 
tails, wished that Tweedledee had been right.
In the above example, the counterfactual “if the coin had been tossed it would have landed 
heads”, the question whether the statement is true in the actual world, remains unanswerable since there 
are no facts which determine which several points is the actual world.  In such situations according to 
Stalnaker “[W]e may need a distinction between possible  situations  in which the coin would have 
landed heads and possible situations in which the coin would have landed tails in order to give an 
adequate description of attitudes of Tweedledee and Tweedledum, even if we don’t need or want such a 
distinction in order to locate the actual world in a space of possibilities” (Stalnaker, 194,, p.167).  Thus 
for purposes of psychological explanation we need the finer grained space of possibilities “to which 
nothing really [i.e. actually] answers.”
Here,  then,  we  find  Stalnaker's  case  for  realism  in  spite  of  the  failure  of  bivalence  for 
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counterfactual claims.   Many counterfactuals  are  barely true  in the sense of not being reducible to 
another class of statements, but not in the sense of failing to be true in virtue of something.  They are 
true by virtue of the truth of the consequent in a different possible situation.  But not all counterfactuals 
are  barely true or false in this way, because the meaning of an antecedent may fail to pick out the 
relevant alternative (possible situations).  Nevertheless, in either case the result is that possible worlds 
are indispensable.  This indispensability is what Stalnaker points to when asked what makes him a 
realist about possible worlds.  This is what seems to be implied when Stalnaker claims to be a modest 
realist.  Thus we see that metaphysical consequence of the respective accounts of Stalnaker and Lewis, 
make them a modest realist and an extreme realist, respectively, about possible worlds.  
Some critics  of possible  worlds maintain  that  the metaphysical  baggage of having to  take 
possible  worlds somewhat  seriously is  an unwelcome price to pay.   One such critic  is  Kvart.   He 
developed a syntactic account of counterfactuals, in the post-Kripke era trying to avoid metaphysical 
consequences of possible world accounts.
Section 5. Kvart
Nowadays, in the post-Kripke era, almost everybody in the field advocates some or other sort 
of possible worlds account.  Igal Kvart is an interesting exception to this.  Kvart in his award winning 
book A Theory of Counterfactuals argues that the metaphysical price of possible worlds semantics is 
too high, and that a more sophisticated version of the earlier "syntactic" views can share the benefits of 
the possible worlds accounts.
We have seen that, generally speaking, a Chisholm-Goodman type of analysis, provides truth 
conditions for conditionals in terms of the following: 
p à q is true if q follows by law from p together with a set Γ of true sentences such that for r ∈ Γ it is 
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not the case that p à¬ r.  
Given  that  such  accounts  provide  truth  conditions  for  conditionals  in  terms  of  the  truth 
conditions of other conditionals, it involves an infinite regress.  Breaking free of this regress requires 
providing an independent characterization of  Γ.  Kvart makes a sophisticated attempt to do just that. 
He revives certain aspects of the pre-Kripkean approach because of worries about the metaphysical 
baggage that seems to come with the Lewis-Stalnaker account.  
I will explain the basic idea in Kvart’s account with the following example: 
Suppose Poonam lived in India, and during her Master’s in India she got a scholarship to study at a 
Canadian University.   She came to  Canada where subsequently she met  Jason and made a family. 
While studying in Canada she got a job offer in India and realized that “Had I (Poonam) not met Jason 
and begun a family in Canada, I (Poonam) would have gone back to work in India”.  
How  do  we  analyze  such  counterfactual  statements?   Kvart  explains  the  truth  of  such 
counterfactuals, when they are true, as follows: For a counterfactual to be true the consequent must be 
inferable from the antecedent and some implicit premises.  Now the question is what those implicit 
premises are.  It seems obvious that these implicit  premises must include some part of the world’s 
history prior to the antecedent.  But that does not exhaust the premises since no adequate analysis will 
make the statement  in  question come out  true unless there is  a premise to the effect  that  Poonam 
actually got a job offer from India.  However, this event (Poonam getting a job offer) does not belong to 
the prior history of the world (the world in which the antecedent event was supposed to take place), but 
to the time after it.  So, the question still remains—what are these implicit premises?
The important question to be asked according to Kvart is: what is special about the actual 
event of Poonam getting a job offer from an Indian University vis-à-vis the antecedent event of Poonam 
not meeting Jason?  Kvart’s proposal for analyzing counterfactual statements such as this one is the 
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following: the occurrence of the antecedent event (Poonam not meeting Jason) would not “endanger” or 
“would not put at risk” the occurrence of the job offer.  “And it  is the statements describing such 
events,  whose occurrence is  not “risked” by the antecedent  event  that  we would want  to  retain  as 
implicit  premises  out  of  the  history of  the  world  from the  time  to  which  the  antecedent  pertains 
onwards” (Kvart, 1986, pp. xi-xii).  
What do these notions of “endangering” or “putting at risk” amount to? According to Kvart 
they imply that  the  antecedent  event  (of  Poonam not  meeting  Jason)  bears  some  negative  causal 
relevance to such events (of Poonam getting a job offer).  According to Kvart, we want to preserve all 
true statements pertaining to times later then the antecedent event that describes events to which the 
antecedent event bears no negative causal relevance.  Not bearing negative causal relevance amounts to 
either causal irrelevance or pure positive causal relevance.  In other words, we want to include in the 
implicit premises all true statements describing events that pertain to times later than the antecedent 
event and especially/particularly the ones that describe the events that are not denied or annihilated but 
may be positively affected by the antecedent event.  Going back to our example—“Had Poonam not 
met  Jason and had a family in Canada, she would have gone back to work in India”,  we want to 
preserve all  events  not  endangered by the truth of  the antecedent.   And  that's the reason why the 
statement about the job offer should be preserved, presuming it isn't endangered.  In other words, we 
want to include in our implicit premises true statements such as, “Poonam gets a job offer”, “Poonam 
didn’t write nasty letters to her prospective employers in India”, etc.  (These are events to which the 
antecedent  bears  no  negative  causal  relevance).   Kvart  adds  an extra  clause that  we also  want  to 
preserve laws of nature.  
This is how Kvart analyzes counterfactuals whose antecedents are compatible with the prior 
history of  the  world.   He  explains  the  notions  of  “causal  relevance”  and  “purely positive  causal 
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relevance” in terms of probabilistic analysis using a notion of objective conditional probability.
The  requirement  that  besides  including  true  statements  (pertaining  to  time  later  than  the 
antecedent event) that are either causally irrelevant or else purely positively causally relevant, among 
our implicit premises, we also want to preserve laws of nature, limits the scope of Kvart’s account. 
Since  in  evaluating  counterfactuals  with  impossible  antecedents  we  may  encounter  physically 
impossible antecedents, and such antecedents would seem to have negative relevance for some or other 
laws.  So, while I think Kvart's account would be worth deeper investigation if my goal were a general 
account  of  counterfactuals,  through  the  remainder  of  the  thesis  I  shall  follow  the  mainstream  by 
presuming that a possible worlds account is the state of the art, and so my proposed revisions will be 
revisions to that sort of account.  This will leave an interesting question of whether similar revisions 
could be made to Kvart's account to achieve the same ends I achieve in Chapter IV and Chapter V, 
though I will not pursue that question in this thesis.
Section 6. A Generalized Lewis-Stalnaker Account
Differences in formulation and ontological commitments aside, I will for the remainder of this 
thesis  adopt  a  generalized  Lewis-Stalnaker  style  analysis  and  build  on  this  generalized  account, 
borrowing  (and  developing)  some  ideas  from  contemporary  semantics  for   Relevance  Logic,  to 
construct a new theory of counterfactuals.  
The generalized Lewis-Stalnaker account I will use is the following: In analyzing a conditional 
of the appropriate sort (i.e., P ⃞ à Q), one checks the closest possible worlds where the antecedent (P) 
is true, and if in all those possible worlds (where P is true), the consequent (Q) is true as well, the 
conditional in question is true.
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Chapter III: Conceivability, Possibility and The Notion of A Case
In this chapter I investigate the notions of conceivability, imaginability, and possibility with a special 
purpose.  The eventual goal is to isolate the notion of a case—a notion that will play a role in our new 
semantics for counterfactuals that is similar to the role played by possible worlds in Lewis-Stalnaker 
type accounts. 
As  we  have  seen,  there  are  similar  problems  with  analyses  of  thought  experiments  and 
counterfactuals, and there are similarities in the structures.  There is a fairly straightforward way to 
think about a link between counterfactuals  and thought experiments .  Recall  the three parts  of the 
description of a thought experiment, described in section 2, Chapter I—scenario description, argument 
for X being  the correct evaluation, and X being taken as the lesson (i.e., what the argument reveals 
about  the  real  world).   Now,  consider  a  counterfactual  with  an  antecedent  that  is  a  collection  of 
sentences that describes the scenario, and consequent being the X.  The argument then can be regarded 
as making a case that  this  particular  counterfactual  is  true.   So having an account  of  what  makes 
counterfactual true or false gives us a starting point for explaining how thought experiments work, and 
perhaps even a way to evaluate the quality of the arguments.  
However,  if  the  thought  experiment  in  question  considers  an  impossible  scenario,  the 
counterfactual we end up with, using this process, is worthless.  Since, as we have seen, the current 
accounts of counterfactual do not offer satisfactory explanations of such counterfactuals.  So we need to 
develop an account of counterfactuals that is more comprehensive and is able to systematically handle 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  This chapter is a step in this direction.  As we will see in 
this chapter,  examining the notion of conceivability is a key to understanding the notion of case.  Cases 
are crucial to our core project of developing a new semantics for counterfactuals.
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There  are  two  apparent  advantages  to  expressing  thought  experiments  in  terms  of 
counterfactuals, especially for incomplete thought experiments.  First, in case of a thought experiment 
with an incomplete  scenario,  when we express it  in  terms of a counterfactual,  the antecedent,  of 
course, turns out incomplete.  But as we know, all counterfactuals have incomplete antecedents.  The 
literature on counterfactuals, as we have seen earlier in the thesis, includes some persuasive accounts 
about what determines the truth values of counterfactuals, in spite of their antecedents not completely 
describing the alternative possibilities relevant to determining the truth values.  By expressing thought 
experiments in terms of counterfactuals we can overcome the problem that incompleteness poses for 
thought experiments.  So, the main advantage of analyzing thought experiments in this way is that it 
makes it possible to exploit the same accounts of counterfactuals to explain the truth conditions of 
claims about thought experiments.  
Another advantage of expressing thought experiments in terms of counterfactuals is that there 
has been a significant development in the theories of counterfactuals, especially in the post-Kripke 
era.  So, we can look at various theories of counterfactuals to see if we can use them to analyze 
incomplete/unimaginable, yet useful thought experiments.
It is worth mentioning here that, of all the different kinds of thought experiments that are 
incomplete, my focus is on the kind of thought experiments that are incomplete because there is some 
inconsistency,  contradiction,  impossibility or  other  incoherence  built  into  the  specification  of  the 
experimental set up.  What do we do with these special kinds of thought experiments?  In Chapter IV, 
we will see how, by using semantics borrowed from Relevance Logic and a Lewis-Stalnaker style 
account of counterfactuals, and by building on the borrowed semantics, we can make sense of such 
incomplete  and impossible  scenarios.   We will  be  in  a  position  to  see  why incompleteness  and 
impossibility do not always hamper a thought experiment’s informativeness/usefulness.  We will also 
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find out,  by looking at  theories  of  counterfactuals,  how we can prevent  everything and anything 
following from an  impossibility.   This  comes  in  handy in  explaining  why from some important 
thought experiments such as Strawson’s auditory world, everything does not follow.  Notice that the 
auditory world is a special case not only in that it is incomplete, but in that it is also impossible.  This 
is what is in store for Chapter IV.
This chapter is divided into seven sections.  Section 1, includes the preliminaries that set the 
stage for what is to come.  Section 2 is a brief historical discussion of the two notions of imaginability 
and conceivability.  In section 3, we discuss different kinds of possibilities viz., epistemic, logical, 
metaphysical,  and nomological possibilities  and some key issues regarding these various kinds of 
possibilities.  Section 4 is an overview of the issues regarding conceivability and possibility.  This 
section provides a glimpse of the recent discussions on these topics against a Kripkean backdrop. 
Section 5 also includes a detailed discussion of the concepts of imaginability and conceivability.  In 
this section I argue that there is a distinction to be made between conceivability and imaginability, and 
that there are three layers to these concepts viz.,  imaginable,  conceivable, and  fully and coherently  
describable.   In section  6,  I consider the much anticipated  question “Is conceivability a guide to 
possibility?” and argue that it is not.  Section 7 is where all this work pays off.  I will introduce the 
concepts  of  states and  cases,  and  argue  that  while  conceivability  is  not  a  guide  to  possibility, 
philosophers have been right to pay close attention to it:  it is a guide to being a case, and, as we will 
see in the next chapter, being a case is an important thing indeed.
Section 1. A Few Preliminaries
First,  I want to explain  what I mean by usefulness of a thought experiment.   A thought 
experiment is useful insofar as we can learn some lesson/s from it, philosophical or otherwise.  In 
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other words, a thought experiment is useful if it is informative about the subject matter in question. 
For example, Galileo’s thought experiment is useful because we learn from this thought experiment 
that the natural speed with which a body falls is independent of its weight.  The Theseus’ ship thought 
experiment informs us that  identity, at least for some objects, has to do with something over and 
above bodily identity.
What  I  want  to  show  here  is  that  when  it  comes  to  useful  but  impossible  thought 
experiments, we get the "information" by figuring out that a particular counterfactual is true (or some 
class of counterfactuals are).  Consider fission for example: In order to see how fission is informative, 
we express this in terms of a counterfactual or a series of counterfactuals, one possible counterfactual 
might look something like the following: “if it were the case that your brain could be transplanted into 
another body nearly identical to your own, and that either the left or right hemisphere of the brain 
would be sufficient to support full preservation of all mental properties, and that your right and left 
hemispheres are successfully transplanted into two different bodies, such that each has all of your 
memories,  beliefs,  desires,  etc.,  and  that  both  transplants  are  successful.…,  then  you  would  be 
identical  to  neither  continuer”.   This  is  just  one  counterfactual  and  it  is  not  clear  whether  this 
counterfactual is true or false.  Another counterfactual about fission could be: :“if it were the case that 
your brain could be transplanted into another body nearly identical to your own, and suppose further 
that either the left or right hemisphere of the brain would be sufficient to support full preservation of 
all mental properties, and that your right and left hemispheres are successfully transplanted into two 
different bodies, such that each has all of your memories, beliefs, desires, etc.…, then you would be 
identical to both continuers”.  A third possible counterfactual would be: “if it were the case that your 
brain could be transplanted into another body nearly identical to your own, and suppose further that 
either the left or right hemisphere of the brain would be sufficient to support full preservation of all 
62
mental  properties,  and that  your right  and left  hemispheres are successfully transplanted into two 
different bodies, such that each has all of your memories, beliefs, desires, etc., and only one transplant 
is successful.…, then you would be identical to one of the continuers”.  We may need to consider a 
couple of possible counterfactuals with the same antecedent but different consequents depicting the 
possible  outcomes to  figure out  which of these counterfactuals  is  true.   After figuring out which 
counterfactual  is  true  we  will  be  in  a  position  to  say  what  information  the  particular  thought 
experiment is able to give us.  And the philosophical debate is fruitfully considered a debate about 
which counterfactual is true, perhaps?
Again consider the auditory world:  One possible counterfactual is the following; “If there is 
such a being as Hero, who resides in a completely auditory and non spatio-temporal world with only 
sound fragments that could serve as objective particulars, and Hero has one and only one mode of 
outer  sense,  viz.,  hearing,  and  he  distinguishes  between  different  sound  particulars  against  the 
background of “universal sound” or “M-sound”, then in such a world objectivity would amount to…”. 
Again we may need to consider a few other counterfactuals with the same antecedent but different 
possible consequents to see what the thought experiment can teach us.
In  both  the  auditory  world  and  the  fission  example,  and  other  similar  ones  which  are 
incomplete yet useful, one can extract the relevant “information” by translating the particular thought 
experiment into a series of counterfactuals and figuring out which particular counterfactual/s is/are 
true.  In some cases many counterfactuals may be true, especially in cases where many lessons may be 
learnt.  Such counterfactuals are special cases in so far as their antecedents are impossible.  Similarly 
one can also extract information from thought experiments that turn into counterfactuals with false but 
possible antecedents.  However, as stated in Chapter I, classical logic, and in particular in accounts of 
counterfactuals  built  on classical  logic,  the first  sort  pose a special  problem in that  anything and 
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everything follows form an impossible antecedent.  Relevance Logic, as we will see in Chapter  IV, 
when coupled with Kripke-Stalnaker style semantic machinery, provides us with the tools to explain 
why any and every counterfactual with an impossible antecedent is not true.  Thus with the help of 
Relevance Logic we can find out why only certain counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are 
true and what this can help us analyze a certain class of  thought experiments so that we are in a 
position to accommodate thought experiments that are impossible and incomplete.
I should mention here that  initially it  seems incompleteness and impossibility go hand in 
hand, at least for the cases we look at in this thesis.  In other words, it seems that precisely the feature 
that  makes  a  thought  experiment  impossible  also  makes  it  incomplete.   That  feature  is 
inconceivability.  As we will see later in section 5, this is not the case—impossibility does not entail 
inconceivability.  Amongst other things, we need to consider in what ways unimaginability is tied to 
impossibility.  In other words, do things that are inconceivable also turn out to be impossible or vice 
versa?  The question that is more commonly asked is the contrapositive: Is conceivability a guide to 
possibility?   We  will  see  that  in  asking  this  question  we  get  our  answer  regarding  whether 
unimaginability is tied to impossibility.
Section 2. Historical Perspective of Conceivability and Imaginability
 In  this  section  we  will  be  dealing  with  the  following  two  pairs  of  concepts: 
imaginability/unimaginability, and conceivability/inconceivability.  Considering these two notion from 
a historical perspective is important because, as we will see, philosophers such as Descartes draw a 
sharp  distinction  between  conceivability  and  imaginability,  whereas  Hume  uses  the  two  notions 
interchangeably.  Not making a distinction for Hume has some unpalatable consequences, as we will 
see.  We can learn some lessons from history about why we ought to make a distinction between these 
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two notions. 
Generally speaking, is there a distinction between imagining and conceiving?  If there is, then 
what is the nature of this distinction?  Prima facie it seems that imagining is imagistic, and sensory in 
nature  whereas  conceiving  is  non-imagistic  and  conceptual.   So  what  is  the  connection  between 
imagining  and  conceiving?   More  generally   “one  might  wonder  about  the  relation  between 
imagination/conception,  on  the  one  hand,  and  perception/intellection,  on  the  other:  is  the  former 
parasitic on the latter…?” (Gendler, 2002, p. 9).  
We can trace the distinction between conceiving and imagining back to early modern period, 
particularly to  Descartes  and Hume.   The distinction  between imagining  and conceiving is  clearly 
expressed in Descartes'’ letter to Messene where he writes: “whatever we conceive without an image is 
an idea of the pure mind, and whatever we conceive with an image is an idea of the imagination” 
(Descartes vol. III, p. 186).  Descartes draws a sharp distinction between intellection and understanding, 
on the one hand, and imagination and sensation on the other.  While intellection and understanding are 
cognitive faculties  that  belong to  us  essentially  qua thinking things,  imagination  and sensation are 
limited cognitive faculties that belong to us  contingently qua embodied beings (Descartes, vol. II, p. 
51).  As Gendler and Hawthorne point out, these faculties, according to Descartes, not only differ in 
their range of subject-matter in that imagination is “nothing but an application of the cognitive faculty 
to  a  body which  is  intimately  present  to  it”  (Descartes,  vol.  II,  p.  50),  they  also  differ  in  their 
phenomenology.   For,  Descartes  writes  in  the  Sixth  Meditation:  “When  I  imagine  a  triangle,  for 
example, I do not merely understand that it is a figure bounded by three lines, but at the same time I 
also see the three lines with my mind’s eye as if they were present before me” (Descartes, vol. II, p. 50).
Hume,  unlike  Descartes,  does  not  maintain  a  sharp  distinction  between  conceiving  and 
imagining and conflates the two terms.  For, he writes: 
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'Tis  an  establish’d  maxim  in  metaphysics,  That  whatever  the  mind  clearly  conceives, 
includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing that we imagine is 
absolutely impossible [emphasis my own] (Hume, 1968, p. 32)
It seems to me that Hume is making two claims here: (a) what we imagine or conceive is presented as 
possible and (b) what we imagine or conceive is  not absolutely impossible.  What (a) claims is that the 
relation between conceivability and possibility is internal, whereas what (b) claims is that there is an 
external  relation  (mind to  possible  world,  if  you will) between conceivability and possibility.   (b) 
amounts to claiming that what the mind conceives/imagines is  in fact not absolutely impossible  or 
possible in some states of affairs.  (b) is a much stronger claim than (a), what we imagine/conceive is 
presented as  possible  (to  our mind).   We can show that  (b) is  a much stronger claim than (a) by 
considering conceivable impossibilities.  If we were to be able to conceive of impossibilities, would 
they be presented as possible (as (a) requires) or would they possible in some states of affairs?  The 
latter  would  be  an  absurd  claim to  make  because  according  to  this  claim whatever  the  mind  can 
conceive  is not absolutely impossible or possible in some states of affairs, but what we are talking 
about is conceivable impossibilities.  How can impossibilities be also possible in any sense?  Although 
these claims, viz., (a) and (b), might not be directly related to the distinction between conceiving and 
imagining, for Hume the question whether conceivable impossibilities are only presented as possible 
arises, one might say, because he fails to make a distinction between conceivability and imaginability. 
This is because ordinarily an act of imagination presents the imagined entity as possible.  If imagining = 
conceiving,  then  conceivable  impossibility  =  imaginable  impossibility.   Thus  making  conceivable 
impossibilities presented as possible.
This is a brief overview of the history for the distinction between conceiving and imagining. 
The natural progression would be to consider whether there is any distinction to be made between 
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conceiving and imagining and what my take is on this  distinction.   However, before going on to 
discuss the distinction between conceiving and imagining, I shall consider the following questions: 
What kinds of possibilities/impossibilities are there?  What is the relationship between conceivability 
and possibility?   There are  two reasons  for  this  diversion:  first  I want  to  consider  the  notion  of 
possibility/impossibility separately from conceiving and imagining.  As we will see there is a natural 
tendency to assume that  conceiving and possibility are so closely tied together that  being able to 
conceive x entails x’s possibility.  And secondly, the notion of possibility/impossibility is closely tied 
to conceiving in such a way that we have to sort out the different kinds of possibilities/impossibilities 
before  answering the  question  whether  conceiving is  a  guide  to  possibility.   In other  words,  the 
question becomes what kind of possibility is conceivability a guide to, if any?
Section 3. Different Kinds of Possibilities and Some Key Issues
In their recent work, Gendler and Hawthorne divide possibility into two broad classes, viz., 
epistemic possibility and non-epistemic possibility.  Epistemic possibility is “defined relative to some 
subject  (or  sets  of  subjects)  in  terms  of  some  body of  knowledge  or  evidence  available  to  (or 
otherwise associated with) the subjects(s) in question” (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 3).  There 
are two kinds of epistemic possibility----strict and permissive.  On the permissive account, 
P is epistemically possible for S just in case S does not know that not-P.  
On the strict account, 
P is epistemically possible for S just in case P is consistent (metaphysically compossible) with all that 
S knows.  (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 3).
There are important differences between these two accounts, as Gendler and Hawthorne point 
out.  While on the strict account epistemic possibility entails metaphysical possibility, on the 
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permissive account it does not.  
Non-epistemic possibility is the other kind of possibility.  They distinguish three kinds of 
non-epistemic possibility  viz., logical, metaphysical, and nomological possibility, which they define 
in the following way:
(1) logical:  P  is  logically possible  just  in  case no contradiction  can be proven from P using the 
standard rules of deductive inference.
(2) metaphysical: This can be defined in terms of a primitive notion along the lines of “how things 
might have been”/“how God might have made things”.  In possible world terminology, it is actual that 
P just in case P obtains in the actual world.  It is (metaphysically) possible that P just in case P obtains 
in some possible world. 
(3) nomological: P is nomologically possible for a relevant body of laws just in case P is logically 
consistent with the body of truths implied by those laws (for example, if we consider the true laws of 
Physics, P is possible if P is consistent with the laws of physics).  
In other words, P is nomologically possible just in case S is not ruled out by the (logically 
contingent)  laws  of  nature  (that  counts  as  the  relevant  body of  laws  in  that  context).   So  it  is 
nomologically impossible for two objects separated by a finite distance not to exert gravitational force 
on each other, but it is nomologically possible that there are ponds of ice cream.
According to Gendler and Hawthorne, generally speaking logical possibility is the broadest 
sort of possibility.  According to their definition, a proposition is said to be logically possible if there 
is  no  logical  contradiction  involved  in  its  being  true.   “George  Bush  is  a  bachelor"  is  logically 
possible,  although it  is actually false.  “George Bush is a married bachelor” is  on the other hand 
logically impossible.  Most philosophers have thought that statements like "If I flap my arms very 
hard, I will fly" are logically possible, although they are nomologically impossible.  
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Now let us consider some details about these possibilities.  First let us consider metaphysical 
possibility and logical possibility.  In this context consider the following quote from Gideon Rosen's 
"Modal Fictionalism Fixed".  
In the first place, the feature of the standard semantics for counterfactuals which Hale's 
objection exploits is plausibly regarded as a defect in that analysis.  As Hartry Field has 
observed  in  another  context,  we  do  seem  to  be  able  to  make  discriminating  use  of 
counterfactuals  whose antecedents we suppose to express necessary falsehoods (Hartry 
Field: Realism, Mathematics and Modality, (Blackwell 1989).[3], pp. 237-8): if arithmetic 
were inconsistent, set theory would be inconsistent; if the God of the philosophers (i.e., a 
perfect, necessary being) existed, the righteous would have nothing to fear; if the Queen 
were your mother, Diana would be your sister-in-law.  There may be no good systematic 
semantics for counterfactuals of this sort.  But this does not mean that they don't make 
sense, or that a philosopher may not avail himself of them in trying to explain his view. 
The significant feature of these examples is that the alleged impossibilities supposed in 
the  antecedents  are  not  logical  impossibilities.   They are  substantive  impossibilities, 
metaphysical or mathematical; and while there may be insuperable obstacles to making 
sense of counter-logical conditionals, conditionals whose antecedents are impossibilities 
of  these  substantive  sorts  seem  much  better  behaved—as  indeed  we  all  tend  to 
acknowledge whenever we explore the consequences of a metaphysical or mathematical 
view we in fact reject (and so, presumably, regard as impossible) by saying such things as 
'If that were true, then this would be true; but this is absurd; so that must be false.' (Rosen, 
1995, pp. 70-71).
So, according to Rosen, there are two kinds of impossibilities viz., logical and substantive. 
Substantive  impossibilities  include  at  least  two  kinds,  viz.,  metaphysical  and  mathematical.   It  is 
apparent  from the above that  Rosen subscribes  to  the  view that  there  is  a  distinction  to  be made 
between the  two kinds  of  substantive  possibilities,  viz.,  mathematical  possibility and metaphysical 
possibility.  I would like to mention here that I will ignore the distinctions between the two sorts of 
substantive possibility (mathematical and metaphysical).  It is worth pointing out in this context that 
Rosen  thinks  that  there  may  be  no  good  systematic  semantics  for  mathematically  impossible 
counterfactuals such as “if arithmetic were inconsistent, set theory would be inconsistent”.  There is a 
systematic semantics for counterfactuals of the sort mentioned above, as we will see in Chapter IV.
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In the  context  of  possible  worlds  the  modality in  question  is  “metaphysical”  possibility. 
Metaphysical possibility is either equivalent to logical possibility or distinct from it, depending on the 
philosopher’s view.  Following Kripke, some philosophers hold that there is a distinction to be made 
between these two kinds of possibilities.  In statements like "Water is H2O”, which they think are 
metaphysically necessary, ‘water’ functions as a demonstrative.  So, ‘water’ is a rigid designator.  A 
term  t  is a  rigid designator if  t picks out the same thing in all possible worlds, in which the thing 
exists.  Now since, ‘water’ is a rigid designator, and since the chemical composition of water is H2O, 
and it is an essential property of water, it is metaphysically necessary that "Water is H2O".  That is, 
‘water’ picks out the stuff with the chemical composition of H2O in all possible worlds.  However, 
although it is metaphysically necessary that “Water is H2O”, it is not logically necessary that “Water is 
H2O” as there is no formal contradiction involved in saying "Water is  not H2O".  Thus according to 
them,  "Water  is  not H2O"  is  logically  possible,  even  though  it  turns  out  to  be  metaphysically 
impossible.  
Pre-Kripke, philosophers in the opposite camp considered logical and metaphysical necessity 
to be coextensive.  They would deny that “Water is H2O” is necessary at all.  Claims like “Brain states 
are mental  states”, “Water is  H2O”  were regarded by most philosophers in the pre-Kripke era as 
contingent identities, since they are clearly not logically necessary, and since the only sensible notion 
we can attach to the phrase “metaphysically necessary” is “logically necessary”.
In this context, consider the following claims:
(1) H2O contains hydrogen atoms.
(2) Water contains hydrogen atoms.
Alexander Pruss discusses how by using a Kripkean account of natural kind names, one can 
defend a claim that  one cannot  use the distinction between logical and metaphysical  necessity to 
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distinguish  between  (1)  and  (2)10.   For  those  who  maintain  a  distinction  between  logical  and 
metaphysical  necessity,  some propositions,  such  as  (1)  are  logically necessary since  it  is  logically 
necessary that anything that has two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen in each molecule (and 
that, after all, is the definition of “H2O”) contains hydrogen atoms.  (2) is only metaphysically necessary 
since  it  does  not  follow  from the  logic  of  the  terms.  Similarly,  “Water  is H2O” is  not  logically 
necessary, since it does not follows from the logic of the terms.  Philosophers in this camp would claim 
that (1) and (2) have different modal statuses because they express different sentences. 
Those who claim that there is no distinction to be made between logical and metaphysical 
necessity would reply by saying that they cannot have different modal statuses, because modal status 
belongs to propositions, not to sentences, and (1) and (2) express the same proposition, and hence have 
the same modal status.  If following Kripke we say that “water” in (2) functions as a demonstrative 
pointing to the natural kind of that paradigm body of water that was involved in a Kripkean baptism, 
and if that natural kind just is H2O, then the difference between (1) and (2) involves no change in modal 
status.  Thus one cannot use the notions of logical necessity and metaphysical necessity to distinguish 
between  (1)  and  (2).   This  would  imply  that  on  this  view  the  claim  “Water  is  H2O”  is 
logically/metaphysically necessary.  
I will not go into details about modal status of sentences vs. modal status of propositions.  It is 
sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  our  discussion  to  say that  we will  take  the  metaphysical  and  logical 
necessity to be distinct
Now  let  us  consider  the  relationship  between  metaphysical  possibility  and  nomological 
possibility.   In this  context  let  us consider a recent view developed by Edgington on metaphysical 
possibility.  In “Two Kinds of Possibility” Edgington argues that metaphysical necessity “derives from 
10 I have relied on Pruss, A.R.: Possible Worlds: What They Are Good For and What They Are http://www9.georgetown.edu/
faculty/ap85/papers/PhilThesis.html#_Toc515941274).
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a modal concept we all use, in distinguishing things which can happen and things which can’t, in virtue 
of  their  nature,  which  we  discover  empirically”  (Edgington,  2004,  p.  1).   Thus  she  claims  that 
metaphysical possibility is constrained by laws of nature.  This view, according to her, is Kripkean in 
spirit and is a consequence of a natural reading of what Kripke says about metaphysical possibility and 
necessity.  As we have already seen, on a Kripkean interpretation, statements like “Water is H2O”, are 
metaphysically necessary.  “Water is H2O” is metaphysically necessary because among the essential 
properties  of water is  that  it’s  chemical  composition is  H2O.  In case of “Water is  H2O”, laws of 
chemistry (a law of nature) dictate that water cannot be something other than H2O.  
To gain a clear understanding of Edgington’s claim, it is important to understand a traditional 
debate about the modal status of laws of nature.  Following Hume, many philosophers hold the view 
that the laws of nature are  metaphysically contingent—that there could have been different natural 
laws than the ones that actually obtain.  If this is the case, then for example it would be both logically 
and metaphysically possible that the law of gravity does not hold.  So, for example, apples might not 
fall from a tree but would float in mid air.  However, it seems that there is an important sense in which 
this is not possible; given that the laws of nature are what they are, there is no way that apples would 
float.  
While  this  is  certainly  the  more  prevalent  view,  there  have  been  dissenting  voices.   Sidney 
Shoemaker, for instance, argues that natural laws are in fact necessary, not contingent.  On this view, 
nomological possibility is equivalent to metaphysical possibility.  Edgington agrees with Shoemaker 
in holding that laws of nature are necessary in some serious sense. She points out, in “Two Kinds of 
Possibility”,  that  there  has been a  competing tendency in  Philosophy to  either  assimilate  laws of 
nature with necessary truths  or to differentiate  laws of nature from necessary truths.   And before 
Kripke, in so far as the a priori and the metaphysically necessary were not separated, this dilemma 
72
remained unresolvable.  In Edgington’s words:
Very roughly,  the prevalent philosophical  view before Hume,  correctly perceiving that 
such  statements  have  the  mark  of  necessity,  was  that  we  have  to  think  of  them  as 
somehow deducible from self-evident truths about how the world must be—if we only 
knew how.  Hume showed definitively that reason was not up to the task.  The prevalent 
view since Hume, recognizing that they can’t be known a priori, concludes that they are 
contingent  regularities….Only  with  Kripke’s  separation  of  the  a  priori and  the 
metaphysically necessary is there room for the view that the pre-Humeans were right in 
thinking that laws of nature are necessary but wrong in thinking they are knowable  a 
priori, and the post-Humeans made exactly the opposite mistake.  If  Kripke has shown 
that there is a class of necessary truths which can be known empirically, and if  there are 
reasons for treating laws as necessary in some serious sense, why should this class not be 
the natural home for natural laws? (Edgington, 2004, p. 3)
Edgington offers two reasons for treating natural laws as necessary in some serious sense. 
First, “the modal idiom is the natural reason for distinguishing laws from accidental generalizations. 
Nothing can travel faster than light.  These plants can’t be grown under freezing temperatures.  These 
other plants, merely, never are, in the history of the universe, grown at freezing temperatures, although 
they could have been” (Edgington, 2004, p. 3).  The second reason is that, according to Edgington, 
most neo-Humean theories trying to distinguish between natural laws and necessity in some serious 
sense,  fail.   The  best  known neo-Humean  theory which  she  calls  “‘Mill-Ramsey-Lewis’”  theory 
maintains that laws are those true contingent generalizations that occur as axioms or theorems in the 
true deductive system that achieves the best combination of simplicity and strength, by our standards 
of simplicity and strength.  Now, according to Edgington, the problem with this theory is that although 
we may very well like better a world in which laws fit into nice systems and we may have acquired 
reasons to think we live in such a world, it is far from obvious that our concept of law precludes the 
possibility of relatively isolated laws governing the workings of their own subject matter, not clashing, 
but  not  exactly  cohering  either.   Conversely,  as  Edgington  points  out  using  Bas  van  Frassen’s 
example,  might  there  not  be  highly informative  and simple  generalizations  which  are  not  laws? 
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Consider a world which contains just two kinds of objects: iron cubes and gold spheres—whizzing 
around according to Newtonian mechanics.  Suppose also that it just so happens that there were no 
collisions, although there could very well have been, that altered the shapes of these objects.  It is hard 
to deny that in such a world “all and only cubes are iron” and “all and only spheres are golden” add a 
lot of informational content to the description of this world, at little loss of simplicity.  But they are 
not laws.  
As we can see, this  debate regarding whether natural  laws are necessary in some serious 
sense  has  bearing  on  our  definition  of  metaphysical  possibility  and  nomological  possibility.   If 
metaphysical possibility is constrained by laws of nature then what is metaphysically possible is also 
nomologically possible.  There is definitely something to be said about laws of nature being necessary 
“in some serious sense” in that they are not merely accidental but uniform regularities.  In the context 
of  this  thesis  one  consequence  of  collapsing  the  lines  between  metaphysical  possibility  and 
nomological possibility is the following: As I shall argue,  fully and coherently describable implies 
possible.   If  this  is  so  then  it  yields  a  surprising  result,  given  that  metaphysical  possibility  and 
nomological  possibility  amounts  to  the  same  as  on  the  Edgington-Shoemaker  view.   How  can 
something about language or our linguistic capabilities (i.e., x being fully and coherently describable) 
be a guide to laws of nature (i.e. , x being nomologically possible)?  I agree with Edgington  that laws 
of nature are necessary “in some serious sense”.  However, I don’t think that metaphysical necessity is 
constrained by laws of  nature.   So my eventual  view is  compatible  partly with both approaches, 
because I concur with the Edgington-Shoemaker view in that laws are necessary is some serious sense 
and I also concur with the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view that nomological possibility and metaphysical 
possibility are not one and the same.
Going back to van Frassen’s examples of a world which contains just two kinds of objects, 
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iron cubes and gold spheres, I would like to say the following: I concur with Edgington in saying that, 
in such a world, statements like “all and only cubes are iron” and “all and only spheres are golden” 
accurately describe the world and these statements are not laws.  Facts about our language do not 
determine laws of nature;  Edgington would agree,  since she thinks that generalizations like the ones 
mentioned above are not laws.  Although it is accurate in our world to say that “all apples that fall off 
the tree, fall  downwards”, it  is not a law itself.   The law behind this generalization is the law of 
gravitation.  All generalizations that hold uniformly are not alike.  Generalizations like “all and only 
cubes  are  iron”  in  a  world  where  all  objects  are  iron  cubes  and  gold  spheres  are  the  same  as 
generalizations like “all ravens are black”.  However, generalizations like “all objects fall upon being 
dropped” explain cause and effect.  Laws are what explains such causal generalizations.  So, I agree 
with Edgington in that not all generalizations, even those which hold uniformly in a given world, are 
laws.  After all, such uniformity may in fact be accidental.
Now,  let  us  consider  the  relationship  between  metaphysical  possibility  and  epistemic 
possibility.  It is impossible for somebody to square the circle.  This is metaphysically impossible. 
However, it was only in 1882 that the task was proven to be impossible, as a consequence of the fact 
that “pi” is not a algebraic but a transcendental number.  It had been known for some decades before 
then  that  if pi  were transcendental  then  the  construction  would  be  impossible,  but  that  pi  is 
transcendental was not proven until 1882.  Although before 1882, it was epistemically possible for 
somebody to  square the circle,  it  was  always metaphysically impossible.   Since all  mathematical 
proofs are a priori,  that it  is impossible to square the circle is a priori.   Thus in this context it  is 
important to distinguish between “knowable a priori to be false” and “epistemologically impossible”. 
Notice that the distinction between two kinds of epistemic possibility that Gendler and Hawthorne 
talk about comes into this.  If something is provable but has not been proven yet, then it is knowable a 
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priori.  But it’s negation is still epistemically possible in the weaker (permissive, to use Gendler and 
Hawthorne’s terminology) sense.  In this context it is important to distinguish these two notions of 
possibility.  
The epistemically possible and the metaphysically possible are orthogonal.  That is to say, it 
can be epistemically possible that P without being metaphysically possible that P and vice versa.  To 
illustrate that it can be epistemically possible that P without being metaphysically possible, consider 
Edgington’s own example: Suppose the security men inside the tradesmen’s entrance to 10 Downing 
Street find a large parcel.   Upon examining it closely they hear a ticking noise and call the bomb 
squad because that  bomb might  explode.   But  it  turns out  that  the parcel  contains  an eighteenth 
century clock just back from repair.  Now, there was no metaphysical possibility that the parcel would 
explode, although there was an epistemic possibility.
The  converse,  that  there  are  cases  where  something  is  not  epistemically  possible  but  is 
metaphysically possible  is  illustrated with one of Kripke’s examples  (see Edgington,  2004, p.  7): 
Leverrier, noticing some irregularities in the orbits of the planets, concludes that they must be caused 
by another, as yet unseen planet, and decides to call it “Neptune”.  Now, it is epistemically possible 
that his hypothesis was wrong—that there is no such planet.  But if his hypothesis is right—if Neptune 
exists—it is the planet causing these irregularities.  This conditional is known a priori,  at least by 
Leverrier.  It follows from his stipulation about the use of ‘Neptune’.  There is no epistemic possibility 
that  Neptune  exists  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  irregularities.   But  there  is  a  metaphysical 
possibility.  Thus it was metaphysically possible that Neptune, which caused the irregularities, was 
knocked off course a million years ago and did no such thing.
Following Edgington, we can further suppose that an unconnected group of astronomers in 
China develops a new, more powerful telescope, and discovered this same heavenly body and decided 
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to call it 'Buddha'.  It is not knowable a priori that Neptune is Buddha.  But if this is a situation where 
the same object was named twice in two separate incidents,  any metaphysically possible thing that 
could have happened to Neptune could have happened to Buddha.  There is no metaphysically possible 
situation in which they are different objects.  But for anyone wondering whether Neptune is Buddha, it 
is epistemically possible that it is not.
Now, coming back to Gendler and Hawthorne’s definition of logical possibility, notice that 
they do not describe a very sophisticated notion of logical possibility.  First of all, in this definition one 
cannot say that things like square circles would be logically impossible which it should be.  Also some 
second order  “contradictions”  are  not  provable.   But  they are  contradictions  nevertheless  and thus 
remain logically impossible.   However if we follow Gendler and Hawthorne’s definition of logical 
possibility these contradictions  would not  be logically impossible  since they are not provable.   To 
elaborate: In first order logic the following holds:
if s|−A, then s|= A (this is soundness)
if s|= A, then s|− A(this is completeness).
This means that in first order logic A is provable if and only if A is logically true (i.e., valid). 
However,  in  second order  logic,  there  is  no  complete  proof  procedure.   In other  words,  for  any 
particular system of proofs for second order logic, there are “logical truths” that are not provable.  It 
follows that there are “contradictions” that are not provably inconsistent—that is, there will be A, B 
which are inconsistent but cannot be proven to be inconsistent.  Let T be an unprovable logical truth. 
Then ¬T is logically impossible.  But if from ¬T we could derive P  ∧¬P, we could thereby prove 
¬¬T, so we can prove T after all.  Hence there are no contradictions provable from ¬T.  Thus, we can 
see that Gendler and Hawthorne’s definition of logical possibility is inaccurate.  
This is an overview of the different kinds of possibilities and some key philosophical issues 
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relating to these kinds of possibilities.  Now let us look at the notions of conceivable and possible.
Section 4. Overview of Conceivability and Possibility
It is important to investigate these two notions and delineate the differences between the two 
because there is a natural tendency to presuppose that conceivability of an entity entails its possibility. 
Therefore, before investigating the question whether conceivability is a guide to possibility or not, we 
should try to get a clear understanding of the notions independently of one another.  The point is nicely 
put by Timothy Williamson: 
Although there are  truth and falsehood about  conceivability and inconceivability,  they 
concern our mental capacities, whereas metaphysical modalities are supposed to be mind-
independent.  They are not contingent on mental capacities (Williamson, 2007, p. 4). 
So conceivability is a mind-dependent and possibility a mind-independent notion.
Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, identified the two way independence between the knowable 
a priori and the metaphysically necessary.  A priori and a posteriori are epistemological and necessity 
and contingency are metaphysical categories.  In other words, it is an epistemological question to ask 
whether a proposition is a priori or a posteriori.  Whether a proposition is necessary or contingent is a 
metaphysical question.  
With Kripke we learnt not only that these concepts differ in their intension, they also differ in 
their extension.  Besides necessary a priori and contingent a posteriori truths there are also necessary a 
posteriori and contingent a priori truths11. Kripke’s own example of necessary a posteriori truth is the 
following: the standard one meter rod in Paris is one meter long.  Suppose a person when he sees the 
standard meter rod does not know that this is the standard meter rod, and measures it.  Upon measuring 
it he finds out that “the standard one meter rod is one meter long”.  The proposition that “the standard 
11 Notice that Kripke wasn’t the first to consider contingent a priori truths.  Kant famously defends the synthetic a priori,  
where synthetic roughly correspond to some sort of contingency.
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one meter rod is one meter long” is necessary but in this example, one learns it a posteriori.
Now, the question is why might we have thought otherwise, prior to Kripke?  In Kripke’s own 
words: “I guess it’s thought that….if something is known a priori it must be necessary, because it was 
known without looking at the world.  If it depended on some contingent feature of the actual world, 
how could you know it without looking?” (Kripke, 1980, p. 80). 
What is the connection between a priori and a posteriori and, necessity and contingent, on one 
hand and conceivability and possibility on the other?  This is a more complicated picture post-Kripke. 
Gendler and Hawthorne explain succinctly:
On the traditional picture…, there is a straightforward…way to explain the connection 
between conceivability and possibility….P is possible iff it  is not necessary that not-P. 
Let us introduce… that P is Conceivable iff it is not a priori that not-P.  If all and only a 
priori truths are necessary truths, then all and only Conceivable truths are possible truths. 
For the Conceivable truths are just those whose negations are not a priori, and the possible 
truths are just those whose negations are not necessary.  And since the latter two classes 
coincide, so do the former two.
….[s]ome version of this form of reasoning is implicit both in Descartes and Hume…Put 
crudely,  in  Descartes  the  direction  of  explanation  runs  from  the  metaphysical  to  the 
epistemic:  something  is  knowable  by reflection  because it  is  necessary;  in  Hume,  the 
direction  of  explanation  runs  from  the  epistemic  to  the  metaphysical;  something  is 
necessary because the mind treats  it  as  such.   Yet  in  each case the metaphysical  and 
epistemic categories coincide.
On the post-Kripkean picture, however, no such explanation is available.  For if there are a 
posteriori necessities and a priori contingencies, no such grounds can be appealed to in 
establishing a conceivability—possibility link.  On the post-Kripkean picture, even if it is 
not necessary that not-P, it may still be a priori that not-P (contingent a priori); and even if 
it is not a priori that not-P; it may still be necessary that not-P (necessary a posteriori). 
But then, by substitution, it may be possible that P.  Thus the contingent a priori seems to 
guarantee that there will be cases of possibility without Conceivability; the necessary a 
posteriori seems to guarantee that there will be cases of Conceivability without possibility 
(Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, pp. 32-33). 
Defining  conceiving  broadly as  any sort  of  mental  depiction  of  a  scenario,  Gendler  and 
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Hawthorne put forward the following list of mental activities (any ones of which or any natural cluster 
of which) might qualify as candidates for conceiving:
(1) rationally intuiting that it is possible that P 
(2) realizing that not-P is not necessary 
(3) imagining that P 
(4) conjecturing that P
(5) accepting that P for the sake of argument
(6) describing to oneself a scenario where P obtains 
(7) telling oneself a coherent story in which P obtains
(8) pretending that P
(9) make-believing that P
(10) supposing (that) P
(11) understanding the proposition that P
(12) entertaining that P
(13) mentally simulating P’s obtaining
(14) engaging in off-line processing concerning P
In their words, 
…the wide variability among their features suggests that the notion in question may be 
highly elusive.  Some for example are propositional attitudes; some are attitudes towards 
scenarios or states of affairs; and still others are activities.  Some seem explicitly sensory; 
still others are neutral on this question.  Some are highly conceptual; others are strongly 
language  based;  still  others  are,  perhaps,  non-conceptual.   Some  seem  to  take  place 
primarily spontaneously; others only under our deliberate control;  others in both ways. 
All  seem  capable  of  being  directed  both  towards  propositions  (or  states  of  affairs) 
involving  particular  individuals  as  well  as  propositions  (or  states  of  affairs)  that  are 
general.   And both  within  and among them there  seem to  be variations  in  degree of 
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privileged access associated with the attitude/activity and its content/object.  In light of 
these differences, one might reasonably wonder which, if any of these features alluded to 
is required by conceivability in the sense we seek (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, pp. 7-8).
Notice  that  Gendler  and  Hawthorne  do  not  seem  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between 
conceiving and imagining12.  What they say about whether or not there is a distinction between the two 
is the following:
There is a traditional distinction made between (sensory) imagining on the one hand, and 
(non-sensory) non-imagistic conceiving on the other.  But it is far from settled whether the 
distinction has a proper role to play in circumscribing the appropriate subject-matter for an 
investigation of conceivability as a guide to possibility (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 
9)
Their  list  above  suggests  that  there  is  no  clear  cut  distinction  between  imagining  and 
conceiving.  However, Hawthorne and Gendler themselves do not point out whether they are aware 
themselves that there are some problems with some of the items on the list, as I will point out shortly. 
Gendler and Hawthorne merely uses this list to toss out some possible candidates for conceiving.  I will 
use this list as a starter for my argument that there is a distinction to be made between conceiving and 
imagining.   And more importantly,  as we will  see in  the next  section,  I claim that  the distinction 
between the two does have “a proper role to play in circumscribing the appropriate subject-matter for 
an investigation of conceivability as a guide to possibility”.  
Another problem with the list is that some items in the list assume possibility in describing 
conceivability.  Although it is all too common to slip from one to the other without even noticing, this 
is something I want to avoid.  I want to examine these notions independently in order to be able to 
investigate whether conceivability is a guide to possibility or not.  
12 Gendler, and Hawthorne point out (p. 1 footnotes 1 and 2, 2002), that conceiving can be used in the narrow and broad 
sense of the term.  In the broad sense, conceiving refers to the activity of representing scenarios to ourselves using concepts,  
imagery (actual or non-actual) etc.  The word ‘conceive’ which is traceable to the Latin verb concipere shares its root with 
the word ‘concept’, which is traceable to the past participle, conceptus (see, Gendler, 2002, footnote 1).
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To see what I mean, let us look at the list again: (1) is “rationally intuiting that it is possible 
that  P”.  This clearly presumes a connection between conceivability and possibility.   Similarly,  (2) 
(realizing that not-P is not necessary) presumes a connection between conceivability and possibility 
because in classical Modal Logic ¬⃞ ¬ p = ◊ p and thus (2) presumes P’s possibility too.  
Not  all  items  on  the  list  suffer  from  the  defect  of  assuming  a  connection  between 
conceivability and possibility.  Some are problematic for other reasons though.  (3) (imagining that P) 
implies conceiving = imagining.  And, as I shall argue, there is a crucial distinction to be made between 
the two.
It is worth pausing to remark on a couple of other items on the list.  With regards to (6), notice 
that there is a difference between “describing to oneself a scenario where P obtains” and “describing 
that P”.  This is not a distinction pointed out by Gendler and Hawthorne.  As an example consider the 
following: I can describe to myself a scenario where Dave squares the circle [Dave squaring the circle = 
P].  I do not need to describe P itself in describing a scenario where P obtains.  As I shall suggest later, 
describing the scenario does not entail the possibility of P itself, only P’s conceivability.
In this context also notice that there is a difference between squaring the circle and producing 
a square circle.  The first, is conceivable but not possible.  The latter is not even conceivable.  A square 
circle is an impossibility much like a hot and cold thing.  That is,  no single object can have both 
properties, at once.  To belabour the obvious, suppose S is a circle with centre C, and also is the square 
ABCD. Since S is a square, the line CA is longer than a line from C to a point P half way between A 
and B. But since S is a circle, CA = CP. This is a contradiction13. 
13 ''Squaring the circle'' is the problem of constructing a square with the same area as a given circle using a finite number of 
steps with only a compass and straightedge.  This entails constructing pi. The impossibility of squaring the circle follows 
from the fact that pi is a transcendental number—that is, it is non-algebraic and therefore a non-constructible number.  If one 
solves the problem of the quadrature of the circle using only compass and straightedge, then one has also found an algebraic  
value of pi, which is impossible.  Note that the transcendence of pi implies the impossibility of exactly "circling" the square,  
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Going back to  “describing to  oneself  a  scenario where P obtains”,  one can conceive of a 
situation where an impossibility holds i.e., one can describe to oneself a scenario where P obtains (i.e., 
a scenario where Dave squares the circle).  Notice that this does not involve knowing what exactly is 
involved in squaring the circle.  However, one cannot even describe a scenario in which there is a 
square circle.  Exactly why there is this difference remains to be seen, but that “a square circle” is an 
obvious  analytical  impossibility  while  “squaring  the  circle”  is  a  subtle  substantive  impossibility 
presumably is part of the answer.  So not only is  there a difference between squaring a circle and 
describing a square circle, there is also a difference between describing a square circle and describing to 
oneself where somebody squares the circle.  Describing a situation where somebody has squared the 
circle amounts to describing what would count as someone having squared the circle, but not what it 
would be for someone to have produced a single shape that is both a square and a circle at once.  In 
light of our discussion, does “describing to oneself a scenario where P obtains” entail possibility of P? 
The answer is “No”.  It entails only conceivability of P.  
I will discuss the concept of conceivability in much more detail in the next section where we 
look at how the conceivable and the imaginable are related.
Section 5. Conceivability and Imaginability Revisited
Here, we need to ask the question, is there a distinction to be made between “imagining” and 
“conceiving”?  As I have said before, I argue that there is a distinction between the two.  There are 
various aspects to these concepts—psychological, epistemological, metaphysical, and semantic.  As a 
starting point, Imagining and conceiving can be characterized in the following way:
• Imaginable: This has to do with visual imagery. Imagining x involves both “seeing” x and “seeing 
as” x.  One would know how something would look  in one’s mind’s eye, if you will.  One can imagine, 
as well as of squaring the circle.  
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for example what a red couch would look like i.e., one can imagine a red couch.  Similarly one can 
imagine a golden mountain.  Notice though, one can of course be mistaken about whether something 
has been successfully imagined or not.  
• Conceivable: This has to do with forming a general conception of the entity or entities in question, 
not necessarily involving any particular figurative detail of the entity in question.  One could compare it 
to Locke’s general ideas.  As Locke said, when we think about a triangle, we do not think about a 
particular kind of triangle such as a right angle triangle or an isosceles triangle.  We think about a 
triangle in general.  Similarly, consider the example of motherhood.  One does not conceive a particular 
mother, but invokes the general notion associated with mothers.  Some may object to this description of 
“conceivable” and might say that when they think about a triangle or motherhood they think about a 
particular  triangle,  a  right-angle  triangle,  for  example  or  a  particular  mother.   If  they  are  right, 
conceiving for them does involve figurative detail of the entity in question, but what is important is that 
in conceiving a particular entity, it need not necessarily involve any particular detail.  In the case of a 
triangle, it does not need to be a right-angle triangle, it can very well be another kind of triangle.  
Conceiving that P or conceiving of P seems to involve knowing what would count as a case of 
P.  For example, if one can form a concept of a triangle, one must know what would count as a triangle, 
if one were to come across one.  Which is  not to say that one could come across something, merely 
because it is conceivable.  Consider conceiving that someone solves the problem of squaring the circle. 
One cannot  imagine this, but one can conceive it—one knows what would  count as a solution to the 
problem, even though one knows that no such solution is possible.  As we will see later, conceivability 
is only a sufficient but not a necessary condition for something to be a case.  Conceiving could involve 
a broad range of mental activities, for example where conceiving involves being able to tell oneself a 
coherent story in which P obtains, where P could be something one pretends, where one supposes (that 
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P), or where it otherwise involves understanding P.  
Notice that these categories are not exclusive.  Conceiving might involve mental imagery in 
certain cases, for example.  Or imagining might involve forming a concept.  Here we can introduce a 
further distinction, which at first may appear psychological, between sorts of conceiving.  This is what I 
call “fully and coherently describable”.  It can be defined in the following way:
• Fully and coherently describable: This has to do with having a sufficient grasp of a concept or 
concepts  in  order  to  be  able  to  describe  it  fully  and  coherently.   For  something  to  be  fully  and 
coherently describable one needs to be sure that the description is complete and fits together cohesively. 
For example, consider a chiliagon.  Although one may have never come across one, one knows that it is 
a hundred-sided figure.  From the concepts of other many sided figures one can have a sufficient grasp 
of the concept and one is able to not only extrapolate the notion of a hundred sided figure but also know 
that the description is complete and cohesive.  
At first this appears to be a psychological distinction.  But while we sometimes can conceive 
of impossible things, we can only fully and coherently describe possible things.  Indeed, that is part of 
the  definition of the notion.  Thus fully and coherently grasping for that reason cannot be a merely 
psychological  matter.   We  have  a  psychological(ish)  distinction  between  the  imaginable  and  the 
conceivable; then, a different distinction between the fully and coherently describable and the not-fully-
and-coherently  describable.   Consider  a  particular  case  that  is  conceivable  but  not  possible,  e.g., 
someone squaring the circle, a bit more in detail.  We can conceive it because we know what would 
count as a solution.  But when we try to give a complete description of the situation we cannot, for a 
complete description would involve describing the construction of pi, which cannot be done.
Next let us return to the question of how imaginability and conceivability are related.  Is the 
imaginable a subset of the conceivable?  Is everything that is imaginable conceivable too?  The answer 
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to this question is yes.  If one can imagine it, i.e., see it in one's minds’ eye, one must have a concept of 
it available to him/her.  Of course, what I say here is plausible only if one distinguishes imagining from 
merely picturing in one's mind.  A distinction parallel to that between seeing and seeing as is needed 
here. It is a commonplace that someone unacquainted with tennis presented with a tennis raquet, in 
some sense, does not see a tennis raquet.  But nobody supposes that the person's visual field is blank in 
the area in question—rather we note that the person sees the raquet, but does not see it as a raquet, and 
for many purposes that is what is crucial.  Imaginability, properly so called, requires the same sort of 
conceptual resources as seeing as.  One might be able to produce a mental picture of something one saw 
yesterday but had no idea what it was, but one could not imagine it.  For example, consider someone 
presented with a cricket bat who had no idea what it actually was, but perhaps thought that it was used 
for putting pizzas into ovens at restaurants.  If the person in question were to think about the object at a 
later time, this would not qualify as imagining since it does not involve seeing the cricket bat as a 
cricket bat.  This would count as a case of conceiving since one had the concept of something  being 
used for putting pizza into ovens.  If one knows what x would look like i.e., one can imagine x, then if 
one were to come across a case one would know that it counts as a case.  This is because one has a 
concept of x, i.e., one can conceive x.  Everything that is imaginable is conceivable but not vice versa, 
as  have  already seen  in  case  of  the  example  of  squaring  the  circle.   Imaginability requires  more 
accuracy than conceivability.  Imagining requires both seeing something and seeing it as.  
To recap, let us consider various combination of categories and see whether those are possible 
combinations or not and if not, why not?  
● imaginable  but  not  conceivable:  this  is  not  a  possible  combination  since  everything  that  is 
imaginable is also conceivable.
● imaginable (and a fortiori conceivable) and fully and coherently describable: For example, take the 
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concept of a golden mountain.  Can one imagine it? Yes, I can see what a golden mountain would look 
like.  Can one conceive it?  The answer is “yes”—if one were to come across a case one would know 
that it counts as a case.  Is it a fully and coherently describable case.  “yes”.
● imaginable (and a fortiori  conceivable) and not fully and coherently describable:   For example, 
Poonam being a member of the royal family.  I can conceive and even imagine what it would be like 
to be a daughter of the Queen.  However, I cannot fully and coherently describe it because as I fill in 
the details, the story eventually becomes incoherent.  So, in this particular example, what makes it 
metaphysically  impossible  for  me  to  be  a  member  of  the  English  Royal  Family  is  that  identity 
conditions are determined by biological origins (following Kripke).  Thus as we fill in the details that 
make me actually a member of the Royal Family, we are eventually going to have to change my 
ancestry (or theirs), so eventually it is not me who is a member of the Royal Family, but someone a lot 
like me in some ways but with different origins.
● conceivable and fully and coherently describable and not imaginable: Prima facie, it seems that this 
is  not a possible  combination.   For it  seems,  since one can conceive it  and fully and coherently 
describe it then  one can very well imagine it.  However, consider for example, a chiliagon.  Can one 
imagine it?  The answer is not so straightforward for this case is a little bit more complicated than 
others.  It is tempting to think that since one can conceive and fully describe x, one can imagine x. 
However, as Descartes famously argued (in the Sixth Meditation), it seems that a chiliagon, while 
conceivable, is not imaginable.  Although one might think that it is imaginable, how could one tell 
that one in fact had imagined a hundred sided figure and not a ninety eight sided figure?  One can 
conceive it though.  Is this a fully and coherently describable case?  Given what we know about many 
sided figures, one would be able to have a sufficient grasp of the concept so as to tell whether a figure 
is a chiliagon or not, if one were to come across one.  So it is an example of a conceivable and fully 
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and coherently describable but not imaginable case. 
As we have seen, for some cases it is fairly easy to discern which category or categories they 
belong to.  However, there are some not-so-straightforward cases for which the answer may not be so 
clear cut.  We will see in section 7, that the list above comes in handy in devising what count as cases 
and what does not.
As far as the distinction between conceiving and imagining goes, we have established that 
there are things that we can conceive but cannot imagine.  Strawson’s auditory world is another case in 
point.   Why  is  this  not  imaginable?   Many people  think  imagining  should  allow  many  sensory 
modalities.  I can imagine now what apples taste like.  Apparently, smell is a crucial accompaniment for 
taste.  It is believed by some scientists that if we did not have a sense of smell apples and potatoes 
would taste the same.  Thus, if this theory is true, in imagining the taste of an apple, I am (consciously 
or unconsciously) imagining the associated smells as well.  So, I cannot imagine the taste of an apple 
without having the accompanying smell of an apple.  However, in the auditory world case, we have no 
way to tell what a completely auditory world would be like.  For, it would not or should not look like 
anything but only sound like this or that.  The auditory world case is similar to the chiliagon.  Namely, 
it  may  be  that  one  accidentally  “images”  a  chiliagon  when  trying  to  imagine  one—but  that  is 
insufficient.  Similarly for the auditory world—we don't know enough to know the difference between 
accidental  accuracy and inaccuracy.  It might be useful to remind the readers about the cricket bat 
example, where we noted that imagining involves both seeing and seeing as.  In the auditory world 
example, there is no way of making sure that the world imagined is completely  auditory (as Strawson 
requires  it  to  be,  in  his  project)  without  any other  accompanying  information  from other  sensory 
modalities.  Thus we are not in a position to see whether the world we are considering which we may 
think is auditory is in fact so.  So we may not be seeing it as the auditory world.  So, auditory world is 
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conceivable but not imaginable.   We see once again that there are cases of impossibilities  that  are 
conceivable but not imaginable.  The above examples further establish my argument that there is a 
distinction between the notions of conceiving and imagining.
One important  point  that  emerges  from the  discussion  of  various  categories  above is  that 
impossible things are not fully and coherently describable.  If a description is really both complete and 
coherent,  that  would imply possibility.   So,  we can be  mistaken about  whether we have fully and 
coherently described (or imagined) something, as would happen when I think I have figured out how to 
build a perpetual motion machine or some such thing.  It seems right to say that it could happen that I 
have conceived of such a machine, and that I thought I had fully and coherently described it, but was 
mistaken.   It  is  not  possible  to  build  such  a  machine,  so  my description  must  have  been  either 
incompletely specified or incoherent in some way.  
Section 6. Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?
There is a natural tendency to think that conceivability implies possibility.  Conceivability in 
this sense is construed in a broad way that includes mental imagery of actual or non-actual things, 
representation of a concept, or grasping of a concept that implies linguistic expressibility.  Often we 
come across situations  where if one is  asked whether X is  possible or not,  one tries earnestly to 
conceive of X.  Under such a broad construal of ‘conceive’, it seems to imply that what we conceive is 
presented as possible.  However, sometimes we make the mistake of jumping to the conclusion that 
what is presented as possible is in fact possible. 
Upon carefully examining the notions of conceivability and possibility we find that they are 
distinct  notions.   As Williamson  points  out,  conceiving is  mind-dependent  and  possibility mind-
independent.   But  even  if  conceivability  does  not  imply possibility,  we  might  still  ask  whether 
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conceivability is a guide to possibility.  If it is, what kind of possibility is it a guide to? 
Recall  that  Gendler  and  Hawthorne  distinguish  between  epistemic  and  non-epistemic 
possibility  the  latter  of  which  is,  in  turn,  divided  into  three  kinds;  logical,  nomological  and 
metaphysical.  They argue that conceivability definitely cannot be a guide to epistemic possibility.  This 
can be easily demonstrated taking their own example: if I know that the cat is on the mat, then it is not 
epistemically possible for me that the cat is not on the mat.  Yet, I can conceive a situation in which the 
cat is not on the mat.  So, I can conceive something epistemically impossible (Gendler and Hawthorne, 
2002, p. 4).  So, in talking about conceivability as a guide to possibility we must mean some other kind 
of possibility (other than epistemic possibility).  According to Gendler and Hawthorne, the question 
whether conceivability acts as a guide to possibility arises only in the case of metaphysical possibility.
As we have seen, they define logical possibility as “P is logically possible just in case no 
contradiction can be proven from P using the standard rules of deductive inference”.  Based on this 
definition of logical possibility they suggest that conceivability is “superfluous” as a guide to logical 
possibility.  It is better determined by logical proofs and methods than by scenario depiction (Gendler 
and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 5).  In their words, “whether or not a contradiction can be derived from P 
seems better determined by proof procedures than by scenario depiction” (Gendler and Hawthorne, 
2002, p. 5).  I have to disagree.  First with regard to their definition of logical possibility; as already 
noted, in some cases, proof procedures do not exist.   Thus, even logical impossibility may not be 
better determined by logical proofs and methods than by conceivable scenario depiction.  But notice 
that  formal “proofs” of possibility are not formal proofs at all, at least typically.  Rather, a proof of 
logical possibility usually involves presentation of a model in which a sentence can be seen to be true. 
This obviously has a lot in common with “scenario depiction” even if often the scenarios involve 
assigning mathematical properties  to predicates and working with domains of numbers rather than 
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other objects.  Surely Gödel's  Second Incompleteness Theorem should warn any philosopher not to 
expect that formal proofs of consistency are going to tell the whole story about logical consistency.
Gendler and Hawthorne think that conceivability is not a guide to nomological possibility for 
the same reason as it is not a guide to epistemic possibility— we can conceive of many things that are 
nomologically impossible.  It seems all too easy to conceive of things that are not possible in the 
relevant sense.  They seem to think that if conceivability is a useful guide for anything, it is a guide to 
metaphysical possibility.  Gendler and Hawthorne recognize that while the above clarifications dispel 
some of the confusion surrounding these issues, they do  little to solve philosophical puzzles regarding 
conceivability as a guide to possibility.  The very notion of metaphysical possibility is highly loaded 
and elusive.
While these clarifications dispel a certain amount of confusion, they do little to resolve an 
obvious puzzle: on the face of it, the idea that conceivability is a guide to metaphysical 
possibility  is  extremely  problematic.   According  to  current  orthodoxy,  metaphysical 
possibility can neither  be reduced to,  nor eliminated  in  favour of,  linguistic  rules  and 
conventions;  it  constitutes a fundamental,  mind-independent subject-matter  for thought 
and talk.  Given that picture, it is rather baffling what sort of explanation there could be 
for conceiving’s ability to reveal its character.  It seems clear that the causal explanation 
for the reliability of perception is unsuitable here — and it is profoundly difficult to see 
what to put in its place (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. viii).
I agree with Gendler and Hawthorne, that in most cases when we talk about conceivability as 
a guide to possibility we talk about metaphysical possibility.  As Chalmers points out: 
[t]here is at least some plausibility in the idea that conceivability can act as a guide to 
metaphysical  possibility.   By contrast,  it  is very implausible  that  conceivability entails 
physical or natural possibility.  For example, it seems conceivable that an object could 
travel faster than a billion meters per second.  This hypothesis is physically and naturally 
impossible, because it contradicts the laws of physics and the laws of nature.  This case 
may  be  metaphysically  possible,  however,  since  there  might  well  be  metaphysically 
possible  worlds  with  different  laws.   If  we  invoke  an  intuitive  conception  of  a 
metaphysically possible world as a world that God might have created: it seems that God 
could have created a world in which an object traveled faster than a billion meters per 
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second.  So in this case, although conceivability does not mirror natural possibility, it may 
well mirror metaphysical possibility (Chalmers, 2002, p. 146).
But  as  I  will  argue,  conceivability  is  not a  guide  to  possibility—not  even  metaphysical 
possibility.  The question whether conceivability is a guide to possibility or not arises because, when 
we engage in conceiving that involve depiction of scenarios to ourselves “the things we depict to 
ourselves frequently present themselves as possible, and we have an associated tendency to judge that 
they are possible.  Indeed, when invited to consider whether something is possible, we often engage in 
deliberate effort to conceive of it; upon finding ourselves able to do so, we conclude that it is.  We 
may even decide that something is impossible on the basis of our apparent inability to conceive of it” 
(Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 2).  
Williamson’s words illustrate the case why conceivability is not a guide to possibility, both 
when  we  talk  about  conceivability  in  non-philosophical  terms  as  well  as  when  we  talk  about 
conceivability in  philosophical terms:
The impression is that, outside philosophy, the primary cognitive role of conceivability is 
propaedeutic.  Conceiving a hypothesis is getting it onto the table, putting it up for serious 
consideration  as  a  candidate  for  truth.   The  inconceivable  never  even  gets  that  far. 
Conceivability is certainly no good evidence for restricted kinds of possibility that we care 
about in natural science or ordinary life.  We easily conceive particles violating what are 
in fact physical laws…On this view, conceiving, outside philosophy, is not a faculty for 
distinguishing truth  and falsity in  some domain,  but  rather  a  preliminary to  any such 
faculty (Williamson, 2007, p. 4).
Although sometimes conceiving, at least prima facie, may seem to be a guide to metaphysical 
possibility,  there  are  well  known  misleading  cases.   That  is  to  say,  there  are  conceivable 
impossibilities.  For example, an Ancient Greek might have found it conceivable that Hesperus is not 
Phosphorous although this is not actually possible.  There are examples like the auditory world where 
Hero resides in a completely auditory world, which is metaphysically impossible but conceivable. 
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Examples like trisecting an angle with only a ruler and compass demonstrate the same point.  That is 
why  conceivability  cannot  be  a  guide  to  possibility.   Although  conceivability  does  not  imply 
possibility, it  divides impossibilities  into two classes—the conceivable ones and the inconceivable 
ones.  That is to say that not all impossibilities are conceivable.  A hot cold thing, for example, is not 
even conceivable.  
Now conversely, does inconceivability imply impossibility?  Prima facie it  might look like 
inconceivability implies impossibility.  For example, when we are asked to think about things like a hot 
cold thing, or a tall short person, one might jump to the conclusion that these things are impossible 
because they are inconceivable.  As we noted in the beginning in examples like the auditory world, it 
may  seem  like  impossibility  is  tied  to  inconceivability.   But  surely  there  are  things  that  are 
inconceivable  because  we  do  not  even  have  the  concepts  available  to  us,  but  that  are  possible. 
Advancement in the Sciences is a good proof for things that were inconceivable once but are certainly 
possible.  The first test tube baby was born in 1978, and presumably the idea of a test tube baby was 
conceivable in 1978.  But it is plausible that such a thing was inconceivable one or two thousand years 
earlier.  However, it was not impossible.  This is an example of something that was inconceivable once 
but its inconceivability did not imply its impossibility.  Thus we find that the relationship between 
conceivability/inconceivability and possibility/impossibility is orthogonal—neither implies the other.
Now  coming  back  to  our  three  layers  of  the  imaginable,  conceivable,  and  the  fully  and 
coherently describable, we will see that these three layers are closely related to the question whether 
conceivability is a guide to possibility or not.  It may look like that what I call “fully describable cases” 
and conceivable cases are one and the same.  Let’s see how the imaginable, the "fully and coherently 
describable" and the merely conceivable are related, especially the last two.  A person would typically 
be able to tell whether something was conceivable or not, but not whether it was fully and coherently 
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describable.   So, someone might  think they had conceived of something in complete  detail,  but be 
mistaken  about  that.   This  is  important  because  something that  is  fully  described in  this  sense is 
possible.  So "fully described conceivability" is a guarantee of possibility  because—to put the matter 
bluntly—it  guarantees  being  a  fragment  of  a  possible  world.   Unfortunately,  as  a  matter  of 
epistemological fact, human beings often mistakenly think they have fully described something, e.g., a 
being with all perfections, when in fact they have not.  Similarly, all fully and coherently describable 
cases may not in fact be imaginable.  Again as a matter of epistemological fact one might mistakenly 
think what one has imagined, i.e., formed a mental picture of, is a chiliagon.  But it may very well be a 
figure with 97 sides.  In this context I want to point out that number 6 (describing to oneself a scenario 
where P obtains) on Gendler and Hawthorne’s list  of candidates for conceivability,  does not entail 
possibility.  Describing to oneself a scenario in which P obtains, does not involve fully and coherently 
describing P.
In this  context,  it  is  worth pointing out  that  making a distinction between conceiving and 
imagining and spelling out the above three layers, help us show that this distinction has a “proper role 
to play in circumscribing the appropriate subject-matter for an investigation of conceivability as a guide 
to  possibility”.   As  we  saw  in  section  4,  Gendler  and  Hawthorne  express  doubt  about  this. 
Interestingly, we have arrived at a negative result for our first question—conceivability does not imply 
possibility—but  conceivability  turn  out  to  be  suitable  to  play  an  important  role  in  evaluation  of 
counterfactuals.
Section 7. States and Cases
The reason conceivability is such an important notion is because for something to be a case it 
has to be at least potentially conceivable.  The point of all this discussion has been to make it possible 
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to isolate  a notion that will  play a role in our account of counterfactuals  similar  to that  played by 
possible worlds in Lewis-Stalnaker accounts.  That is the notion of a  case.  As we will also see in 
Chapter IV, we will use  cases in our semantics for a new theory of counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents.  Here we will use the  notion of conceivability to distinguish between those inconsistent 
classes of statements that count as cases and  those that do not.  
We borrow from the notion of a state used in Relevance Logic, to define what a case is.  States 
can be both inconsistent or incomplete.  In Relevance Logic states represent ways that parts of the 
world could be, ways that parts of the world could not be, ways the whole world could be, and ways the 
whole world could not be.  In our semantics for a new theory of counterfactuals, states can be extended 
to  cases.  Any random set of sentences that can be extended to something conceivable is a case.  By 
adding enough details  to make something conceivable out of a set of sentences that  contains some 
inconceivability or incompleteness, we can turn it into a case.  
The notion of a case is important because, as we will see in Chapter IV, we use cases as a 
(modal) tool to analyze counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  The reason all this is important is 
because in Chapter IV, I need to distinguish those inconsistent classes of statements that count as cases 
in my semantics for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, from those that do not.  Let us remind 
ourselves  what  counts  as  cases:  Squaring  the  circle  and flying  dogs  are  some examples  of  cases. 
Examples of non-cases are a flat-spherical object, a tall short person.  The former ones count as cases 
because, one would know what would count as squaring the circle by using only a finite number of 
steps with a compass and a straightedge, although one cannot actually do it.  These are conceivable 
impossibilities.  Whereas for some non-cases, one would not know what such an object be like.  When 
it comes to the above sort of non-cases not only can one not imagine it but one cannot make sense of 
such  things  conceptually.   As  we will  see  in  Chapter  IV,  there  are  some  non-cases  that  may be 
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potentially conceivable, thus may turn out to be cases.  These are inconceivable impossibilities.  They 
are inconceivable due to human conceptual or cognitive limitations.  Some of these entities may in time 
(in the future due to changes/advancement in scientific theories) come to be regarded as conceivable.  It 
turns out that any random group of sentences that can be extended into something conceivable is a case. 
In short, the ones that are cases, even though they are impossible, are the ones that can be 
extended to something conceivable.  If something is not even potentially conceivable, then it does not 
count as a case.  So cases are of two kinds: possible and impossible. 
So where are we at after all these?  Let me clarify by using a now familiar example: The 
auditory world is metaphysically impossible.  Is it imaginable?  No, at least not completely, which is 
why in the end Strawson gives up that project.  But a more important question is this: is the auditory 
world conceivable?  The answer is yes.  This is the reason why it is not completely useless.  This is 
where we are at  now.  We are going to take advantage of the conceptual spadework we have just 
completed  to further develop a theory counterfactuals. This will allow us to explain the amount of 
mileage Strawson is able to get out of the sound world, in spite of its impossibility.
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Chapter IV: Counterfactuals with Impossible Antecedents
In this  chapter I will  sketch a theory about  how to make sense of counterfactuals  with impossible 
antecedents.   The  aim  is  not  just  to  address  the  key problem of  counterfactuals  with  impossible 
antecedents,  but  to  then  shed  some  light  on  a  contested  class  of  thought  experiments,  namely 
incomplete/impossible yet useful ones.  By no means do I dare pretend that my account is complete. 
However, I contend that it does make progress towards making sense of these notoriously ill-behaved 
conditionals.  
This chapter is divided into five sections.  In section 1, I explain why we need a better story 
about these conditionals.   Section 2 includes a preliminary discussion of Relevance Logics and the 
rudiments  of  the  semantics  of  Relevance  Logic  that  is  used  in  analyzing  counterfactuals  with 
impossible antecedents.  In section 3, I discuss the idea of ‘closeness’ with regards to possible worlds. 
In  section  4,  I  consider  some  details  that  need  to  be  ironed  out  regarding  this  new  theory  of 
counterfactuals.  In this section I discuss the notion of ‘closeness’ with regards to impossible worlds.  In 
Section 5, I present a new theory of counterfactuals that can handle counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents. 
Section 1. The Need for a Better Story about Counterfactuals 
We need a better story about counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—a better story than 
classical two valued logic (classical logic for short, henceforth) has given us.  There are two reasons for 
this: First, the more direct and general reason, as we noted in Chapter I, is that classical accounts of 
counterfactuals  cannot  handle  counterfactuals  with  impossible  antecedents—not  very satisfactorily, 
anyway.  I will assume the deficiencies of classical logic and focus on how to tell a better story about 
these conditionals.
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Secondly, it is an important contention of this thesis that the payoffs of an improved account of 
counterfactuals are to be found in various areas of philosophy.  To make the case,  I have chosen to 
focus on one particular philosophical payoff: if we have a better explanation of these counterfactuals 
we are going to able  to better  analyze thought  experiments  in terms of counterfactuals.   In earlier 
chapters, I have argued both that there are important advantages to analyzing thought experiments in 
terms of counterfactuals and that many thought experiments that involve impossible scenarios are both 
informative and useful.  Since, in the counterfactual analysis of  thought experiments, the antecedent 
amounts to a description of the scenario, this account does not go very far if all counterfactuals with 
impossible  antecedents  come  out  true.   In  order  to  defend  these  claims  we  need  an  account  of 
counterfactuals that is more comprehensive. In particular, we need one that can give us a better story 
about counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.
As we will see, to construct a more comprehensive account of counterfactuals we will make 
use of a logical  concept of “impossible  worlds”.  At this  point,  it  is natural  to wonder what these 
impossible worlds are or why we need them at all.  As Daniel Nolan puts it:
[T]here are a variety of areas in which it is useful to be able to reason about impossible 
situations and to do so in a nontrivial way (so that it is not good enough to just throw up 
one’s hands and say that everything follows).  The mere fact that we can think about what 
is impossible does not commit us to impossible worlds, any more than the mere fact that 
we claim that some claims are necessary or possible commit us to possible worlds.  But 
just as it  is a natural way to cash out our talk of necessity and possibility in terms of 
possible  worlds,  it  is  tempting to  talk  about impossible  worlds,  or situations,  or ways 
things couldn’t be (Nolan, 1997, p. 536).
In order to avail ourselves of concepts such as impossible worlds we turn to recent works in 
Relevance Logic.  
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Section 2. Semantics of Relevance Logic
Relevance Logics are non-classical logics that developed out of the main idea that a necessary 
condition for the conditional  A  à B to be true is  that  there must be some kind of a “connection 
between A and B”.  In other words, for A à B to be true, A must be relevant to B in some sort of way. 
In turn Relevance Logics also attempt to avoid paradoxes of material and strict implication.  
Before going into the semantics for Relevance Logic I want to explain these paradoxes.  This 
is important because Relevance Logics are an attempt to preserve some sort of relevancy between the 
antecedent and the consequent when it  comes to conditionals.  As such, the philosophers who have 
developed Relevance Logics have needed to develop tools to avoid those features of classical logic that 
result  in  classically  valid  reasoning  where  no  such  connection  exists—for  instance,  everything 
following  from  a  contradiction—that  are  very  similar  to  features  of  standard  accounts  of 
counterfactuals that we shall also try to avoid, as we shall be able to see by considering the paradoxes. 
In these paradoxes there is evident loss of relevancy between the antecedent and consequent, which is 
what Relevance Logics strives to avoid.  So naturally these paradoxes are distasteful for advocates of 
these  logics.   These  are  not  paradoxes  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  i.e.,  the  ones  that  entail  a 
contradiction, but they are paradoxes in the sense that they seem to go against ordinary intuition. 
First let’s see what the paradoxes of material implications are.  
The truth table for material implication is familiar:







(1) whenever the antecedent is false, the whole conditional is true and
(2) whenever the consequent is true, the whole conditional is true, otherwise 
(3) the conditional is false.  
If we intend the ‘p à q’ operator to represent some notion of “q follows from p” or “p implies 
q” this truth table is counterintuitive to say the least.   In particular, it  gives us the following three 
paradoxes of material implication:
(a) p à (q à p)
(b) ¬p à (p à q)
(c) (p à q) v (q à r)
From  (2),  we  get  the  first  paradox  i.e.,  (a)  a  true  proposition  is  implied  by  anything 
whatsoever! Thus, “ the moon is made of green cheese” implies “2 + 2 = 4”.  Let p = “2 + 2 = 4” and q 
be “the moon is made of green cheese”.  Since, “2 + 2 = 4” is true, the consequence above is true. 
From (1) we get the second paradox, i.e., (b) if p is false it implies anything whatsoever! According to 
(b) I am a monkey’s uncle implies that the earth is round.  Let p be “I am a monkey’s uncle”.  Since it is 
false, we can demonstrate the consequent of the above i.e. “if I am a monkey’s uncle then the earth is 
round”.  Consider, now, (c):  it  has this  as a special  case:  (p  à q)  v (q  à p).   This is  known as 
Dummett's scheme, and it amounts to saying "for any two propositions, one implies the other or vice 
versa" ...  which seems strange when you can have entirely unconnected p and q (either (Dave is a 
philosopher implies cats have tails) or (cats have tails implies Dave is a philosopher)).  But (c): (p à q) 
v  (q  à r)  is  one step worse,  because it  means  that  either  p  implies  q  or  else q  implies  anything 
whatsoever: Either (Dave is a philosopher implies cats have tails) or (cats have tails implies the sun is 
about to explode).  Well, cats do have tails, so since the sun is not about to explode it must be that Dave 
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is a philosopher implies that cats have tails.  
If we take “implication”, as in the case of material implication, as a truth functional connective 
then we have to pay a big price.  If the truth-value of a whole conditional depends on the truth-values of 
its antecedent and consequent alone, then what matters is the  truth-value,  and not the  content of the 
antecedent and consequent.  But if the content of the antecedent and consequent is irrelevant, then they 
may be utterly unrelated to one another.  We have abandoned the requirement of ordinary implication 
that antecedent and consequent be mutually relevant or somehow connected.  So, if we adopt “⊃”, for 
implication  we  embrace  truth-functionality  in  exchange  for  relevancy.   The  paradoxes  are 
counterintuitive because the truth-value of one component can determine the truth-value of the whole 
compound,  regardless of the truth-value or content  of the other.   That is,  they disturb us precisely 
because of this loss of mutual relevancy.  
The paradoxes of material implication are not the only paradoxes that relevance logicians try 
to avoid.   There are the so-called paradoxes of strict  implication,  in which we again see a loss of 
relevancy between the antecedent and the consequent.  Long before Relevance Logics came along, C. I. 
Lewis invented the strict conditional to avoid the paradoxes of material implication.  He introduced a 
new symbol called a “fishhook”.  
p —⊰ q (this is called a strict conditional)
is interpreted as “it is not possible that p be true and q be false”.  So p —⊰ q is equivalent to ¬◊ (p & ¬ 
q).  
In this system, ⃞ p is equivalent to ¬ ◊¬ p.  With this equivalence, substitution, and double 
negation elimination, we get:
⃞ (p àq) is equivalent to ¬◊ (p &¬ q).
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Therefore, ⃞ (p àq) is equivalent to p —⊰ q.
There are remnants of the “paradoxes of material implications” in this.  For example we get 
what is called the “paradox of strict implication” which is a modal version of (a) in the list of paradoxes 
of material implication, which looks like the following:
⃞ p —⊰ (q —⊰ p)
This says that a necessary proposition is strictly implied by any proposition.  Suppose p is necessarily 
true.  Then it  cannot be false, and thus it  cannot be the case that q is true and p is false.  Thus a 
necessary proposition is implied by any other, however irrelevant that other may be.
Since strict  implication  is  defined so that  p strictly implies  q if  and only if  it  is  logically 
impossible for p to be true and q false, it follows that a contradiction strictly implies any proposition, 
and any proposition strictly implies a logical truth.  Thus we get the following paradoxes:
(p & ¬ p) —⊰ q.  
p —⊰ (q —⊰q).  
p—⊰ (q v ¬ q).  
These so-called paradoxes of strict implication seem counterintuitive because again, just as in 
the paradoxes of material implication, the antecedent seems to be irrelevant to the consequent.
This is enough about the paradoxes of implication.  Suffice it to say that relevant logics are 
created in an attempt to construct logics that avoid these paradoxes and require “à” to mean something 
that makes the antecedent relevant to the consequent14 when conditionals are true.  
Before going into showing how, with the help of Relevance Logic and Lewis-Stalnaker style 
14 Re: paradoxes of material and strict implication, see: Mares, E 2006, and Mattey, G.J, 1998
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account  of  counterfactuals,  we can  account  for  counterfactuals  with  impossible  antecedents,  I  will 
introduce a few semantic primitives taken from Restall’s recent work, that this chapter alludes to.
Ways / States
One  of  the  important  semantic  notions  used  in  Relevance  Logic  is  ‘ways’  (=states).   In 
possible worlds semantics for classical modal logic, we can only talk about the ways the (actual) world 
could be.  The different ways the actual world could be are in turn different possible worlds.  So, in 
classical possible worlds semantics, ‘ways’ is just a synonym for ‘worlds’.  We will see shortly why 
this is not the case in Relevance Logic.  In Relevance Logic, we can talk about the ways the world 
could be as well as the ways that this world could not be.  Consider some examples of the ways the 
world could not be: the world could not be such that there are hot cold things.  It also could not be such 
that there are square circles….  These are some examples of the ways the world could not be since these 
are examples of inconsistencies.  
Classical accounts of possible worlds do not allow us to talk about inconsistencies since these 
accounts are only and purely a systematization of the possible.  As Restall points out, it is obvious that 
allowance for inconsistencies (a la Relevance Logic) is incompatible with Lewis-style extreme realism. 
As we know, Lewis himself rejects impossible worlds (Lewis, 1986).  This incompatibility between 
allowance  for  inconsistencies  and Lewis-style  extreme  realism is  a  direct  consequence  of  Lewis’s 
construal of the notion of possibility.  Nolan captures this point rather nicely in the following:
On his [Lewis’s] conception, possiblia do in fact have the features we associate with them: 
the  merely  possible  blue  swans  are  literally  blue  and  literally  swans,  for  example. 
Possible worlds for Lewis, notoriously, are just large objects much like our own cosmos—
so the worlds where there are blue swans are just cosmoi with blue swans (among other 
things)  in  them.   Extending  this  approach  to  impossible  objects  produces  literal 
impossibilities…: if the impossibilium corresponding to the blue swan-and-not-a-swan is 
literally a swan and is literally not a swan, then a contradiction is literally true… (Nolan, 
1997, p. 541).
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The problem with literal impossibilities is specific to Lewis’ extreme realism only.  However, 
the problem of theorizing about inconsistencies is not specific to Lewis’ account alone.  It is a problem 
with all classical accounts of possible worlds.  
Also, it is worth noting that classical modal logic deals only with the total or complete ways 
the world could be, and it does not accommodate merely partial ways.  This is a handicap of classical 
modal logic.  This idea of completeness being essential (for classical logic), clashes with what is often 
useful  in thought  experiments,  where incompleteness  is  in  some cases harmless,  and may even be 
beneficial.  Intuitively,  my working on my thesis at this moment, for example, has implications for 
some  things  like  the  department  of  philosophy  (hopefully  it  will  have  one  more  Ph.D.  student 
graduating soon) or my family (viz., that I could not go out skating with them) but what implication 
does it have on things like the colour of the shirt President Bush is going to wear or whether the U.S. is 
going to wage a war against Iran next?  So, there is at least a prima facie advantage in being able to 
consider the ways parts of our world could be, without regard to the rest.  Putting these ideas together, 
it seems that prima facie there is an advantage in being able to consider ways parts of world could not 
be.  For example, Dave’s squaring the circle has implication for whether or not he would be famous, 
but it does not seem to have any implication for whether or not the sun would explode.  So we will 
borrow this idea of partial ways and incorporate it in our new theory for counterfactuals.  Note that 
when we talk  about  ‘partial  states/ways’  we are  talking  about  it  in  the  sense  of  states  which  are 
incomplete—not in the sense of parts of a state.  
The entities that represent ways that parts of the world could be, ways that parts of the world 
could not be, ways our whole world could be, and ways whole world could not be, are called “states”. 
States can be inconsistent (some states might answer both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to some issues, so, P & ¬P can 
come out true in some states, unlike in traditional possible worlds semantics), and incomplete (states 
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need not answer every issue with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’).  In other words, in some states there is just no fact 
of the matter about whether P or ¬P is true.  Or in other words, the law of excluded middle is not valid. 
Now we can see why “states” come in handy in analyzing the kind of counterfactuals (and in 
turn  the  kinds  of  thought  experiments)  we  want  to:  they   admit  of  both  “incompleteness”  and 
“inconsistency”.  If we can use states to analyze counterfactuals and thought experiments, then we no 
longer have to discount counterfactuals and thought experiments either on account of inconsistency or 
incompleteness.
Cases
Instead of “states” in our new account of counterfactuals,  we will  be using “cases”.   Our 
discussion of “states” sets the stage rather nicely for “cases”.  Cases are much like states in that they 
can be incomplete and inconsistent.  In Chapter IV we saw that cases include both possible (including 
the  actual  case)  and  impossible  ones.  We  will  be  focusing  our  discussion  on  impossible  cases—
naturally, because we are interested in analyzing counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.
Recall the following important details about cases:
• there are possible ones and impossible ones
• impossible cases must be conceivable or at least potentially conceivable.
• not just any group sentence of a world w forms a meaningful ‘case’ which we would need  if it were 
going to be used for evaluation of a thought experiment or a counterfactual.  
Let us consider some details about this last point.  Consider the following two sets of sentences:
(1) {Poonam is  related to  Mary,  Mary is  imprisoned in  a tower in  Scotland,  Mary is  the sister  of 
Elizabeth II}
(2) {it is snowing outside, this cup of tea is both hot and cold, Gandhi was killed by a gunman named 
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Nathuram Godse}
Although (1) is impossible because it implies genetic links that do not exist, nevertheless, it is 
conceivable.  Let me explain why: As I mentioned in Chapter IV, all sets of sentences that can be 
extended to something conceivable are cases.  If we can add details to make something conceivable out 
of a set, that shows that the set is not so fundamentally incompatible that it can be disregarded.  (1) is 
conceivable because we can reckon that I (Poonam) was the genetic progeny of one of the lesser royals, 
who tossed me over the side of the Queen Elizabeth II yacht when I was born, where I was discovered 
by a passing cruise ship, then placed in an orphanage… Thus we can add details to (1) and tell a story 
about the link between me and Mary.   So we can add enough details  to (1) and thus extend it  to 
something conceivable as a case.  (2) is not a case.  We cannot do the same to (2).  In other words, we 
have no idea what would be involved in making all of these claims true, because no single thing can be 
both hot and cold at the same time, thus making (2) a non-case.
Similarly,  there  are  cases  where  Dave  squares  the  circle  and  the  sun  explodes,  because 
supposedly Dave is born on a distant galaxy far in the future, just before the sun goes supernova.  You 
just have to add those details to {Dave squares the circle; the sun explodes} to "link them up".  But 
{This is hot at time t, this is cold at time t} cannot be extended in that way.  
Thus we can see conceivability is  at  least  a  sufficient condition for being a case.   Hence 
impossible but conceivable situations count as cases.  However, as I argued in Chapter IV, since there 
can  be  inconceivable  possibilities  (e.g.,  due  to  human  conceptual  or  cognitive  limitations), 
conceivability cannot be a necessary condition for being a case, because all possible situations must 
count as cases (because our new semantics is an extension of Lewis-Stalnaker approaches).  
Now the question still remains: What about inconceivable impossibilities?  As we just saw, 
some inconceivable impossibilities, like a hot and cold thing or a tall short person, cannot be cases. 
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However, could there be some inconceivable impossibilities that are cases, but we can not conceive of 
them because  of  human  conceptual  or  cognitive  limitations?   It  seems  that  there  will  be  sets  of 
sentences which at one time are regarded as inconceivable and so as non-cases, but which (e.g., after 
changes in scientific theories) come to be regarded as conceivable, though still impossible.  Thus such 
sets of sentences may come to be regarded as cases at a later time.  Take the notion of "faster than light 
travel", for instance.  At one time, when the idea that light travelled at finite speed had not occurred to 
anyone, the notion itself made no sense.  Nowadays it is generally regarded as physically impossible, 
but conceivable.  Thus some inconceivable impossibilities may come to be regarded as cases.
Thus "conceivability" is not going to give us a decision procedure for determining whether a 
given set of sentences can be extended to something conceivable, and so to be a case.  I like to think of 
cases as compact “micro worlds” that could have added features of conceivability and that may have 
the properties of incompleteness and inconsistency.
Since my goal is to give a semantics that is structurally similar to a Lewis-Stalnaker semantics 
for possible worlds, but with cases in place of worlds, I will need some account of the relationship of 
“closeness” among cases, since it plays a fundamental role in the Lewis-Stalnaker account.  
As we have noted, there are two kinds of cases: possible (for which I will use the variables x, y 
etc. including the actual case a); and impossible ones (for which I will use the letters w, z).  There are 
some details that needs to be worked out about these cases.  What is the relationship between these two 
kinds of cases in terms of their closeness?  The following are some questions that one could raise about 
these cases, in terms of closeness: Could it be that a is closer to w than z?  In other words, could it be 
that the actual case is closer to one impossible case than another?  Or more broadly, could it be that a 
possible case is closer to one impossible case than another?
More  generally  we  can  ask  the  following  question:  what  is  “closeness”  in  relation  to 
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impossible cases? How do we spell out this notion in this new context?  Before answering, we must 
take stock of “closeness” more generally.  That is to say what does closeness amount to in possible 
world semantics?
Section 3. “Closeness” vis-à-vis Possible Worlds
The general agreement is that closeness involve some sort of similarity.  But similarity of what 
kind? As Bennett points out, after Lewis’s Counterfactuals, initially it was thought that closeness is all-
in  similarity.   However  that  this  was  a  misunderstanding  was  clarified  in  the  paper  entitled 
“Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow” (Lewis, 1979).  In Bennett’s words:
Lewis’s theory evidently needs to be based not on untutored offhand judgments about all-
in similarity, but rather on similarity relation that is constrained somehow—it must say 
that A à C (Bennett writes A > C) is true just in case C is true at the A-worlds that are 
most like the actual world in such and such respects.  The philosophical task is to work 
out  what respects of similarity will enable the theory to square with our intuitions and 
usage (Bennett, 2003, p. 196).
For example, it was pointed out that we want constraints on similarity relations so that it will allow 
some counterfactuals of the form A à Big-difference to be true.  To make this clear consider Bennett’s 
own example:
(1) If on July 20 Stauffenberg had placed the bomb on the other side of the trestle, Hitler would have 
been killed.  Or
(2) If at time T, the trajectory of asteroid X had been one second of arc different from what it actually  
was, the dinosaurs would have survived to the present.
Counterfactuals like the above seem true.  But if “closeness” amounts to overall similarity then we will 
have to consider counterfactuals of the form A à Big-difference like the above false.  (1) is almost 
certainly true.  But if we take closeness to mean overall similarity, any A-world at which Hitler dies on 
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July 20 1944, is less close to actual world a than some of those at which Hitler miraculously survives. 
Thus we are forced to make this counterfactual false.  Again in case of (2), that dinosaurs still exist and 
roam the Earth seems less like the actual world  than are some at which X miraculously swerves just 
after time T into a trajectory identical with its actual ones so that it hits our planet and extinguishes the 
dinosaurs.  So, we want constraints on similarity relations that will allow counterfactuals like (1) to be 
true, “implying that some of the worlds at which Hitler dies on July 20, 1944 are more like the actual 
world in the relevant respects than are any at which Stauffenberg puts the bomb within reach of Hitler 
and the fuse fails.  This must be achieved without also declaring true some conditionals that informed 
people are sure are false” (Bennett, 2003, p. 197)
There are two constraints that are placed on closeness by Lewis, making closeness of worlds 
amount to similarity in certain specified respects.  The theory makes the truth value of A à C depend 
on whether C is true at the A-worlds that are 
(1) like the actual world in matters of particular fact up to the antecedent time and
(2) perfectly like the actual world in respect of causal laws.
(1) says that we must compare closeness of worlds in respect of their states up to the time that the 
antecedent is about—call it TA.  This could not be the whole theory because what a world is like up to 
a  particular  time  implies  nothing  about  what  it  is  like  later  unless  we  take  causal  laws  into 
consideration.  Consider two worlds w1 and w2, in each of which a bomb with a fuse is placed at TA, 
with the fuse failing at one of them, and third world war ensuing in the other.  The difference between 
war and no-war makes no difference to how close they are to the actual world because it pertains to the 
post-antecedent time.  Alongside the bomb-world w1 which is  like the actual world up to TA and 
happens to be the world with the third world war, there is a bomb-world w2 that is equally like w1 up 
to TA and happens to be the world at which the third world war does not obtain.   If we consider 
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constraint (1) alone, nothing said so far about the constraints lets us choose between these two worlds. 
This is why we need (2) to bring causation into the story.  The closest A-worlds must not only be like 
the actual world  a up to TA but also must conform to the causal laws that govern  a.  In case of the 
Stauffenberg example, 
The bomb, the room, and the people were so structured and interrelated that the bombs 
being placed on Hitler’s side of the trestle supporting the table would causally suffice for 
Hitler’s death; so that the only way for Hitler to survive is through a miracle, a breach of 
the causal laws of a [Bennett writes α].  The proposed confining of ourselves to causally 
possible worlds is, precisely, the exclusion of all worlds in which miracles occur.  So we 
have what we want: a theory that makes it true that if a bomb had been placed a foot to the 
right Hitler would have been killed (Bennett, 2003, p. 198).
This is a brief version of one of the important views on what closeness amounts to.  It will 
suffice for my purposes in this thesis to assume that this account is more or less correct.  Now that we 
have seen what “closeness” vis-à-vis possible worlds amounts to, let us look at what closeness vis-à-vis 
impossible cases amounts to.
Section 4. Closeness vis-à-vis Impossible Cases
We can take Lewis’s idea of closeness as a jumping off  point to construct a new idea of 
closeness in relation to impossible cases.  However, we cannot just borrow the idea of closeness vis-à-
vis possible world wholesale, keeping all the causal laws fixed, and all the matters of particular fact up 
until  the  time  in  question,  and  apply it  to  impossible  cases.   As  we will  see  shortly,  this  is  not 
compatible with the partiality of ways.  
We  want  the  new  account  to  handle  counterfactuals  with  various  sorts  of  impossible 
antecedents, including causally impossible antecedents.  So it is not easy to see how those are going to 
work  if  all  the  causal  laws  must  be  held  fixed.   For  Lewis,  such  counterfactuals  with  impossible 
antecedents come out vacuously true, by the mere fact that there is no such world where the antecedent 
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is true.  However, to determine counterfactuals like "If humans had three eyes, it would be harder to 
make glasses",  where the antecedent  is not  metaphysically impossible  one needs to look at worlds 
where the antecedent is true, if the consequent is true also.  If we borrow Lewis’s idea, then we would 
have to end up saying that counterfactuals with metaphysically or causally impossible antecedents are 
vacuously true.  However, this is not what we want.  We want some of these counterfactuals to be true 
and some of them to be false.  
The real problem, I think, is that impossible cases, even logically or metaphysically impossible 
cases, will require a very different structure to the universe if things are going to be arranged "overall" 
so that they would be true.  "If there were finitely many primes..." may be an antecedent for interesting 
counterfactuals, but if this were so then the laws of most areas of mathematics would have to be very 
different, and so too, presumably, would be the laws of physics.  Since we can, as things stand now, 
encode all well-behaved formal languages via Gödel numbering, which involves the use of primes, 
much  of  linguistics  and  computer  science  will  be  false  ...   In  other  words,  the  partiality  of  the 
impossible ways is important for handling antecedents such as the above.  For, we can not really take 
seriously the idea of "making things overall  so that  things can turn out this  way".  So the idea of 
partiality plays an important role in figuring out closeness.  
The impossible cases are necessarily partial, and we can handle them only by insulating much 
of  the  rest  of  the  "world"  from  the  influence  of  the  impossible  bits.   But  what  distinguishes 
counterfactuals like “If Dave squared the circle, he would be more famous than Gödel” from “If Dave 
squared the circle, the sun would explode” is that the revisions involved to actuality to make Dave 
famous in a "squares the circle" way need not require wholesale revisions to the actual laws and the 
actual facts—there is a practice of publication of mathematical theorems, and solution to long-standing 
and famous problems brings fame (of a sort) to mathematicians—and the changes involved in making 
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the impossibility true put Dave in a position to publish a theorem that is a solution to a long-standing 
and famous mathematical problem.  On the other hand, to make the sun explode in a world where Dave 
squares the circle requires significant changes to the physical facts or the physical laws (and probably 
both), changes which have no direct connection to the changes needed to make it so that Dave has 
squared the circle.
So closeness of one case to another depends on whether the changes we need to allow for the 
consequent to be true in a case where we have already allowed changes for the antecedent to be true, are 
related to the actual case and whether these two sets of changes are connected or not.  Thus the Dave-
famous case is closer to the actual world  a than the sun explodes case, because, in the actual case, 
publishing of papers relating to proving a theorem in mathematics brings you fame.  So the changes we 
need for the impossibility of Dave  squaring the circle and thereby becoming famous to be true is 
connected to the facts about the world where fame follows directly from publishing difficult theorems 
in mathematics.  
Thus, we try to explain closeness in the following way:  Let
A = Dave squares the circle
B= Dave will be famous
C = the Sun explodes
a = actual world.
Is this AB (Dave squares the circle and he is famous) case closer to a than AC (Dave squares 
the circle and the sun explodes) case?  If it is, why?  What does it mean for one case to be closer to the 
actual world than another?  One can say the AB case is closer to a than the AC case because for AB to 
be true, the changes that we allow for A to be true are connected to the changes we have to allow for B 
to be true.  It follows directly from the changes we need to envisage for the impossibility of Dave 
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squaring the circle to be true, that for such a major accomplishment, Dave would publish the results, 
because in the actual world people publish the results of major mathematical  accomplishments like 
proving such a theorem, and in the actual world publishing such results bring fame.  Therefore, in that 
AB case, it will bring fame to Dave and thus make the conditional true.  However, for AC to be true, 
we need rather far fetched changes such as changes in the laws of physics for C to be true in a world 
where A is true.  And the changes we need to envisage for A to be true are mathematically related 
whereas the changes we need for C to be true are causal, and as there is no link between the two sets of 
changes.
Notice that such an account makes room for a role for the actual case a in explaining which 
counterfactual is true.  It seems likely that how things actually are should have some influence on which 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents turn out to be true.  This way of viewing closeness also 
makes  room  for  capturing  relevancy between  the  antecedent  and  the  consequent,  which  is  what 
Relevance Logics tries to capture.  From “Dave squares the circle” one can infer that “Dave would be 
more famous than Gödel” , because he could publish the results, which would be more impressive than 
Gödel’s  incompleteness  results  (because  up  to  this  point  squaring  the  circle  was  considered  a 
mathematical impossibility, whereas the incompleteness theorem was not)….But from “Dave squares 
the circle” one cannot infer “the sun would explode” because proving a mathematical impossibility has 
nothing to do with the sun exploding.
Thus, some impossible cases are closer to the actual case than others.  In other words the 
answer to our initial questions is “yes”.  Because it seems a case where Dave squares the circle and he 
is very famous (AB case) is closer to the actual case a than a case where Dave squares the circle and the 
sun explodes (AC case).  In other words, impossible cases that  are closer in some relevant crucial 
respects  (i.e.,  the  same  laws  of  physics  hold  etc.)  are  far  less  dissimilar.   This  way of  viewing 
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“closeness” in terms of relevant similarity, with regard to impossible cases, facilitates the distinction 
between counterfactuals like “if Dave squares the circle then he will be more famous than Gödel” and 
“if Dave squares the circle then the sun will explode”.  We can say that the former is true and the latter 
is false, if the closest and most relevantly similar Dave-squaring-the-circle impossible cases are also 
cases  where  he  is  more  famous  than  most  famous  mathematicians.   But  Dave-squaring-the-circle 
impossible cases are not the cases where the sun explodes.  And that is why they are dissimilar.
Notice that the difficulty with the Lewis-Stalnaker style account is going to be explaining what 
it means for one case to be closer to another.  Let me explain this with the help of our original example: 
Consider why the Dave-famous counterfactual is true: any nearby case in which Dave squares the circle 
is also a case in which he is famous, because part of "closeness" in this case is that theorems are the 
kinds of things that get published and can make you famous.  The content of the consequent links to 
that sort of feature of the world, so it is natural to include them in the specification of the case, even if 
cases can be incomplete.  On the other hand, there is no link of content between the mathematical 
practice  of  constructing  and publishing  proofs  and the  sun  exploding.   So,  one  is  not  completely 
unconstrained in including what sorts of things should count as being held constant between two cases 
for them to count as nearby.  Indeed, this is less problematic for analyses using cases than those using 
worlds—a notorious problem for Lewis and Stalnaker because they have to consider whole worlds, 
including the vast, uncountable realms of facts not relevant to what is actually stated in the antecedent.
Now that we have sorted out these crucial details about impossible cases, we are in a position 
to discuss the new theory for counterfactuals.
Section 5. A New Theory of Counterfactuals
What  is  this  new theory of  counterfactuals,  and how does  it  manage counterfactuals  with 
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impossible antecedents in a systematic way so that some of these counterfactuals come out true and 
some come out false?
In  our  new  theory  for  counterfactuals  we  use  the  basic  concepts  of  incompleteness  and 
inconsistency made available by Relevance Logic, incorporate that with our concept of “cases” that 
have the added feature of conceivability (at least potential) and combine that with the basic ideas of 
Lewis-Stalnaker  style  analysis  of  counterfactuals  to  produce  a  new  theory—one  that  manages 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedent in a fairly systematic way.
As we have noted before, the basic idea in Lewis-Stalnaker style analysis is the following:
In analyzing a conditional  of the appropriate  sort  (i.e.,  P  ⃞  à Q) one checks the  closest 
possible worlds where the antecedent (P) is true, and if in all those possible worlds (where P is true), 
the consequent (Q) is true as well, the conditional in question is true.
On this new theory:
P ⃞ à Q is true at w iff there is a (P and Q) case y that is closer to w than is any (P and ¬Q) case z.  If 
there are no P cases at which either Q or not Q is true, then P ⃞ à Q is indeterminate.  Also iff for 
every P & Q case there is a closer P & ¬ Q case, then P ⃞ à Q is false at w.
So w ⊦ P ⃞ à Q iff there is some y such that: 
*1.  If y ⊦  P ∧ Q, y ⊬ ¬ P, y ⊬ ¬Q, and z ⊦  P ∧ ¬Q then y is closer to w than z.
There is another alternative:
*2.  y  ⊦ P ∧ Q, y ⊬ ¬ P, y  ⊬¬Q, and if z ⊦ P and z ⊬ Q then y is closer to w than z.
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To see the difference this change would make consider the following counterfactual: “If Dave 
squared the circle then the earth would continue to circle the sun”.  Adopting *2 makes it easier to say 
that the counterfactual being considered is indeterminate since truth value of Q is unknown in z.  But by 
adopting this analysis the risk we run is that on this formulation counterfactuals like “if Dave squares 
the circle then the sun will explode” also turns out indeterminate.  This may not seem problematic. 
However, it is counterintuitive to the premise this thesis is originally based on.  This thesis started with 
the intuition that counterfactuals like “If Dave squares the circle then the sun will explode” seems false 
and counterfactuals like “If Dave squares the circle then he will be famous” seems true.  At this point I 
am tempted to stay with *1.  
The price we pay for adopting this is that counterfactuals like “If Dave squares the circle then 
Monica (his daughter) will have toast for breakfast”, and “If Dave squares the circle then the earth will 
continue to go around the sun” will come out true, though we can say that “If Dave squares the circle 
then the sun will explode” is false.  But this is not a high price to pay.  Recall that we define closeness 
in relation to actual cases.  It is quite plausible that if Dave squares the circle then he will be so excited 
that he will offer to make breakfast that day and that he will decide to make French-toast for Monica or 
if Dave squares the circle then although it is a considerable mathematical achievement, the world will 
still largely be the same as it was before he squared the circle, and hence the earth will continue to 
circle the sun.  How about the sun-explodes counterfactual then?  It is also a case, as we said earlier, 
because of the example in which Dave is born on a distant galaxy long in the future, just before the sun 
goes nova.  But it is false and the sun-explodes case is not as close as the Monica-having-toast case 
because the changes we need to allow for the consequent to be true, when the antecedent is true, have 
nothing to  do with the actual  case.   There is  no connection  between the sun exploding and Dave 
squaring the circle.  In the actual world,  there is no connection between such things as publishing 
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mathematical  theorems  and stars  exploding.   Thus  the  way the  actual  world  is  determines  which 
impossible cases are closer to a.  Thus I am quite comfortable allowing for counterfactuals like “If Dave 
squares the circle, Monica will have toast for breakfast” coming out true, much like counterfactuals 
such as “If Dave squares the circle, then he will be famous”.
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Chapter V: Application of the New Theory to Thought Experiments
One of the key objectives of this  thesis is to provide a tool that  can analyze  thought experiments 
involving impossible scenarios, such as the auditory world and fission, in a way that accounts for their 
usefulness/informativeness.  As we will see  this kind of thought experiments is  deemed uninformative 
in two highly regarded book length treatments of thought experiments, due to Roy Sorensen and Tamar 
Gendler.  In this chapter, I will show how by applying the new semantics for counterfactuals to these 
thought experiments we can explain their usefulness.  With  the help of these two and two other crucial 
examples of thought experiments  (Ship of Theseus, and Chinese Room),  I will  show that  the new 
semantics allows for a nice representation of what is at issue in the philosophical debates that surround 
them,  and  that  it  provides  guidance  to  philosophers  about  what  needs  to  be  shown  to  make  a 
compelling case about what they show.  
This chapter is divided into five sections.  In section 1 and 2 I will discuss   Sorensen's and 
Gendler's  accounts  of  thought  experiments.   Section  3  and 4,  are  critiques  of  the  aforementioned 
accounts,  in  particular  in  relation  to  what  they imply about  impossibility.   I show that  these  two 
accounts fail to handle thought experiments with impossible scenarios, because they imply that thought 
experiments with impossible scenarios are incoherent, and so fail to explain why some such thought 
experiments are much-discussed by philosophers, and generally regarded as potentially informative.  In 
section 5 I will discuss how the new semantics for counterfactuals apply to the four example thought 
experiments (Theseus's Ship, Chinese Room, Fission, and Auditory World).  I will also discuss the 
main pay offs of such an application.
The availability of the new account of counterfactuals brings two related advantages when it 
comes to thought experiments.  First, for impossible scenario thought experiments, the new account can 
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explain how they can still  be informative.   Secondly, for thought experiments  such as the Chinese 
Room, where it is not clear whether there is a subtle impossibility in the scenario or not, this new 
account with its continuous treatment of possible and impossible cases makes clear why the debate 
about them looks the way it does.  The crucial question about the Chinese Room is not whether there is 
such an impossibility, but what is the "nearest" situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it 
is impossible or not) and what we would say in such a case (about the intentionality of the room).  On 
traditional  accounts,  including Gendler's and Sorensen's,  it  ought to be paramount  to deal with the 
possibility question, because if it is an impossible scenario the lessons we learn are very different from 
the ones we learn if it is possible.  
Thus, there are two related deficiencies in the standard book length accounts.  First, they fail to 
account  for  incomplete/impossible  yet  informative  thought  experiments.   Secondly,  even  for  the 
possible ones, they are unable to explain, at least in some interesting cases, what are the important 
philosophical issues at stake.  
Section 1. Sorensen
Sorensen,  in  his  book  Thought Experiments,  aims  to  present  a  general  theory of  thought 
experiments that would account for: what they are, how they work, their virtues and vices.  Based on 
the  definition  of  an  experiment  as  "a  procedure  for  answering  or  raising  a  question  about  the 
relationship between variables by varying one (or more) of them and tracking any response by the other 
or others" (Sorensen, 1992, p. 186), Sorensen defines a thought experiment to be "an experiment that 
purports to achieve its aim without the benefit of execution" (Sorensen, 1992, p. 205).  By “purports to 
achieve its aim without execution”, Sorensen means that “the experimental design is presented a certain 
way to the audience.  The audience is being invited to believe that contemplation of the design justifies 
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an answer to the question or (more rarely) justifiably raises its question” (Sorensen, 1992, pp. 205-206). 
Thus,  Sorensen’s  view  is  that  the  thought  experiment  constitutes  a  “limiting  case”  of 
experiments and thought experiments can achieve their aim without being executed.  There are five 
models of thought experiment that are suggested by philosophers and psychologists, claims Sorensen. 
The five models are the following: the recollection model, the transformation model, the homuncular  
model, the re-arrangement model, and the cleansing model.  Thought experiments are categorized thus 
according  to  the  purpose  they serve  in  “improving  the  epistemic  state  of  the  thinker  without  the 
addition of new information”.
Many thought experiments  that  fall  into  the category of  the recollection model serve their 
purpose  as  reminders.   These  function  by bringing  about   the  recollection  of  previously acquired 
empirical knowledge.  Sorensen’s example of the following standard thought experiment in physics is a 
case in point: This thought experiment asks us to picture a pilot who forgets to fasten his seat belt when 
performing a front-back loop.  At the top of the loop, when the pilot is upside down, does he fall down? 
One is naturally inclined to answer “yes” since gravity should pull  the pilot  down.  However, one 
figures that the question would not have been asked if the answer was so simple.  So  one examines the 
forces that  might counteract gravity.  Many are led to think of centrifugal force because the pilots 
hypothetical stunt reminds them of carnival rides.  Now the similarity between the pilot’s stunt and a 
carnival ride is increased by imagining that the pilot is doing a left-right loop.  The pilots feet would 
press against the floor, he would not be leaning just on his side.  This similarity leads the thinker to a 
negative answer for the vertical loop case: centrifugal force would keep the pilot on the plane.  
Thought  experiments  in  the transformation model achieve  their  results  by  codifying 
knowledge  of  linguistic  rules.   Explaining  what  transformation  model thought  experiments  are, 
Sorensen  says:  “Linguistic  philosophers  portray the  a  priori  refinement  of  implicit  knowledge  as 
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proceeding from knowing how to knowing that.  The idea is that we all have knowledge about how to 
speak the language in which we are philosophizing.  Since philosophical theses concern meaning and 
meaning is governed by rules of the language, we can settle philosophical questions by codifying our 
mastery of linguistic rules” (Sorensen, 1992, p. 92).  As an example, Sorensen cites Harry Frankfurt’s 
refutation of ‘A person is responsible only if he could have done otherwise’.  Frankfurt asks us to 
imagine that a scientist has wired up a man with a fail-safe device.  The device will cause the man to do 
a bad thing if he does not do it on his own.  As it turns out, the device is not activated because the man 
does the wicked deed on his own.  Now, is the man responsible?  Since we are inclined to describe him 
as  responsible  for  the  deed,  our  mastery of  English  give  us  evidence  against  the  entailment  rule. 
Knowledge  of  how  to  use  ‘responsible’  thus  transforms  into  knowledge  that  responsibility  is 
compatible with the inability to do otherwise.  
The homuncular  model thought  experiments  are  mental  information  processing  as  if  by 
homunculi.  Sorensen here endorses Dennett’s idea of viewing the agent as an imperfectly coordinated 
complex of cognitive systems---a crew of homunculi (little men).  According to Sorensen, this model 
suggests that the imagination will have a distributional role.  Some thought experiments in this model 
reveal hidden disagreements within the “internal committee”.  Sorensen provides an illustration of this 
model through the following: consider the belief that all harms must make a discriminable difference to 
their victims.  Jonathan Glover, with the help of the following thought experiment, shows that this 
belief conflicts with our belief that little differences can add up to a big difference:
Suppose a village contains 100 unarmed tribesman eating their lunch.  100 hungry armed 
bandits descend on the village and each bandit at gun-point takes one tribesman’s lunch 
and eats it.  The bandits then go off, each one having done a discriminable amount of 
harm to a single tribesman.  Next week, the bandits are tempted to do the same thing 
again, but are troubled by new-found doubts about the morality of such a raid.  Their 
doubts are put to rest by one of their number who does not believe in the principle of 
divisibility.  They then raid the village, tie up the tribesman, and look at their lunch.  As 
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expected, each bowl of food contains 100 baked beans.  The pleasure derived from one 
baked beans is below the discrimination threshold.  Instead of each bandit eating a single 
plateful like last week, each takes one bean from each plate.  They leave after eating all 
the beans, pleased to have done no harm, as each has done no more than sub-threshold 
harm to each person.  (Glover, 1975, pp. 174-175)
This thought experiment  helps to bring out the contradiction in two beliefs—disagreement 
among  the internal committee of homunculi.  
The re-arrangement model thought experiments re-arrange information into more convenient 
formats.   “This  model  is  inspired  by situations  in  which  the  information  at  hand  is  made  more 
digestible by changing its form” (Sorensen 1992, p. 99).  As an example, Sorensen provides James 
Rachels’s thought experiment that serves a critique against American Medical Association’s position 
on  euthanasia.   Association  policy forbids  active  euthanasia  (“mercy killing”)  but  permits  passive 
euthanasia.  According to Rachels there is no morally relevant difference between killing someone and 
letting someone die.  Rachels provides the following scenario in which he places a pair of hypothetical 
bad moral deeds side by side.  The first involves a man, Smith, who will inherit a large estate if his six-
year-old cousin dies.  One evening while the boy is taking a bath, Smith sneaks in and drowns the boy. 
The second involves a man, Jones, who, like Smith, has a six-year old cousin standing in the way of 
Jones inheriting a large estate.  Jones, like Smith, decides to kill his cousin.  However, when Jones 
sneaks in to kill the boy, he sees the boy slip, hit his head, and land with his face in the water.  The 
delighted Jones stands over the boy, ready to push him under if he recovers.  But the boy drowns on his 
own.  Smith killed his cousin.  Jones merely let his cousin die.  But having controlled all the extraneous 
variables carefully, we see that the distinction does not make a moral difference.  Thus if we rearrange 
the information in new ways, into a more convenient format, the information is made more digestible.
The cleansing model thought experiments expose and eliminate acts of irrationality in belief-
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formation.  This includes a familiar situation where an inconsistency is noticed, and is then weeded out 
(Sorensen, 1992, pp. 88-109).  “The cleansing model is inspired by incidents in which you recognize 
your own irrationality and then change your beliefs  to remove the flaw” (Sorensen, 1992, p. 104). 
According to Sorensen, Plato’s allegory of the cave serves to demonstrate this.  The allegory of the cave 
demonstrates that Plato’s theory of forms could be right although it contradicts common sense.  
The difference between the first four models and the cleansing model is that “whereas the 
previous models cast the epistemic improvement as a matter of adding positive features, the cleansing 
model concentrates on subtracting negative features” (Sorensen 1992, p. 104).  Sorensen further adds: 
“These negative features are intellectual vices that diminish your efficiency at tasks such as argument, 
explanation, inquiry, prediction, planning, problem solving, and teaching” (Sorensen, 1992, p. 104).
None of these five models preclude the others, according to Sorensen.  So, he says, “we are 
free to pick and mix.  There are thought experiments conforming to each—and some that fit all the 
models simultaneously” (Sorensen, 1992, p. 109).  Sorensen acknowledges that although all these five 
models  may have  some application,  he  believes  that  only one  can  be  elaborated  on  further.   For 
developing the first four would require psychological theories more sophisticated than we at present 
possess.  Given this situation, he deems only the fifth, i.e., the cleansing model, suited for development. 
In his words:
Although  all  of  the  models  have  applicability,  only  one  has  prospect  of  immediate 
elaboration.   We  have  a  very  limited  understanding  of  how  the  mind  works.   This 
psychological obscurity fogs in the positive models.  We can say that thought experiments 
function as reminders,  transformers,  autosimulators,  and rearrangers, but we cannot go 
much beyond that.  Future progress may enable us to go further.  But for now, the positive 
models only provide vague sketches of how thinkers improve without new information 
(Sorensen, 1992, p. 109).  
Thus, he goes on to develop an account of cleansing model thought experiments.  Henceforth 
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when we talk  about  Sorensen’s account  of  “thought  experiments”  we mean Sorensen’s account  of 
“cleansing model thought experiments”.  
Sorensen contends that, in general, thought experiments are reactions to inconsistencies in sets 
of statements.  More specifically, thought experiments aim at refuting a statement (which he calls the 
thought  experiment's  "source  statement")  by disproving  its  alethic  modal  consequences,  i.e.,  those 
consequences of the statement having the form "It is necessary/possible that p".  In those cases where 
the  alethic  modal  consequence  of  the  statement  is  of  the  form “it  is  necessary that  p”—a source 
statement that entails that p holds in all possible worlds—a successful thought experiment involves 
finding a possible world in which p is false.  Conversely, in cases where the alethic modal consequence 
is a statement of the form “it is possible that p”—a source statement that implies that p holds in some 
possible world—a successful thought experiment involves establishing that there is no such possible 
world.  
Sorensen claims that any argument purporting to refute a source statement by disproving one 
of its modal consequences can be laid out in a standard form, consisting of five propositions that are 
jointly  inconsistent,  of  which  one  is  the  source  statement.   “Necessity  refuters”  and  “possibility 
refuters” are what Sorensen calls the arguments that purport to overthrow the source statement that 
implies that p holds in all possible worlds, and p holds in some possible worlds respectively.  This can 
take the following form:
(1) Modal source statement: 
(2) Modal  extractor/possibility  extractor:  this  proposition  draws  the  relevant  modal  implication/a 
possibility consequence from the source statement.   
(3) Counterfactual:  this  proposition  claims  that  the  antecedent  which  is  the  conjunction  of  the 
implication and the imagined situation, has a weird consequence.
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(4) Absurdity: this proposition explains the weirdness as an impossibility.  
(5) Content possibility/content copossibility: this asserts that the content of the thought experiment is a 
possibility/that the statement extracted at 2 is true only if it is compatible with the content of the 
thought experiment.
The joint inconsistency of the above statements imposes an obligation to deny at least one of 
the statements.  While the successful thought experiment establishes that it is the source statement that 
should be denied, unsuccessful thought experiments lead to the denial of other statements in the set. 
On the basis of these observations Sorensen proposes a taxonomy of thought experiments according to 
the particular member-statement of the set which they undermine (Sorensen, 1992, pp. 135-60).
To see how a thought experiment can be translated into the above form, consider Gettier’s 
thought experiment.  Gettier attempted to overthrow the “JTB” definition of knowledge (the definition 
that knowledge is justified true belief). According to JTB, A knows that p if and only if (1) A believes 
that p, (2) A is justified in believing that p, and (3) p is true.  Gettier’s objection was that the definition 
is too broad.  He proved it through the following imaginary situation: Imagine that Smith and Jones are 
candidates for the same job.  Now imagine that Smith acquires a justified belief that 
(a) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones had ten coins in his pocket.
For example, Smith’s evidence might be that the president of the company told Smith that 
Jones will get the job and that Smith previously counted the coins in Jones’s pocket.  Smith notices that 
(a) entails:
(b) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
And thus comes to the justified belief  that (b).  However, despite what the president said, 
Smith is the man who will get the job and, as it happens, Smith has ten coins in his pocket.  Hence (b) 
is true, and Smith justifiably believes it.  Yet Smith does not know (b).  Too much luck was involved. 
125
Thus JTB does not hold.  
This thought experiment can be put in the following form:
(1) The definition of knowledge is justified true belief.
(2) If knowledge is justified true belief, then necessarily, if a person has a justified true belief that p, 
then he knows that p.
(3) If all justified true believers that p have knowledge that p and Smith is justifiably right but for the 
wrong reason, then Smith knows that (b) because of luck.
(4) It is impossible for anyone’s knowledge to be due to luck
(5) It is possible for Smith to be justifiably right for the wrong reason.  
Most epistemologists agree that the Gettier cases are counterexamples to the JTB definition of 
knowledge.  So they reject the first member of the set.  Some deny that the possibility of a justified 
false belief and thus deny the fifth member of the set on the ground that Smith was not justified in 
believing in (b).  
This in a nutshell is Sorensen’s theory of thought experiments.  Now we come to Gendler’s 
account.
Section 2. Gendler
Tamar  Gendler,  in  her  recent  work,  Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of 
Imaginary Cases, discusses how imaginary cases provide (wherein lies their power) or fail to provide 
new knowledge (wherein lies their limits).  My interest is not to provide a synopsis of Gendler’s book. 
Thus I will not be discussing all the valid points she makes about thought experiments and criticisms 
she offers of her predecessors.  Instead, I want to discuss certain crucial and novel points that she makes 
about thought experiments.  
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The following,  according to  Gendler,  characterizes  the fundamental  structure of  a thought 
experiment:
(1) An imaginary scenario is described.
(2) An argument is offered that attempts to establish the correct evaluation of the scenario.
(3) This evaluation of the imagined scenario is then taken to reveal something about cases beyond the 
scenario (Gendler, 2000, p. 21).
Gendler finds the negative counterpart of this characterization particularly useful in classifying 
criticisms directed at thought experiments and their real-world import.  The grounds of attack are the 
following:
(1a) Unimaginability: the scenario described is not (fully) imaginable.
(2a) Unsound argument: although the scenario described is imaginable, the argument establishing the 
correct evaluation of the scenario is unsound.
(3a)  Inapplicability: although the scenario described is imaginable, and the argument establishing the 
correct evaluation of the scenario is sound, the conclusion does not reveal what the author takes it 
to reveal about the actual world (Gendler, 2000, p. 22).
Gendler also provides a taxonomy for thought experiments.  Depending on three basic sorts of 
questions  that  different  sorts  of  thought  experiments  are  trying  to  answer,  we  can  divide  thought 
experiments into three kinds.  The questions are the following:
(1) What would happen, 
(2) How, given (1) (i.e., what would happen), should we describe what would happen,
(3) How, given (2) (i.e., how should we describe what would happen), should we evaluate what would 
happen.
The  first  type  is  called  factive (e.g.,  Galileo),  the  second  conceptual (e.g.   The  Ship  of 
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Theseus), and the third  valuational (e.g. Fission).  In the first type we are concerned about what the 
facts of a situation would be, in the second, what would we take the proper application of the concepts 
to be, and the third, what would be the proper moral or aesthetic response to a situation.  Gendler also 
cautions us that the line between these types of thought experiments may sometimes collapse.
According to Gendler, the powers and limits of a thought experiment depend on whether or 
not  the case provided by a  thought  experiment  is  correctly treated by the theory,  i.e.,  the thought 
experimenter  maintains  a  distinction  between theories  with  “norm-driven-exceptions”, and theories 
with “exception-driven-norms”.  By theories with norm-driven exceptions and  theories with exception-
driven norms, Gendler means the following: There are two main ways in which a theory can explain 
exceptional  cases.   In other words,  there  are two main  strategies users  of  a theory can employ in 
explaining exceptional cases.  According to Gendler, “[T]he first strategy is to use exceptional cases as 
a way of progressively narrowing the range of privileged characteristics…  According to this strategy, 
one uses exceptional  cases to ascertain the theory’s exception-driven norms.  The exceptions drive 
interpretation of the norms; what is taken to matter about normal cases is whatever it is that they have 
in common with exceptional cases…” (Gendler, 2000, p. 8).
So, let’s suppose, following Gendler, that entities under inspection by the theory in question 
generally have the characteristics a, b, c, d, and e.  Suppose further that an exceptional entity is found 
that falls within the purview of the present theory, but which has only characteristics b, and d.  Under 
this strategy, it follows that no characteristics other than b and d can be privileged characteristics in the 
sense that they necessarily belong to any entity that falls within the purview of the theory.  “Such an 
attitude  towards  exceptional  cases  involves  using  them  as  test  cases  to  ascertain  necessary  and 
sufficient conditions”, says Gendler (Gendler, 2000, p. 8).  The conclusion one draws is that even in 
non-exceptional cases, the characteristics that really matter are those that are present in the exceptional 
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cases as well, viz., b and d, in this case.  
The second strategy is to view exceptional cases as evidence for the strength of the theory’s 
core.  “On the basis of this strategy, one concludes that what it is that allows the exceptional cases to be 
cases at all is that they have enough in common with the normal cases”.  So, for example, suppose 
again that entities under the theory in question generally have the characteristics  a,  b,  c,  d, and e and 
suppose further that some entity is found that has only b, and d, but which nonetheless seems to fall 
within the purview of the theory.  According to the second strategy, what we ought to say about the 
entity in question is that it falls within the purview of the theory, but only because it is similar in certain 
crucial  ways to  more typical  instances of  entities  under  the theory.   Under this  strategy,  one uses 
exceptional  cases  to  ascertain  the theory’s  norm-driven  exceptions.   It  is  the norms  that  drive the 
interpretation of the exceptions (Gendler, 2000, p. 9).
Gendler contends that both the powers and limits of imaginary cases can be traced back to the 
fact that when such contemplation brings us to new knowledge, it does so by forcing us to make sense 
of an exceptional case (Gendler, 2000, p. 12).  Why is this so?   She writes: 
My  answer  is  three-fold:  First,  thinking  about  exceptional  cases  can  lead  us  to  a 
reconfiguration of our conceptual commitments, allowing us to organize information in a 
way that renders it newly meaningful.  Moreover, exceptional cases are good test cases; 
they help prevent us from mistaking accidental regularities for regularities that reflect a 
deeper truth about the world.  But, third, exceptional cases are dangerous; if we fail to 
keep straight the distinction between theories with norm-driven exceptions and theories 
with  exception-driven  norms,  we  are  likely  to  draw  radically misguided conclusions 
(Gendler, 2000, p. 12).
Galileo’s thought experiment (see Section 3. Chapter I, for a detailed description), according 
to Gendler, brings new knowledge to the Aristotelian by allowing him to see all cases involving falling 
bodies through the lens of an exceptional case of strapped bodies wherein the Aristotelian realizes, 
through the paradox, the inconsistencies in his own theory.  In this  case the exception dictates the 
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interpretation of the norms.  This is what explains the thought experiment’s power in this case.  
In the fission case, precisely the same feature [i.e.,  the feature that exceptions are taken to 
drive the interpretation of the norms] explains the thought experiment’s limitations (Gendler, 2000, p. 
159).   According to  Gendler,  the fission case is  an obviously exceptional  case.   It is  meant  to  be 
unusual/extraordinary.   She  argues  that  to  make  sense  of  such  cases  they  have  to  be  treated  as 
extraordinary.  Otherwise, we are bound to draw “radically misguided conclusions”.  Our ability to 
draw any meaningful lessons from such cases relies on our ability to draw lessons from ordinary cases. 
So,  such  cases  are  powerful  insofar  as  we  treat  them  as  norm-driven-exceptions  rather  than  as 
exception-driven-norms.  
As Gendler points out in the fission case, a process (the process of transplanting Brainy's brain 
into Lefty’s and Righty’s bodies) that  is normally identity-preserving would turn out to be identity 
creating.  That is, in the “single-transfer case” the process would result in continued existence of some 
entity over time.  But the in the “double-transfer case” it would end up in creating two new entities. 
But if these entities are self-conscious, as human beings are, then we are faced with the following 
puzzle: to the extent that we are talking about the same process (intrinsically), in both cases, how could 
the  rationality of  one’s  attitude  towards  one’s  continuer  differ  from the single-transfer  case to  the 
double-transfer case?  In other words, how could one’s attitude depend on whether the process ended 
up preserving one’s identity (in the single transfer case) or whether the process ended up creating two 
new individuals?  Presumably, one's attitude towards one's continuer would be the same in both the 
single-transfer and the double-transfer case.  Up until now, Gendler agrees with Parfit.  However, what 
Parfit concludes from fission is that what makes my prudential concern for myself tomorrow rational is 
not the fact that myself-tomorrow will presumably be identical to myself-today, but only that she will 
be connected to me by the right sort of causal process  i.e., ones that will result in the right sort of 
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relation of psychological continuity and connectedness.  So personal identity is not what matters or, to 
state the point in Gendler’s terms,  the relation which matters  for rational prudential  concern is  not 
identity.  This is because in the double-transfer case what matters for rational prudential concern is 
present but identity is absent.  So, if the former can obtain without the latter, then identity cannot be 
what matters for rational prudential concern.  
Gendler argues against  this  conclusion and claims that fission shows much less than what 
Parfit  takes it to show.  “It shows only that there are conceivable circumstances where it might be 
rational to bear a relation of prudential concern towards a continuer with whom one was not identical” 
(Gendler, 2000, p. 147).  The larger lesson to be drawn from fission, according to Gendler, is  the 
following: in the case of fission, we are asked to imagine a scenario where “a pair of features that 
coincide in all actual situations are imaginatively separated” and we are asked to make a judgment 
about  which of  the two features  has  conceptual  primacy.   The proper  interpretation  of  the case is 
exactly the opposite of what it is taken to be.  We are not to make a judgment about the normal cases on 
the basis of the exceptional cases.  The reason why fission’s implications have been misunderstood is 
the following:
[c]ertain  patterns  of  features  which  coincide  only fortuitously may nonetheless  play a 
central role in the organization of our concepts.  To the extent that imaginary scenarios 
involve  disruptions  of  these  patterns,  our  first-order  judgment  about  them  are  often 
distorted or even inverted (Gendler, 2000, p. 147).  
The Ship of Theseus is another example of an obvious exceptional case in the sense of being 
extraordinary.  It presents us with a case in which a seemingly entity-preserving process apparently 
becomes entity-creating after sufficient iteration.  According to Gendler, it would be wrong to draw the 
conclusion in this case that such processes are  ordinarily entity-creating.  “For, if cases like Theseus 
were the norm rather than the exception, it would not make sense even to speak of identity-candidacy 
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for ships.  Ships would be like amoebae or cloud formations or World Wide Web sites—messy sorts of 
entities with obscure criteria for individuation and persistence” (Gendler, 2000, p. 155).  So, according 
to Gendler, to properly interpret this thought experiment would be to say that this is a case of a norm-
driven-exception.  And we can make sense of such an unusual case only against the background of 
normal cases.  Hence, thought experiments are powerful or limited depending on what conclusions can 
legitimately be drawn from them, according to Gendler.  
Section 3. Sorensen’s Diagnosis vis-á-vis  Impossible Thought Experiments
Since Sorensen's account is in essence an account of the cleansing model thought experiment, it 
is not clear how this account applies to some of the impossible-scenario thought experiments under 
consideration in this thesis.  According to Sorensen, the cleansing model thought experiments work by 
exposing and eliminating acts of irrationality in belief-formation.  This includes a familiar situation 
where an inconsistency is noticed, and is then weeded out.  However, thought experiments such as the 
auditory world are not aimed at exposing and eliminating irrationality in our belief formation about 
objectivity.  The auditory world is construed with the aim to expose previously unnoticed ties between 
our concepts in our conceptual scheme of the real world. 
The “source statement” under attack in this thought experiment is that 'space is a prerequisite 
for objectivity”.  However, Sorensen will deem this thought experiment not successful.  For, according 
to Sorensen, in those cases where the alethic modal consequence of the statement is of the form “it is 
necessary that p”—a source statement that entails that p holds in all possible worlds—a  successful 
thought experiment involves finding a possible world in which p is false.  Conversely, in cases where 
the alethic modal consequence is a statement of the form “it is possible that p”—a source statement that 
implies that p holds in some possible world—a successful thought experiment involves establishing 
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that there is no such possible world. 
Applying Sorensen's account to the auditory world thought experiment, the source statement is 
"necessarily, if there is objectivity, then there is space".  So Strawson needs to show that there is a 
possible world in which there is objectivity but no space.  Sorensen would have to say that the auditory 
world thought experiment is unsuccessful because Strawson is unable to establish whether there is a 
possible world (namely the auditory world) in which P (space is a prerequisite for objectivity) is false. 
After all, Strawson does abandon the thought experiment.  So this might be seen by Sorensen as having 
failed  to  establish  a  necessity  refuter.   However,  it  is  clear  that  Strawson's  goal  in  this  thought 
experiment is not to establish that there is a possible world in which P is false.  All he wants to do is to 
find out more about objectivity in the real world, by construing this auditory world.  His aim is not to 
refute that “space is a prerequisite for objectivity”; rather, his aim is to test whether it is the case.  The 
auditory world thought experiment teaches us valuable lessons even though it is ultimately not fully and 
coherently describable.
The Chinese Room thought experiment is also a challenge for Sorensen's account.  As far as 
the original  thought  experiment  goes the source statement  would be: "It is  possible  that  there is  a 
computer with intentionality", and Searle wants to use the Chinese Room to show that this is false (i.e., 
he wants to prove "necessarily, there are no computers with intentionality").  And Sorensen's way of 
looking at the matter  requires that  the Chinese Room be possible,  so that  it  can be an appropriate 
analogue of possible computers.  However, we will  see in our discussion of the Chinese Room in 
Section 5 that Dennett and others have (in effect) pointed out that it doesn't really matter whether the 
Chinese Room is possible; what matters is what we should say in a case in which there is a Chinese 
Room (whether it is possible or not). It is not clear what one would say, if we sit down to consider the 
details.  What comes out of the debate regarding the Chinese Room, as we will see, is that there might 
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be some subtle impossibilities built into the Chinese Room.  For example, speed is an important factor 
for intelligent system.  If there is a person manipulating symbols using a rule book, the speed in which 
the Chinese Room would operate would be too slow to regard it an intelligent system.  So perhaps in 
order for it to  appear intelligent the person inside the Chinese Room would need to operate at a rate 
that  would be humanly impossible.   Applying Sorensen's account to the Chinese Room, the source 
statement would be: “it is possible to have computers with intentionality”. Searle with the  thought 
experiment wants to establish: there are no possible cases of computers with intentionality.  Now, if 
Searle's argument works, Sorensen would have to say that his argument involves the claim that if any 
computer has intentionality, then Chinese Room has intentionality, in order for Searle to justify the 
claim that since  the Chinese Room doesn't have intentionality,  no computer does.” This argument 
depends on the Chinese Room describing a possible world (i.e., the Chinese Room is possible), if the 
point is to show “no possible computer”.  But this is not what the debate turns on, judging from what 
various philosophers say.  Instead the debate is about what to say about Chinese Room, whether or not 
it is possible.
Section 4. Gendler’s Diagnosis vis-á-vis  Impossible Thought Experiments
How well does Gendler’s diagnosis for failure of thought experiment fare when it comes to 
thought experiments with impossible scenarios, especially in difficult (i.e., non-obvious/non-standard) 
cases?  Here I will  show that Gendler’s account fails  to account for certain difficult  (non-obvious) 
cases.  First, let us consider Strawson’s auditory world thought experiment.  
This thought experiment is special in that it  has an impossible scenario and is non-standard. 
The two main questions Strawson tries to answer with the help of this thought experiment are: what are 
the conditions for making a distinction between oneself and states of oneself on the one hand, and what 
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is  not  oneself  and/or  a  state  of  oneself  on  the  other  [this  is  what  Strawson  calls  “non-solipsistic 
consciousness”]?; and how are these conditions fulfilled?  What motivates Strawson to construct the 
auditory world  thought  experiment  is  that  he  wants  to  explore  the  possibility of  a  non-solipsistic 
consciousness that does not rely on material bodies as basic particulars.
Before going on to criticize Gendler, I need to say a few words about why the auditory world 
thought experiment is impossible in a non-obvious/non-standard way.  It is non-standard compared to 
the other thought experiments discussed in this thesis for the following reasons:
(a) It is non-standard in terms of its formulation.  Strawson introduces it to test the thesis that space is a 
pre-requisite for objectivity.  He does not clearly state the results this thought experiment produces.  He 
uses it as a test case to put pressure on our ordinary conceptual scheme regarding objectivity and keeps 
it on the sideline to remind us about how much we take for granted in our ordinary conceptual scheme.
(b)  It  is  also  non-standard  in  that  the  author  himself  expresses  doubt  as  to  whether  the  thought 
experiment is completable.  
Gendler would have to dismiss Strawson’s auditory world and deem it not useful, on the count 
of unimaginability.  Since the auditory world is a conceptually impossible scenario, it is unimaginable. 
However, although Strawson himself admits that the auditory world is not fully imaginable, he still 
finds the thought experiment useful in testing the thesis that space is a prerequisite for objectivity. 
Strawson admits that it might be better to abandon the auditory world because it is not clear how the 
conditions for the distinction between what is oneself and what is not oneself, in the auditory world, are 
to be fulfilled.  In his words: “…the fantasy, besides being tedious, would be difficult to elaborate.  For 
it is too little clear exactly what general features we should reproduce, and why.  It might be better at 
this point to abandon the auditory world…” (Strawson, 1959, p. 85).  However this thought experiment 
is still useful, not for drawing conclusions about what would happen in such-and-such a case, but as a 
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test case.  Strawson’s auditory world is a non-obvious case because it does not fall into the categories of 
a standard thought experiment in that Strawson’s intention is not to draw any direct lessons from the 
auditory world.  Rather he wants to use it as a test case for our conceptual scheme about the actual 
world.  In his own words:
…there  is  a  certain  advantage  in  keeping  before  our  minds  the  picture  of  the  purely 
auditory world, the picture of an experience very much more restricted than that which we 
in fact have.  For it may help to sharpen for us the question we are concerned with; it may 
help to give us a continuing sense of the strangeness of what we in fact do; and this sense 
of strangeness we want to keep alive in order to see that we really want to meet it and 
remove it, and do not just lose or smother it  (Strawson, 1959, p. 88).
The auditory world is  constructed as a case where bodies  are absent.   By constructing an 
auditory world Strawson raises the question, whether we could make sense of the idea of a conceptual 
scheme  which  provided  for  objective  particulars,  but  in  which  material  bodies  were  not  basic 
particulars.  Strawson claims that although some of the conditions of such a scheme could be fulfilled 
in the terms of the thought experiment, in order to satisfy them all, “we should have to reproduce, in the 
restricted  sensory terms  available,  more  and more  general  features  of  the actual  world”.   Thought 
experiments such as the auditory world, according to Strawson, are “not constructed for the purpose of 
speculation about what would really happen in certain remote contingencies.  Their object is different. 
They are models against which to test and strengthen our own reflective understanding of our own 
conceptual structure” (Strawson, 1959, p. 86).
Strawson urges the reader to keep Hero close by, on the sidelines of one's thoughts while 
thinking about the concept of an ordinary person.  For Hero is an oddity in a world of auditory flux. 
Confronting oddities in the conceptual scheme of the auditory world help us explore connections in our 
own framework.  According to Strawson the auditory world helps in the following way: Hero is a 
member of the auditory world and he is just a sound.  What we need to figure out is what conditions 
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need to be satisfied in order for Hero to be more—to be a subject of his own  experience.  Thus, the 
question is: what are the conditions requiring fulfillment for a non-solipsistic consciousness.  Or how 
are the conditions of subjective/objective experience fulfilled?  From this question we can ask the more 
general question: where do I get the idea of myself as a subject that has experiences of things that are 
other than myself?  The auditory world proves useful in so far as we can extrapolate details about our 
own conceptual scheme.  Thus the use Strawson makes of this thought experiment demonstrates the 
usefulness of a thought experiment about a scenario which is not fully imaginable.  
Gendler’s theory fails on more accounts when it comes to applicability to the auditory world 
thought experiment.  Applying Gendler’s tools, one might think that Strawson’s thought experiment 
could be open to more criticism.  According to Gendler, the powers and limits of a thought experiment 
depend on whether or not the scenario inquisition is correctly treated by the theory i.e., whether the 
experimenter  maintains  a  distinction  between theories  with  “norm-driven-exceptions”, and theories 
with  “exception-driven-norms”.   Gendler  is  occupied  with  determining  how  new  knowledge  is 
produced by a thought experiment in the context of an established theory.  So her account is formulated 
in a way that only applies to those thought experiments with an underlying theory.  This is another 
limitation on the applicability of her theory since for many thought experiments, in particular many 
involving impossible scenarios, there is no pre-existing underlying theory. 
The  first  impossible  thought  experiment  in  hand  is  Strawson’s  auditory  world  thought 
experiment.  There does not seem to be the required theory with respect to which one can decide how 
the auditory world is to be treated.  While a “theory of objectivity” may be a candidate “theory” lurking 
in Strawson’s enterprise, as Gendler might point out, I am not sure that it  serves as a theory in the 
manner that Gendler promulgates.  In other words, there is no clear cut underlying theory that would 
treat the auditory world as either a norm-driven-exception or an exception-driven-norm.  
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Theseus’s Ship is a thought experiment discussed by Gendler where a theory of identity is the 
underlying theory for which the thought experiment  is  a test  case.   We can decide in  this  thought 
experiment, according to Gendler, whether the thought experiment is powerful or not on the basis of 
how the  underlying  theory,  viz.,  the  theory of  identity in  this  case,  is  able  to  handle  the  thought 
experiment.  The case acts as a test case for an already established theory, viz., the background theory 
of identity.  
It is at least not clear what the underlying theory is in the auditory world thought experiment. 
It won't  do to  suggest,  on Gendler's behalf,   that  the underlying theory is  some implicit  theory of 
objectivity.  Unlike  with  Theseus’s  Ship,  Strawson’s  main  motivation  for  introducing  this  thought 
experiment is not to test an already established theory but to find out what this theory is in the first 
place—what the various concepts are that serve as the building blocks for the theory of objectivity and 
how they are related.   So,  the theory of  objectivity doesn’t  serve the same purpose in  Strawson’s 
enterprise as the theory of identity does in the Ship of Theseus case. 
Another  paradigmatic  example  of  such  a  thought  experiment  is  Newton’s  bucket  thought 
experiment.  This thought experiment serves as another case that shows that it is no trivial limitation 
that  Gendler’s account only applies to those thought experiments with an underlying theory.   To recap 
briefly, in this thought experiment we are to think away all the rest of the material universe except a 
bucket of water which goes through the following three distinctive stages:
(1) there is no relative motion between the bucket and water, the water surface is flat.
(2) there is relative motion between water and bucket.
(3) there is no relative motion between water and bucket; the water surface is concave.
This is the phenomenon produced by this thought experiment that needs to be explained.  The 
explanation Newton gives is the following: in case 3, but not 1, the bucket and water are rotating with 
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respect  to  absolute  space.   According  to  Brown,  absolute  space  is  not  derived from  the  thought 
experimental phenomenon, rather it is postulated to explain it (Brown, 1991, p. 40).  For our discussion 
the particular explanation itself is not important.  What is important is the fact that the explanation is 
postulated to explain rather than derived from the thought experiment.
I have already argued that the auditory world is an impossible scenario.  Arguably, Newton's 
bucket thought experiments is physically impossible.  For we are to imagine the rest of the material 
universe away.  One could then ask, where is  the bucket hanging from?  Some might retort by saying 
that there is a possible world with only a bucket hanging from a rope.  We could still argue that there 
would still be gravity etc. acting on the bucket if the water is to stay in it.  This matters because it seems 
that in many thought experiments with impossible scenarios there is no underlying theory for which 
these thought experiments serve as test cases.  Thus we cannot assess the limit  or powers of these 
thought experiments against an underlying theory, in the way that Gendler recommends.  Hence, her 
theory is particularly ill-suited for accounting for impossible-scenario thought experiments.  
The question that one could ask is : Why is having no background theory more likely the case 
with impossible-scenario thought experiments than with possible-scenario ones?  In other words, what 
is the connection between impossibility and lack of a background theory?  Impossible scenarios often 
serve  the   purpose  of  bringing  some  previously unthought/unanalyzed  concepts  or  theories  to  the 
forefront.  Hence they do not necessarily try to overthrow or question well-established theories.  This is 
not  the  case with  possible-scenario  thought  experiments.   One of  the  reasons  people  are  likely to 
employ such thought experiments is in the development  of new theories,  or as justification for the 
structure and presuppositions made by a new theory, rather than as a "test" of an existing theory.  In 
Strawson's developing an explicit account of objectivity, and Newton's justifying the presupposition of 
absolute space in his formulation of his mechanics, they are both trying to isolate factors relevant to 
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some fundamental question from potentially misleading other factors, and it is the consideration of the 
factors in isolation that makes the scenarios described impossible.
Another reason why Gendler’s account is not applicable to cases such as Strawson’s is the 
following:  One  might  think,  using  Gendler's  tools,  that  Strawson's  thought  experiment  is  open to 
criticism because he does not recognize that if it makes sense at all it must be treated as an exceptional 
case—especially one in which the norms drive interpretation of the exceptions.  We should not derive 
any lessons  about  objectivity  in  the  real  world,  as  Strawson  does,  from this  thought  experiment, 
Gendler would have to say.  On the contrary, we can make sense of objectivity in the auditory world 
only  against  the  backdrop  of  objectivity  in  the  real  world.   So,  it  seems  that  the  criticism  of 
inapplicability could be raised against Strawson.  
However,  such  a  diagnosis  would  defeat  the  very  purpose  of  this  particular  thought 
experiment.   The main purpose behind Strawson devising this thought experiment is to learn more 
about objectivity in the real world.  At the end of the chapter entitled “Sounds” Strawson says:
My real concern is with our own scheme [of the actual world], and the models of this 
chapter are not constructed for the purpose of speculation about what would really happen 
in certain remote contingencies.  Their object is different.  They are models against which 
to test and strengthen our own reflective understanding of our own conceptual structure 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 86).
We ought to remember that Individuals is an essay in descriptive metaphysics, as the subtitle 
indicates.  According to Strawson, as opposed to  revisionary metaphysics,  descriptive metaphysics is 
content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world rather than producing a better 
structure for our thought about the world.  Descriptive metaphysics aims “to lay bare the most general 
features of our conceptual structure” and thus, “it can take far less for granted than a more limited and 
partial  conceptual  inquiry” (Strawson,  1959,  p.  9).   In this  context  the  purpose of  introducing the 
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auditory world is not to consider it as an exceptional case—especially in the sense that it is a case in 
which the norms drive interpretation of the exceptions. 
For these reasons,  I think it is fair to say that Gendler’s theory cannot account for thought 
experiments that are impossible or uncompletable, yet useful/informative.  It seems to me that unlike 
scientific thought experiments (Galileo’s falling body thought experiment, for example), many thought 
experiments  (especially  the  ones  popular  in  Philosophy)  are  fraught  with  impossibility  and 
unimaginability.  A prime example is fission, not in the sense we have discussed frequently in this 
thesis but in another sense one finds in the philosophical literature on personal identity. The scenario in 
question seems to be imaginable only to a very limited extent.   Fission—that is,  if  Brainy were to 
suddenly undergo real fission, amoeba style (as opposed to brain transplant) is physically impossible. 
We can only imagine what it would be like if Brainy suddenly divided into Lefty and Righty in front of 
our eyes to a very limited extent.  Would each be half the size, for example?  There is something to be 
learned about  a  concept  like  human identity from this  sort  of  case,  but  it's  not  really imaginable. 
Unimaginability is a pervasive feature of thought experiments.  If it is, how useful is it then to include it 
as a characteristic or a criticism for thought experiments?
Since impossibility of the scenario considered makes the thought experiment unimaginable, I 
think in this  light, Gendler’s unimaginability criterion might need revising.  It would seem rash to 
dismiss a broad class of thought experiments altogether on such grounds.  I am therefore, reluctant to 
include imaginability as a formal requirement of a thought experiment, even if only to a predefined 
degree.
Under traditional accounts of thought experiments such as Sorensen's and Gendler's thought 
experiments that consider impossible scenarios are deemed either unsuccessful or unimaginable.  Thus 
one cannot learn very much from such thought experiments.  As we will see in the next section the 
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main advantages of our new semantics for counterfactual, when we apply it to thought experiments are 
that it can account for usefulness of impossible thought experiments, and that this with its continuous 
treatment  of  possible  and impossible  cases  we are  able  to  explain  why the  debates  about  thought 
experiments such as the Chinese Room look the way they do.
Section 5. Application of the New Theory:
The crucial tool my new theory of counterfactuals provides that is relevant to understanding 
thought experiments is an account of the truth conditions for counterfactuals.    Below,  with the help of 
four  crucial  thought  experiments  (viz.,  the  Ship  of  Theseus,  Searle's  Chinese  Room,  Fission,  and 
Strawson's Auditory world) I will show how this new theory helps advance the debate on such thought 
experiments, by showing us the truth conditions for such thought experiments.  The problems that the 
above thought experiments  tackle are very hard philosophical  problems.  So simply knowing what 
those truth conditions are does not mean that we will be able to determine easily whether the claims are 
true or not.  But it can help clarify what is at issue in these debates.  It can help clarify why some 
matters are relevant to the question and some are not.  
Application to Ship of Theseus
In  our  new  semantics,  we  evaluate  a  thought  experiment,  by  first  translating  the  thought 
experiment into a series of counterfactuals.  The different counterfactuals would have, in the present 
case, the following general form:
The antecedent would have the stipulations and requirements that are built into the relevant scenario. 
The consequents of each counterfactual would express the different anticipated outcomes. 
Some possible counterfactuals in the Ship of Theseus (ST) could look like the following:
● If ST, then the newly constructed ship with all of its planks replaced is the Ship of Theseus.
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● If ST, then the ship constructed with all the old planks is the Ship of Theseus.
● If ST,... then an identity preserving process results in identity creation.
This thought experiment is clearly a possible thought experiment.  As we know. the new semantics 
systematically deals with both possible and impossible counterfactuals.  So, how would this thought 
experiment be treated under this account?  The question that is relevant here is: does the new analysis 
of counterfactuals change anything with regards to the Ship of Theseus or are all the same questions 
and answers in place as before the development of the new analysis?  The answer is that since the new 
theory about counterfactuals with possible antecedents is just the same as traditional possible worlds 
accounts,  nothing  really  changes  with  regards  to  the  Ship  of  Theseus.   By thinking  of  thought 
experiments in terms of counterfactuals we can understand why the debate ought to be about these 
issues.  Because these are the issues that determine “closeness”. 
Clearly, at most one of these three counterfactuals can be correct.  Moreover, since  there are 
clearly possible worlds in which Theseus-style activities take place, the truth conditions for my theory 
and for standard Lewis-Stalnaker accounts will be the same for the three counterfactuals: it is a matter 
of whether at the nearest possible two-ship world Theseus's ship is the old plank ship, the new plank 
ship, or both.  What comes out of the discussion above that might help, though, is that some of the 
same kinds of considerations that apply in  determining which of two impossible  cases is  closer to 
actuality could be relevant to answering what to say is the case at the nearest possible two-ship world. 
The question at hand is “what should we say?”.  In determining what the nearest case in which Dave 
squares the circle is like, we must raise issues such as “what features of reality are salient and can be 
held constant?”  Similar questions arise in the present case:  is this a world where people regularly do 
what  Theseus has done?   Then perhaps ships will  have identity conditions  like (to steal  Gendler's 
examples) world wide web sites and amoeba,  and the question of a second christening won't arise. 
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Perhaps, then, the we want to say that the nearest world is one where only Theseus plays pranks of this 
sort.  But in any case, it is on decisions of this sort, it seems to me, that the question of what it will be 
appropriate to say will turn.
Application to Chinese Room
This is, possibly, an example of a computationally impossible thought experiment, as we will 
see.  The Chinese Room can be formalized as a counterfactual as follows: 
● if you consider a Chinese Room, then there is nothing in the room that understands Chinese, 
despite how it appears judging only by outside behaviour.  
By analogy, computers are similar to the Chinese Room.  Thus the conclusion Searle derives is 
that computers are not intelligent kinds of things, and specifically they do not have intentionality, and 
that their purely syntactic manipulations are bereft of the semantics that are requisite for intentionality. 
Daniel Dennett expresses concerns about the Chinese Room and calls it an “intuition pump”. 
Intuition pumps, are “not arguments, they're stories.  Instead of having a conclusion, they pump an 
intuition. They get you to say “Aha! Oh, I get it!”” (Dennett, Chapter 10: Intuition Pumps).  In "Fast 
Thinking" he expresses another concern regarding the speed at which the Chinese Room would operate. 
Although, the operator of the Chinese Room may eventually produce appropriate answers to Chinese 
questions, the speed at which it would be done makes it a slow system.  But however complex they may 
be,  slow thinkers are stupid,  not  intelligent.   In Dennett's  words:  "speed … is ‘of the essence’ for 
intelligence.  If you can't figure out the relevant portions of the changing environment fast enough to 
fend for yourself, you are not practically intelligent, however complex you are" (Dennett, 1987, p. 326). 
Thus some may hesitate  to  attribute  intelligence and understanding to  a  slow system,  such as  the 
Chinese Room, due to concerns regarding speed.  It may simply be that our intuitions regarding the 
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Chinese  Room are  unreliable,  and  thus  the  man  in  the  room,  in  implementing  the  program,  may 
understand Chinese despite intuitions to the contrary.  Or it may be that the slowness marks a crucial 
difference between the simulation in the room and what a fast computer does.  Thus, we may say that 
the man is not intelligent while the computer system as a whole is (Dennett)15.
For thought experiments such as the Chinese Room, it is not clear whether there is a subtle 
impossibility in  the scenario or  not.   For the person in  the  Chinese  Room to manipulate  Chinese 
symbols, as per the rule book, so as to appear intelligent, perhaps some laws of physics have to be 
violated.   Because intelligent systems are incredibly fast  and the Chinese Room would have to be 
equally fast in order to be a candidate for an intelligent system, or the person inside the room at least 
would have superhuman powers. Or maybe there are thousands of people and not just  one person, 
inside the Chinese Room , but then the question of how they coordinate their efforts so effectively 
remains to be answered.  So it  is really not clear what we should/would say when we sit  down to 
consider the details.
What Searle says is roughly that "in this Chinese Room scenario, we should certainly say X (i.e. 
computers don't have intentionality)".  However, what comes out of the debate about the Chinese Room 
is that it is not clear at all what would really be required in such a scenario.  If one tries to conceive 
such a scenario one will see that it's not at all clear that you would say about whether it is thinking. 
Dennett raises the crucial consideration:  "well, what would need to be in place ... the guy inside could 
not just be flipping through a book at the rate normal people do, so what do we change about him? ... 
when we make all those changes, it's not clear at all what one would say."  
Dennett's critique of the Chinese room fits what we suggest is required to turn a set of sentences 
15For the discussion on Chinese Room above,  I  have relied on Cole,  D.:  The Chinese Room Argument,  The Stanford  
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/
entries/chinese-room/>. 
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into a case.  It needs to be shown to be conceivable by filling in a few more details.  However, we need 
not fill it in entirely (because it need not even be possible).  And what Dennett argues, in effect, is that 
it is not clear that the nearest case in which we confront a Chinese Room is one where it is right to say 
"not thinking".  The crucial  question is  not whether there is  such an impossibility,  but what is the 
"nearest" situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it is impossible or not) and what we 
would say in such a case (about the intentionality of the room).  What the semantics makes clear in this 
case is why Dennett's concerns are exactly the relevant ones, and why the debate has not centred on the 
question of possibility.
Application to Fission:
Fission is arguably physically impossible.  Fission is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘counterfactual’  to 
use Gendler’s words.  We do not have to look at the world to see if such a thing happens.  Without 
looking at the world we can tell that such a case is purely fictional.  The criticism that Gendler levels at 
this thought experiment is  unsound argument.  According to Gendler, the scenario described here is 
“imaginable”, but the argument establishing the correct evaluation of the scenario is unsound.  So the 
evaluation of the scenario provided by Parfit is “fundamentally misguided”.
According to Gendler, fission does not show what Parfit takes it to show, i.e., that identity 
does not matter.  I agree with Gendler that fission does not show what Parfit takes it show.  My reasons 
are very different from Gendler's, though.  The fact that I will be the same person tomorrow is because 
me-today is connected by the right sort of psychological and causal connection to me-tomorrow, as 
Parfit  would  say  drawing  from  fission.   This  conclusion  is  unwarranted  according  to  Gendler. 
According to Gendler, fission is a process in which the same process that is identity preserving (in the 
single-transfer  case)  ends  up  being  entity  creating  (in  the  double-transfer  case),  which  raises  the 
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following  puzzle—how  can  the  rationality  of  our  attitude  towards  one’s  continuer  be  different 
depending on the outcome?  In other words, how could we react differently towards the outcome , 
depending on whether it is a single-transfer case or double-transfer case?  “Presumably one’s attitude 
towards one’s continuer would—rationally—be the same in both the single-transfer and the double-
transfer case.  And with this much, I said I agree” (Gendler, 2000, p. 146).  Gendler allows for the first 
step of fission i.e., the single-transfer case to go through. It is the double-transfer case that  Gendler 
calls into question..
What role does the new semantics play in the fission case?  The new account helps make 
clearer what is at issue in the debate; and, in particular, this clearer picture prevents one from being led 
astray as was Gendler,  who is  led by her own theory to  mis-diagnose what is  wrong with Parfit's 
account.  According to Gendler, fission is exceptional and it ought to be treated as an instance where 
norms drive the exceptions, rather than an instance where exceptions drive the norms (as Parfit does 
according to Gendler).  However, what needs to be sorted out even before we decide whether the first 
step of fission (i.e., the single-transfer case) goes through is:  what are the relevant issues?  Gendler's 
account leads her to focus on the wrong sorts of considerations. That is whether fission is to be treated 
as a case of norm-driven exception or exception-driven norms. The new account leads us to focus on 
the right sorts of matters.  According to Gendler, Parfit is misdirected because he considered fission as 
a case where exceptions drive the interpretation of the norms.  Parfit  tells  us 'identity' is not what 
matters and this is what we learn from the double-transfer case.  According to Gendler, what we ought 
to say about fission is that it is obviously an exceptional case and it is o be treated as a case in which 
norms drive the interpretation of exceptions.  The important question, as we will see, is not whether 
fission  is  an  exceptional  case  or  not  and  whether  we  treat  it  as  a  case  where  norms  drive  the 
interpretation of exceptions.  As we will see, why issues such as whether the lack of ability to survive a 
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stroke post-fission  means  Brainy and Lefty are  two distinct  people,  are  the  relevant  issues  in  this 
context.  This will help us figure out why fission does not show what Parfit takes it to show and why 
Gendler's  verdict  is  misguided.   Although  fission  is  impossible  (at  least  physically),  but,  it  is 
conceivable.  The counterfactuals corresponding to the fission thought experiment might look like the 
following:
● If a single-transfer scenario occurred, in which the brain of one of the triplets…(P), then Brainy 
would be identical with Lefty (Q).
●  If a double-transfer scenario occurred…(P2), then Brainy would not be identical to Righty and 
Lefty (Q2). 
How does the semantics help us in this context?  What determines whether P ⃞ à Q is true is 
whether there is a PQ world closer than any P ¬ Q world?  Closeness involves scrutiny of what, at a, is 
involved with the sorts of changes required to make a P-world.  But that means that factors like what 
determines identity in the case of brain trauma are relevant.  And arguably, some properties that Brainy 
has that Lefty does not (after the operation) are relevant.  For instance, Brainy could have a peculiar 
stroke that shuts down important functions on the left half of his brain without serious disability, Lefty 
not.  Grounds such as these seem to be the relevant ones in considering whether or not there is a PQ 
world closer to actuality than is any P and  ¬Q world.  And the semantics explain why they are the 
relevant ones.
What  considerations  of  that  sort  suggest  is  that   the  first  counterfactual  is  indeterminate 
because there are no P cases in which Q or ¬Q is true.  Notice, that Brainy is very special because he 
has a very unusual brain, in that it  is replicated in each lobe etc.  And after the accident, after the 
transplant takes place, for Brainy to be identical to Lefty, if identity includes such things as effects of 
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particular sorts of stroke, the whole of Brainy’s brain needs to be transplanted into Lefty’s.  But because 
only half of Brainy’s brain is transplanted, we cannot call him identical to Lefty.  So even the first step 
of the fission argument (that Brainy is identical to Lefty) cannot go through, if this argument is cogent, 
and the semantics makes clear why.  This is what Gendler’s account misses.  She does let the first step 
of the argument go through.  
Application to Auditory World 
Arguably,  the auditory world is  physically and conceptually impossible.   We established in 
Chapter  IV  that  it  is  unimaginable.   It  is,  however,  conceivable.   If  we  level  the  criticism  of 
unimaginability,  (in  Gendler's  spirit)  the  auditory world  enterprise  collapses  before getting  off  the 
ground. In the present setting, though, we merely translate the thought experiment into a suitable set of 
counterfactuals, and the unimaginability and impossibility of the scenario merely makes the antecedent 
impossible.  So some of the counterfactuals may look like the following:
● If there is a completely auditory and non-spatial world inhabited by  Hero, who is such…(P), 
then for non-solipsistic consciousness Hero would need an analogue of space (Q).
●  If there is a  completely auditory and non-spatial world with Hero, who is such…(P2), then the 
least we need  suffice for Hero to make sense of objective particulars is M-sound (Q2).
And so on and so forth.  
What Strawson argues is that there is a P and Q case that is closer to actuality than is any P and 
not-Q case.  We see this in his argument when he says, for example, that there must be an analogue of 
space, for Hero to be able to distinguish between himself and things other than himself.  Since Hero 
lives in an auditory world populated only by sound particulars, without an analogue of space i.e., M-
sound, which form the background against which Hero compares different sound experiences, Hero 
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could not tell one sound apart from another.
What Strawson needs to show, to establish his conclusions, is that these counterfactuals are 
true.  And, as we now know, this amounts to showing that in the nearest case in which the antecedent is 
true (there is a non-spatial sound world that includes an agent Hero ... and Hero can make sense of 
objective particulars), the conclusion (there is an analogue of space, e.g., M-sound) is true also.  In 
order to make a persuasive case that he is right, all Strawson needs to show is that M-sound world is 
close enough to the actual world.  However, what Strawson does, as we have seen, is that he tries to 
sketch a complete picture of such a world.  When he realizes that it is not possible to completely and 
coherently describe such a  world,  he abandons the  auditory world.   What  we learn from the new 
analysis is that Strawson argues in a way that he didn't need to.  He thought, for the auditory world 
enterprise to be carried out, it had to be carried out in its complete and coherent form.  All that needed 
to be done was that to show that such a world is the “closest” to the actual world.  
Thus  we  can  evaluate  our  original  thought  experiment,  despite  its  being  unimaginable. 
Philosophically this thought experiment is useful and informative, at least in so far as it helps us figure 
out objectivity.  So, we cannot dismiss it, as we would have to if we adopt Gendler’s account.  It is an 
‘exceptional case’ to adopt Gendler’s terminology.   
Using the new semantics one can say Strawson, in this thought experiment, tries to establish 
the nearest case where space is not a prerequisite for objectivity.  In a non-spatial case that is closest to 
the the actual world, what would we need to retain in order to preserve objectivity?  This is what 
Strawson tries to find out with the help of this thought experiment.  Thus our new semantics nicely 




I hope that the discussion in this chapter makes clear that the theory of counterfactuals that has 
been the main topic in this thesis has potential for real philosophical payoff.  I don't pretend to have 
used the new tools I have developed to solve the problems I discuss, nor even to have made significant 
progress on them. Instead, what I hope to have done is made plausible the claim that use of this new 
tool  could  lead  to  such  progress.   One  example  of  the  kinds  of  uses  a  clear  understanding  of 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents will have in getting a clear understanding in these other 
areas is that in case of impossible case scenario thought experiments it allows for a nice representation 
of  what  is  at  issue  in  the  philosophical  debates.   The  new  semantics  provide  some  guidance  to 
philosophers about what needs to be shown to make a compelling case.  And in the fission case, it helps 
us figure out that though it may initially seem fission is fully and coherently describable, it is not the 
case.  However, this is not why fission fails to show what it is taken to show.  For there to be a case 
where either the consequent or the negation of the consequent is true, we need to talk about identity in 
the ordinary sense of the term.  For identity-continuation conditions to be fulfilled, in fission-like cases, 
we need an ordinary case of brain transplantation, where all of Brainy's brain is transplanted into Lefty's 
body.  To make a compelling case for identity, ordinary conditions for identity ought to be fulfilled. 
In the auditory world and the Chinese Room examples, looking at the thought experiments 
through the lens of our new semantics helps us figure out  why consistency is not what is important for 
a thought experiment  to be informative.   In the auditory world example,  with the help  of the new 
semantics we are able to see that what Strawson in fact tries to do is to figure out what is the nearest 
case in which we are able to preserve objectivity without space.  This captures the main motivation of 
the  thought  experiment,  which  the  other  accounts  miss.   In  the  Chinese  room example,  our  new 
semantics helps us see why the debate surrounding this thought experiment looks the way it does.  It is 
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not the possibility or impossibility of the scenario that is important.  What is important what the nearest 
Chinese Room is like, whether possible or not—it is from that case that we learn from the thought 
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